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
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
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will enable us to cope with our declining options, so as to stop the "downward slide to war" as Raymond Aron has termed the present movement in the Western position, must therefore derive from an understanding of the synergism characterizing the interaction of the disparate parts.

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COMPARATIVE POWER PROJECTIONAL CAPABILITIES:
the Soviet Union and the United States, 1980-85

W. Scott Thompson, Principal Investigator,
with the assistance of Andrew Walworth

COMPARATIVE POWER PROJECTIONAL CAPABILITIES:
the Soviet Union and the United States, 1980-85

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PART I

Executive Summary

Executive Summary

Great changes have taken place recently in the relative ability of the Soviet Union and the United States to project power in the world. While in terms of strictly projectional force, measured abstractly, the United States remains greatly superior, it is no longer perceived to be the stronger power in many pertinent circles. Such a perception is tied to the shift in the strategic balance as well as to what such observers as Raymond Aron have called the decline in American will. More importantly, the venue of potential conflict, with the important exception of the Caribbean basin, has shifted decisively to the Soviet periphery, where Moscow's power can now clearly be considered decisive. As the conviction spread in America that we would never again use force to affect the outcome of third world struggles (a conviction followed by shifts in procurement patterns), the Soviet Union and its proxies were able to organize a series of technically brilliant interventions to establish and consolidate the position of friends and allies throughout the third world.

The third world's centrality to world politics was increasing throughout that period and will continue to increase during the 1980s, precisely because instability will increase there. Despite - and to an extent because of - progress toward peace in one part of the Middle East, the chances of conflict are increasing elsewhere around the Persian Gulf oil fields. United States strategic planning in the 1970s was, however, marked by a great contradiction. While the venue for conflict was shifting to the third world, and more specifically the Persian Gulf, the

U.S. increasingly emphasized the European front in part as reaction to the failed effort in Vietnam. This was despite the increasing stability on that front during the period following the Helsinki accord. As a result American power projectional capabilities were increasingly unable to match many vital potential missions. Today, though naval forces have been moved to the Indian Ocean, it is at the expense of the stability of other theatres. Nor do forces exist for coping with additional contingencies easily envisaged for other third world areas.

It is argued herein that the stability of the third world is inextricably linked to the defense of Europe. Further, it is argued that by conceptualizing theatres and events as a hierarchical ladder, the U.S. invites Soviet adventurism on the lower rungs. Recent Soviet advances are examined in light of Soviet doctrine and strategy. It is clear that Europe remains the prize, but one to be won intact, through a global Schlieffen plan that will lead to the isolation of Europe through the denial of the resources of Africa and the Middle East to the West.

The world is ultimately one strategic theatre. Even the land and sea threats can not be divided conceptually at the level of strategy. Postwar trends have been towards "interdependence", but the linkages of trade and the movements of ideas and people that were supposed to be the guarantors of peace have had a negative effect as well. Marginal events are telescoped into potential superpower confrontations. The instability of one state or region spills more readily into another, while resource competition, over oil or phosphates, increased armaments, the growth of terrorism, and ethnic, traditional, and regional conflicts continue to provide opportunities for the Soviet Union and its surrogates. It is demonstrated herein that even Islam, surprisingly, provides a fertile base for Marxist alliances and continued hostility to

the West, given its aversion to western values, susceptibility to radicalism, and idealism. The point is that most trends, and a number of strategic and geographic asymmetries, are vastly more favorable to the Soviets. Thus within a 2,000 mile radius of Soviet or Soviet-controlled territory, Moscow can now deploy, in power projection mode, a superior force in less time than can the U.S., thanks to the buildup of the An-22 fleet and the logistical experience of recent interventions. Soviet sealift capabilities are now superior to America's, for example. U.S. planning must adjust accordingly, especially when the cumulative effects of all factors are weighed.

How much further can these trends continue before some sort of critical mass is achieved, whereby a qualitative change in the character of the international system has occurred? Different scenarios are projected for the next five years, and it is found that a simple straight-lining of trends of the past five years, starting with the fall of Vietnam, presents the West with a severely weakened geopolitical position. The type of options available to us, if another group of such states as Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and South Yemen become working members of Soviet alliance systems (as those have done since 1975), and if still more become correspondingly closer to Moscow politically, are increasingly narrow, when examined in both strict military and political terms.

The fragility of individual regimes on which the U.S. depends for a presence in critical theatres of the third world - for example the Philippines - is examined in case studies; little reason for optimism is found. Rather, broad trends are discerned working against the gradual establishment of coherence and stability in the third world, most particularly in arenas pertinent to our interest.

The worsening outlook for oil supplies to the West and to the third world is examined as a conditioning variable of international stability. In an annex to this study, it is shown that oil supplies have become more than a purely economic question: they have become a prime geopolitical question.

The conclusions of this study have deep implications for the formulation of an American 'grand strategy', the lack of which has been one major contributor to our present weakened condition. It is clear that the NATO alliance, designed for the milieu of the 1950s with its geographic restrictions, is ill-equipped to deal with contingencies in the Persian Gulf and the Third World in general. More intense cooperation with certain NATO allies, preeminently France, whose naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean are well known, and whose cooperation with the U.S. has had a good start in the Indian Ocean, will require new policies if such cooperation is to withstand the stress of crises ahead. The 'swing-strategy' from Asia must be discarded, as its execution would leave important U.S. allies in Asia in untenable positions. A redistribution of naval risks, given the stretching of the Navy's role in recent years, is a high priority. For the expensive 'front-money' of deployed U.S. power in the Indian Ocean is a necessary price to convince local powers of U.S. credibility and staying-power; yet there is considerable opportunity-cost to this move. Ultimately local bases adequate for the protection of the Gulf oil fields may be available but only if such a transitional period and transitional costs are endured and paid.

It is also clear that piece-meal changes in current U.S. strategic planning will not suffice. What is suggested by this study, and remains its most cogent point, is that seemingly disparate events in different theatres bear on each other, and their effects are cumulative.

The strategy suggested by this paper is based on this assumption. Any strategy that will enable us to cope with our declining options, so as to stop the "downward slide to war", as Raymond Aron has termed the present movement in the Western position, must therefore derive from an understanding of the synergism characterizing the interaction of the disparate parts.

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26 February 1981

INTRODUCTION

I

Power Projection, International Perceptions and World

Politics - "The Soviet Union has overtaken the United States in its ability to project power into vital areas of the third world, while the United States has maintained its superiority in strategic systems, or at least maintained parity with the Soviet Union," so spoke the distinguished European expert on international relations, Richard Lowenthal, at Harvard University in April, 1980.¹ The judgment, as stated, is of course untrue and might well be stated as the converse, which is to say that American power projectional capability at least in the abstract remains superior to that of the Soviet Union, while in the strategic realm Moscow has most assuredly forged ahead of the United States overall. How could a renowned expert come to so apparently misinformed a conclusion? While conceding that he was no defense authority, he insisted that such were his perceptions; more pertinently, he implied that such were the perceptions in Europe more generally.

Confidence in the influence and capability of the West ebbed rapidly in the spring of 1980. By June, Raymond Aron, perhaps the foremost student of world politics, could say that by then, to Europeans there was "only one superpower".² Much corroborative evidence exists to sustain his point as to European perceptions, even if in real terms of military capability, the U.S. surely still possessed superpower status.

To be sure, there is good reason why Europeans might so perceive the balance, and on this hangs a tale - and, in an important way, the present study. During the past five years, America has suffered what looks, to foreign eyes, even sympathetic ones, as defeat after defeat in what has become, for all practical purposes, the arena of power projection, namely the third world. America's great military might was seen as irrelevant to the Vietnamese conflict, even though it can well be argued - as Sir Robert Thompson has done so persuasively - that the U.S. in fact won the war it set out to fight in Vietnam.³ But we failed to see it through, and in 1975 we sent in the rescue helicopters. Shortly thereafter, emboldened and Soviet-aided communists in Portugal and in Angola organized to take over their respective territories, those in the former providing critical assistance to the latter, as the rest of the world stood by. When Western allied forces came close to winning in the fall of 1975 in Angola, Cuban forces intervened for the first time in large enough numbers to turn the tide of battle. Momentum therefrom was sufficient to cause Mozambique's Chinese-admiring leadership, inter alia, to switch sides.⁴

Thenceforth comes what Stanley Hoffmann, among others, refers to as the "litany":⁵ Soviet and Cuban assistance to Ethiopia settled a battle in Africa's Horn, one where what popular sentiment there was plainly lay on the side of the Somali people.⁶ A few months later the Soviets appeared to be very much involved in coups in both Yemens resulting in the death of leaders leaning, relatively, in a Western direction.⁷ Later in the same year came Hanoi's conquest of

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Cambodia. After another year came the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan concluding, at the end of the seventies, a half decade of solid advances for the Soviet Union and her allies, with sobering defeats and retreats for the United States and, to a lesser extent, her allies. Throughout this period, the Soviets steadily improved their ability to project power through the acquisition of allies and naval facilities and the development of new air transport, personnel carriers, and assorted materiel.

The strategic level is less graphic to the layman than 'power projection' or conventional balances. It is more abstract, and involves forces so potent that even to most academic international relations experts, the notion that superiority may be meaningful is difficult to grasp, (though when the West was plainly superior, the advantages accruing were appreciated). But during this same period when Soviet capabilities overtook American ones on most indices of comparison,⁸ there was no world war, no Cuban missile crisis in reverse, and, at least through the end of 1979, not even directly threatening statements by Moscow.⁹ Statements from the White House and from civilian levels of the services asserting that American strength remained high, indeed that America remained the foremost military power on earth (and, in the words of the president, would always remain so)¹⁰, were for a time highly reassuring to Europeans, who generally wished to believe that trouble wasn't brewing. Whether the balance remained favorable or not, the important concept, so often missed, remained rather that strategic forces are the backdrop against which one projects national power, the indispensable fulcrum from which all other dimensions of power derive.

There is a final reason for the misperception with which we opened this study. After many years of relative deterioration in the European balance and in the political coherence within NATO itself, by mid-decade the Western alliance had begun to work together with a new purpose and determination. This was greatly reinforced when a new American administration came to power which for varied reasons put the invigoration of NATO at the top of its defense priority list. Though the balance was not to be righted, it was at least to improve in our favor. Europeans were surely right to see a happier picture, in relative terms, than elsewhere, as far as conventional forces are concerned.

The central thrust of this examination of current international politics is that national priorities, in terms of the realities impinging on Western interests throughout the globe, have been topsy-turvy. The threat to Europe, as we shall see, is through a gigantic Schlieffen plan,¹¹ a great flanking operation moving through the third world, from Afghanistan down through the Middle East and Africa, where the American ability to act is becoming increasingly deficient. And the endemic - and increasing - instability in that part of the world, which is carefully examined in this study, ensures that crises harmful and threatening to Western interests will increase, not decrease.

Moreover, there already is a momentum to "the other side",¹² something not necessarily controlled monolithically or even always dominated by Moscow, but something in all its manifestations deleterious to Western interests, whether Hanoi's forces threatening Thailand, Angola's threatening Zaire's Shaba province, terrorists trained in the Soviet Union and operating in all the globe's corners, or even non-Marxist but radical forces hostile to the West which choose to cross-

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ruff with Moscow in advancing their mutual interests. We will in due course take a careful look at what the world will look like, politically and militarily, after another five years of events roughly similar to those through which we have recently passed.

In order to comprehend more clearly how this extraordinary succession of Soviet interventions in the third world became possible, we can identify four trends which converged during the 1970s.

1) The Soviet attainment of nuclear parity - From 1945 until the early 1970s the U.S. enjoyed meaningful superiority over the USSR in strategic nuclear weapons, while Moscow possessed definite superiority in conventional forces. Each side's clear advantage in one category blunted the superiority of the other side in the opposite category. Indeed, following World War II nuclear superiority became essential to the U.S. if it was to maintain overall military parity; conversely, conventional superiority was a necessity for the USSR if it was to maintain any kind of overall balance vis-a-vis U.S. military strength.

Until the early 1970s, America's nuclear superiority played an important deterrent role in countering the Soviet conventional advantage and in discouraging the Kremlin from challenging American interests in the third world. During European crises and local conflicts, such as the October War, Washington could deter Soviet action by the ever-implicit threat of escalation to the nuclear level. This threat to escalate was credible, at least until the early seventies, in that it did not open the door to certain mutual holocaust in the event that an exchange actually occurred. The U.S. had the capability to launch selected nuclear strikes against Soviet con-

ventional and nuclear assets in a manner that would have partially disarmed the USSR and blunted the effect of any all-out retaliatory strike. Though Moscow would have retained enough residual forces to damage U.S. interests seriously, any calculation of the ultimate outcome undoubtedly convinced the Kremlin that it could not risk escalation.

Beginning in the late 1960s, the American capability to deter Soviet military efforts in the third world by the implicit or explicit threat of escalation to the nuclear level began to weaken as a consequence of the USSR's massive buildup of its sea-based nuclear forces, the several-fold expansion of its ICBM forces, and the superhardening of its missile silos. Long before the U.S. Minuteman force became vulnerable to a Soviet first strike, Soviet SLBM and ICBM invulnerability radically altered the nuclear equation and hence the overall balance. The Kremlin's achievement of strategic parity rendered American threats of escalation incredible and therefore gave Moscow an unprecedented margin of safety for exploiting its conventional strengths and its ties with revolutionary regimes and parties in the third world.

The invulnerability of the Soviet strategic forces in effect gave the USSR a protective umbrella that made possible a much more openly offensive approach toward conflict and revolution in the third world. By itself alone, the Soviet achievement of nuclear parity would have not sufficed to make possible the Kremlin's activist foreign policy in the 1970s, but it was coupled with other equally significant developments.

2) Soviet advances in mobility or interventionary forces -

Thomas Wolfe notes that the Soviet drive to achieve "global politico-military maneuverability" began in the early sixties:

"Only gradually toward the end of the Khrushchev decade did it also come to be recognized that there was a need for more mobile and versatile forces, either for asserting a Soviet presence in the distant areas of political contention or for possible use in local conflict situations..."¹³

Moscow refined and expanded its military assistance program, reactivated the naval infantry (Marines), developed instruments for the amphibious landing of combat troops, and greatly improved and enlarged its airborne assault forces. From 1965 to 1975 the deadweight tonnage of the Soviet maritime fleet doubled, and Soviet air transport capacity more than doubled. A massive program of naval construction enabled Russia to establish a permanent presence in the Mediterranean and the Indian oceans for the first time in history; Soviet warships paid hundred of visits to third world ports, and the Soviet fleet began to play a significant diplomatic role in local crises and conflicts.

A global diplomacy cannot be conducted without the requisite military capabilities to support and sustain distant initiatives. Though the Soviet Union might rightfully have been considered a superpower after World War II, it did not become a truly global power until the 1970s, when its investments in mobility forces began to yield significant fruit. Russia was no longer a purely landbased power with its military influence confined largely to contiguous regions. Without the development of this global military reach, the massive Soviet interventions in the Middle East, Angola, and the Horn of Africa would have been impossible.

3) The post-Vietnam isolationism of the U.S. - Russia's historical tradition of prudence and caution makes it doubtful that the USSR's advancing military capabilities alone would have sufficed to embolden the Kremlin to undertake the massive military interventions of the seventies. Moscow's growing military power only made feasible what was first made possible by the drift and uncertainty of American diplomacy. Postwar history suggests that the Politburo is finely attuned to the shifts and nuances of American foreign policy and to the great risks associated with arousing the U.S. to the point of military conflict. It was natural, therefore, that Moscow respond to the opportunity opened to it by Washington's troubles following Vietnam.

The Columbian novelist Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a confidant of Fidel Castro, claims that prior to making a major commitment of troops to Angola the Cuban cabinet made a "rapid analysis" of whether the U.S. would intervene openly. They concluded that the fall of Saigon, as well as the weakening of the Presidency in the Watergate affair, made a major intervention by Washington unthinkable.¹⁴ The Kremlin no doubt made a similar assessment and concluded that the risk of a large American commitment was small. The Cuban assessment was vindicated when the Senate voted 54-22 on December 19, 1975, to cut off all American aid to Angolan nationalist groups. It is very doubtful the Soviets would have dared undertake the intervention - violating as it did so many of the unwritten rules of Soviet-American relations - without a high degree of confidence that it could be carried out without external impediment.

America's quasi-isolationism persisted throughout the decade and was probably the principal reason the Soviet leadership so readily abandoned its traditional prudence with respect to the use of military instruments. As Adam Ulam observes, "...no Soviet move or ruse has undercut the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy as much as what the Americans have done to themselves in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate."¹⁵ By the time of the Ogaden War, the trend of American diplomacy had become so clear that Moscow could no longer have had any doubt that the U.S. would not respond with even a passive display of force - it was the first time in postwar history that the Soviet Union undertook a major military operation outside Eastern Europe without one of the Western powers becoming involved militarily.

4) The growing confidence of the Soviet leadership - In the U.S. it has become customary to speak of the "Lessons of Vietnam." It is often forgotten that the Soviet leadership also learned lessons from the conflict - not about the limitations of military power, but about its manifest political utility. They learned that military power can be used to sustain a client regime and that involvement in a local conflict can yield significant and lasting political benefits. Soviet theorists identified the fall of Saigon and the MPLA victory in Angola as crucial turning points in international relations.

The Soviets were convinced that the U.S. plunge into isolationism was brought about by their own military and diplomatic achievements - an assumption that was at least partly correct. As

the 1970s progressed, Soviet leaders and spokesmen repeatedly stressed that the overall balance of forces in the world was shifting in favor of the socialist bloc, that a "fundamental restructuring" of international relations was underway. Regarding Soviet advances in the third world during the decade, A. Iskenderov in December 1978 wrote the following:

"But one thing is indisputable: on the whole the national liberation movement is on the ascent...

This is confirmed by the historic victories of the heroic Vietnamese people, the emergence in the course of revolutionary struggle of progressive states like Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and the Cape Verde Islands, the successful course of the revolution in Ethiopia, the revolution in Afghanistan and other revolutionary changes in Asia and Africa...¹⁶

Boris Ponomarev of the Central Committee Secretariat observed in January 1980 that the past decade had been marked by the continuing unfolding and deepening of the national liberation process and by the erosion of capitalist strength. To Iskenderov's list of successes he added the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the Iranian revolution, and the rising revolutionary ferment in Latin America. Echoing Gromyko's words on an earlier occasion, Ponomarev declared that the strength of the socialist community had reached such proportions that no serious international problem would or could be resolved without its cooperation.¹⁷ In short, the USSR claimed its full rights as a global power.

In evaluating the seriousness of the Soviet challenge in the third world, particular significance must be attached to the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979. The import of that event is underscored by an anecdote Chiang Kai-shek tells about a visit to Lenin in the early twenties. Sun Yat-sen had sent Chiang to Moscow to seek Soviet backing for the Kuomintang's struggle for power in China. Lenin readily agreed to supply the Nationalists with ammunition, arms, provisions, instructors, and advisors, but he laid down a firm caveat: absolutely no Russian soldiers would engage in combat. Lenin explained that, following the Red Army's disastrous losses in the Polish campaign of 1920, he had issued a new directive regarding the future policy of world revolution. It ruled that Soviet Russia should render the utmost material and moral support to wars of national liberation, but "should never again employ Soviet troops in direct participation."¹⁸ Though Soviet pilots did fly combat missions in the War of Attrition and though Soviet advisors engaged in a broad variety of combat support, the remarkable truth is that for nearly six decades following the Red Army's debacle on the Vistula in 1920, regular Soviet military units did not once initiate military combat outside the Soviet bloc. When Moscow intervened in the third world, it did so with arms shipments, advisors, and proxies, never with Soviet troops. The invasion of Afghanistan was an historically significant threshold. It may conceivably mean the dawn of a new age in Soviet foreign policy, one characterized by the ebbing of Russia's traditional restraint with respect to the use of its own army abroad.

II

The Revolution in International Politics - In 449 A.D. Roman emissaries from Theodosius II to Attila the Hun plotted to dispatch the great "barbarian" leader. Discovering their treachery, Attila nonetheless spared his guests, because they had diplomatic immunity.¹⁹ A millenium and a half later, we find that the concept of diplomatic immunity after wearing well for so long is on a distinct decline. The extraordinary character of the Iranian seizure of 53 American diplomatic hostages lies in what it symbolizes for the alteration of the nature of the international system. The world economic system is hostage to a cartel for the first time in history, which with equal lack of precedent increases sprices even retroactively, while distinguished oil experts like Walter Levy foresee only the most baleful consequences.²⁰ Using the technical developments of today a superpower can stimulate terrorism and revolution abroad on a scale never dreamed possible by moguls of yesterday, while hiding behind fronts of growing apparent respectability.²¹ Even the recent developments in the media bring revolution. Just in the past two years the amount of television coverage of international events in the United States on the major news programs has doubled, owing to the new capabilities of being at the front, following the news in real time.²² The implications of such reportage for a democracy are enormous - but chilling when one considers the asymmetrical effect, since the same does not occur among totalitarian adversaries or only occurs with self-serving selectivity.

The world system is undergoing genuine revolution, but hardly of a helpful character. The fact is that the rules that had been so carefully constructed over the centuries are being routinely broken. International order is, in fact, disintegrating at a more rapid pace than in some respects it did during two world wars: for those were fought at least on one side to reconstruct and thence sustain order, while today it is hardly possible to envisage any war that would have such a mission; certainly no other developments presage such.

In part, what the world is passing through is simply the downward curve of the fourth fifty-year "Kondratieff cycle". The Russian economist's projection of fifty years ago, based on upward curves derived from technological innovation and downward curves after the creative thrust is lost but before a new economic, social and political order is legitimized, would show for the 1980's precisely the sort of terrorism, revolution, and general unsettleness that we are now witnessing. But there is a rub. For today the process is being exacerbated in a way Kondratieff could not have foreseen - ironically by the Soviet Union's enhanced ability to erode the stability of the world system.²³

Nor are there other avenues for improving world order. The United Nations has lost almost all utility as a peace-keeping organization except for marginal areas, or for conducting operations which come within the limited acceptance of both superpowers.

As we see in a later chapter, the military capability of a host of third world states has given these a new ability to stand up to regional or even great powers, making them far less susceptible to

persuasion. Tanzania can occupy a neighboring country - Uganda; Vietnam can occupy the Khmer Republic, and there is nothing the 'international community' can do about it, precisely because there no longer is an 'international community' in any meaningful sense, if there ever were.

III

Military Power-Political Influence - Political scientists have long been troubled by the absence of a suitable parallel in their discipline to the Market in the field of Economics. The study of world politics during the past generation is a battlefield littered with the corpses of conceptual schemes tried and found wanting. Yet there is a simple organizing and ordering device of which we periodically need reminding, namely, power, and an understanding of Realpolitik - "the enduring condition of international politics," as Colin Gray has put it.²⁴

Adam Smith, in organizing the field of economics, found the principle of the "Invisible Hand," wherein everyone in pursuing his own narrow advantage was led, as it were by an invisible hand, to achieve the good of all. Economics is almost always a non-zero sum game, while world politics, alas, given the limited amount of power over men's lives available for distribution, is too often a zero-sum game; in questions of territory and political leadership it always is. In world politics there is something just as pervasive as the "Invisible Hand", and just as value-neutral, though it does not necessarily (and in practice does not usually) bring about the good of all. The "world political hand" is firstly the instinctive sense which individuals and nations have of political trends: where power is coming

ments elsewhere, perhaps not.

How rapidly states adapt to the new realities is of course a function on the one hand of internal forces seeking a realignment of the domestic balance, and the other hand of the salience of external pressures. Luckily for the United States, there are usually considerable lags before many states and people get the full message. Conflict occurs precisely where the external realities change greatly and states are recalcitrant to adapt to them. And here we come back to the analogy with economics. As Clausewitz wrote, "The decision by arms is for all operations in war, great and small, what cash settlement is in trade."²⁵ As Professor Rothfels adds, "When the German socialist Engels read this sentence, it struck him as particularly suggestive. Even though cash settlement and battle may rarely occur, everything is directed toward them. If they occur they decide everything."²⁶

Lags are lucky. Although there may everywhere be an image of American in decline, it is not an even perception, and the full measure of its possible strategic implications is grasped in very few places indeed. How to reverse the perception? To be sure, the best way of doing so is to reverse the decline at every level. But in practice choices are necessary. The first requirement for the short-term is for courageous and plucky action in crises, going in the nature of things beyond what prudence in terms of given force levels might normally permit. Being willing and able to stand by friends in need, the world now sees, is vital indeed; no phrase is more often cited with respect to the purported American decline than its failures on this index.²⁷ As an editorial in the British magazine The Spectator recently put it, "The rest of the world, but most especially western Europe, is coming

face to face with a new reality: that the United States can no longer be relied upon as an ally. Perhaps her reliability has been an illusion for some time, perhaps ever since the end of the second World War."²⁸

The second requirement is more pertinent to this study. Repairing those forces that combine both visibility and peace maintenance functions is the first requirement of the force levels-quick fixes. A navy that is adequately staffed and served for those purposes fills this double function, quite apart from its role in crises and war. "Presence" is often derided as a naval function and rightly so when it is decoupled from war-fighting capabilities. But, in looking at the capacity of a great naval force to help sustain stability in a given region, precisely because of its known firepower, we see how important this function is. And because naval power is visible it alerts friend and foe to our sustained power.

To recapitulate, the 1970s were years of turmoil and upheaval in the third world, and both superpowers were deeply entangled in the vortex. A pattern unfolded as the decade progressed: the USSR became increasingly bold and confident in its support of third world belligerents and revolutionaries, while the U.S. lapsed into a troubled period of isolationism and drift in its foreign policy. The traditional restraints on Soviet military activity abroad eroded considerably - what Moscow achieved in the third world during the seventies would have been unthinkable during the sixties, and even the attempt to achieve it might have led to war.

Because the decade is thought of as a period of detente, the magnitude of the Soviet effort in the third world is often overlooked. But consider once again: from 1973 to 1980 the Soviet Union intervened

in eight regional conflicts, without once suffering military defeat. In October 1973 massive Soviet arms deliveries sustained the Arab side in the third Middle East war, and eighteen months later Soviet weapons enabled North Vietnam to capture Saigon and assume power in the South. In November 1975 Lisbon withdrew from Angola and the ensuing civil war saw large-scale Russian arms shipments and thousands of Cuban troops bring the Marxist-Leninist MPLA to power. In the winter of 1977-78 Soviet weapons and Cuban troops were instrumental in repelling a Somali invasion of the Ogaden in a war that transformed Ethiopia into a virtual Soviet ally. During the following fifteen months, Russian arms supported a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, defended Hanoi against China's subsequent punitive attack, and made possible the PDRY's brief intrusion into Yemen-Sana. Finally, beginning in mid-1978 the Kremlin sent thousands of military advisors and arms to shore up the beleaguered pro-Soviet regime in Kabul against widespread insurgency; the decade closed with eighty thousand airborne and ground troops invading Afghanistan from the USSR.

Never before in such a short period had the Kremlin intervened in so many conflicts so successfully. Moscow's international behavior resulted in the dissolution of detente and propelled the problem of Soviet intervention in the third world to a high place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. During the October War and again during the Angolan crisis, Henry Kissinger warned that Soviet actions imperiled the entire U.S.-Soviet relationship and undermined the international order. Shortly after the Ogaden conflict, Dmitri Simes observed that "the new pattern of Soviet imperial gunboat diplomacy threatens to modify the rules of the international game." By 1979

Robert Legvold could write that turmoil in the third world had overwhelmed all other considerations in the Soviet-American relationship "save the growth of Soviet military power, whose menace it serves to accentuate." President Carter's State-of-the-Union address in January 1980, not long after the invasion of Afghanistan, identified "the steady growth and increased projection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders" as one of the three principal challenges facing the U.S.²⁹ The challenge is certain to remain a critical one throughout the 1980s for the third world is likely to continue as the fulcrum of the Soviet-American rivalry for many years to come.

INTRODUCTION FOOTNOTES

1. Public Lecture, John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, April 30, 1980.
2. Address to the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. June 16, 1980.
3. See "Rear Bases and Sanctuaries," Robert Komer and Sir Robert Thompson, in The Lessons of Vietnam, W. Scott Thompson and Donald D. Frizzell, Eds. (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977) p 105.
4. See W. Scott Thompson, "The Projection of Soviet Power" in Defending America (New York: Basic Books, 1977) p 29.
5. Seminar, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, October, 1979.
6. Somalia, it must be remembered, is one of the few real nation-states, not only in Africa, but in the entire third world; The Ogaden, over which the war was fought, is peopled by Somalis and is in many ways the ethnic heartland of the Somali people.
7. Nimrod Novik, On the Shores of Bab Al-Mandab: Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute Monograph No. 26, 1979) p 18.
8. See "Measures and Trends US and USSR: Strategic Force Effectiveness", draft interim report, Defense Nuclear Agency, February, 1978.
9. Admiral Zumwalt has argued that the 1973 Middle East Crisis constituted to some extent a Cuban missile crisis in reverse. However, the analogy is at best limited. Early 1980 as we see infra Chapter 3, page 4, was to bring forth a new vocabulary in Soviet statements aimed at the West.
10. See "USN Sec Clayton on Anti-sub Capability", New York Times, (May 25, 1978) p 1, and "Defense Sec. Brown on US Strategic Ability, New York Times (June 24, 1978) p 22.
11. A point also made by Jeffrey Record. See his "Some Thoughts On The Rapid Deployment Force" presented to the Conference on The Future Role of Naval and Marine Forces, April 1, 1980.
12. See W. Scott Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Capabilities, Chapter 5 (New York: NSIC Agenda Paper, 1973).
13. Thomas Wolfe, "The Projection of Soviet Power," Military Review (February 1969):64-5.

14. His account, "Cuba en Angola: Operacion Carlota," was first published in Proceso, an official Cuban publication, January 1977, pp 6-15; it appeared in translation in the Washington Post, January 10-12, 1977.
15. Adam Ulam, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Unhappy Coexistence," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1978, p 567.
16. A. Iskenderov, "Unity of the World Revolutionary Process A Factor of Stronger Peace," International Affairs (Moscow, December 1978): 66-74.
17. Boris Ponomarev, "Neodolimost osvoboditelnogo dvizhenia," Kommunist (January 1980): 11.
18. Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York, 1957) p 22.
19. See E.A. Thompson, A History of Atilla and the Huns (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1948) p 95-124.
20. Lecture, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, May 1, 1980.
21. See W. Scott Thompson, "Political Violence and the 'Correlation of Forces'," ORBIS, Vol. XIX, No. 4 (Winter 1976) pp 1270-1288.
22. See Michael Mosetting and Henry Griggs, Jr., "TV At The Front", Foreign Policy (Spring 1980) p 67.
23. See Ehud Levy - Pascal, "An Analysis of the Cyclical Dynamics of Industrialized Countries", (Washington, DC: CIA Report, January 1976).
24. Colin S. Gray, "There is No Choice" Foreign Policy (Fall, 1976) p 125.
25. Edward Mead Earle, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943) p 104.
26. Ibid.
27. Thus for example officers of foreign navies, discussing contemporary world politics on the Tall Ships in Boston Harbor in May 1980 during that city's 350th anniversary. A common theme in discussion was that while America was still the most powerful country, it wasn't acting like it. "You feel it everywhere," a Spanish officer said, "in every port."
28. "The Great American Illusion" Spectator, (April 5, 1980, London), , p 3.

29. Henry Kissinger, DOSB LXIX (Oct. 29, 1973): 528, and DOSB LXXII (Feb. 23, 1976); Dmitri K. Simes, "Detente, Russian Style," Foreign Policy, No. 32 (Fall, 1978):54; Robert Legvold, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," Foreign Affairs 57 (Spring, 1979): 755; Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union," Presidential Documents No. 16 (Jan. 28, 1980): 195.

Chapter 2

THE INDIVISIBILITY OF WORLD POLITICS

The Defense of Europe and Third World Crisis

Europe, for historical, economic, and strategic reasons, is the great prize of world politics today. For equally compelling reasons, as we shall see, a Soviet military attack on it is probably the least likely major contingency of present day world politics. This hypothesis is paradoxical, given the enormous military buildup of Soviet missiles and conventional hardware on the European front in recent years.

For some good reasons indeed, and some of declining validity, NATO has been a preeminent concern of America's defense planners for a generation. However much a world conflict, World War II began in Europe, and, for most of the actors, ended there too. The greatest change which it brought about, the European preeminence of the Soviet Union, with its consequent threat to American and Western interests, necessarily fascinated and dominated the concerns of American defense planners after the cold war's inception. Europe was seen as the prize for what else was there? The Soviet Union was the enemy, as indeed China had become, and almost everything else except in the Asian subcontinent was a client or colony of the leading NATO countries. African, Asian, and Latin American states were largely seen as subject, not actors. Thus even as African and Asian colonies became independent, providing increasing targets of opportunity to the Soviets, America continued to give the highest priority to European defense.

This logic was reinforced by the fact that Europe was dynamic, though only once her security had been assured with the founding of NATO,

As General Haig has often pointed out.¹ The Common Market was expanding and the European national product was growing rapidly. Nowhere were American economic ties proliferating more rapidly. But Europe was, by the same logic, an increasingly attractive prize, and Moscow was building up its forces on the central front accordingly.

There can be no doubt, in the first instance, of the priority Moscow accords to Europe. The scope of the military buildup in recent years by the Soviet Union is well known, and came on top of a conventional superiority already attained in most categories, thanks to seemingly unlimited manpower reserves and geographical advantages. Throughout the 1970s gains in the number of tactical aircraft, new tanks, CBR, new developments in personal carriers, bridge spanning and the like all added to the Soviet advantage in Europe.

The political dimension and consequence of these military developments began to become clear in 1978 in the so-called neutron bomb controversy.² What in retrospect is most interesting about this episode is less how quickly the entire alliance was taken advantage of by Soviet propaganda, a fault compounded by confusing American leadership on the issue, than by how persistent and foreseeing Soviet policy had been; the Soviets had accumulated enormous military advantage and they had no intention of allowing it to be dissipated even slightly where such could be prevented. They succeeded. In 1979 the same process was repeated as NATO edged toward the difficult decision (because of the very asymmetries in the balance) to modernize the theatre nuclear arsenal. Despite the 25-to-one advantage the Soviets already had in megatonnage in Europe-related warheads, for example, Moscow ran an unrelenting campaign against modernization which continues to this day.³

But in 1980 the full dimension of Soviet strategy became clear. Whether the Soviet leaders anticipated the Western response to their invasion or not, Moscow shortly thereafter initiated what could be called a "Je m'en fiche" strategy: since January 1980 there has been no lack of Soviet contempt expressed for American resolve, capability, and intentions. One Sovietologist and consultant at the highest level of the U.S. government has characterized current Soviet official correspondence with the American government as the harshest since World War II.⁴

But the aim of this strategy has been Europe. In one of the most extraordinary interviews ever granted by a Soviet official, the head of the KGB station in Washington, Boris Davydov by name, chose to unburden himself of Soviet reactions to American perceptions, to a German paper, Die Welt, no less. "Why the hell do these Americans get so excited anyway" by Afghanistan, he asks: "We are setting up in Afghanistan our own 'forward based system' against the sphere of interest of the West. Nobody can prevent us from doing that." He had considerably more to say. He mocked the Rapid Deployment Force, as "I believe we have demonstrated that [type of force] in Afghanistan." His last words were sobering:

The Americans are still much too conceited. Their strength is but a strength of words. If we wanted to we could harm the United States twenty times more than it would harm us. We can also live without detente, if necessary... Let me remind you that the Russians have a long tradition in gambling. We know the atmosphere, the psychology in which the gambler moves. If the rules we had with the Americans are no longer applicable, then we shall play our way indeed.⁵

This was a message aimed at Europe, one emphasizing American weakness and Soviet determination.

Moscow's strategy was elevated yet one level further in April of 1980. The Soviet ambassador to France, Stepan V. Chervonenko, made a speech that not only broke new ground for Soviet policy, it threatened to repudiate the entire postwar progress, meager that it be, in arriving at understandings between the two superpowers. Chervonenko, who is a Central Committee member, for all intents and purposes extended the Brezhnev doctrine to the entire world - wherever a friendly regime sought its assistance. Any country has the right "to choose its friends and allies, and if it becomes necessary, to repel with them the threat of a counterrevolution or a foreign intervention," he said.⁶ He insisted on equality for Moscow on all issues, even in such places as the Persian Gulf, a traditional Western sphere of interest (and certainly an area of high Western concern and interest at the moment). As Flora Lewis has pointed out, "Some West European diplomats see in this stance a rejection of the 1945 Yalta agreements, which established certain borders in Europe as an area of Soviet predominance. It seems to mean, a diplomat said, that Moscow now is saying that the rest of the world 'is up for grabs.'"⁷

Yet for all the Soviet threat to Europe, there are important reasons why this threat, for defense planning purposes, must be kept in perspective. The first is very simple, namely a critical dimension of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, in which Europe is even more highly valued historically and geographically than by the West; for that reason Europe could hardly be seen as a theatre for warfare, when it is a prize whose tremendous economic assets, it is believed, could ensure prosperity for the communist bloc (precedent for which exists in the wholesale capture of East German factories at the conclusion of World War II).

There is a second reason of still greater immediate importance for not allowing Europe to dominate defense planning, a positive one unlike

the previous negative one. This study, like Soviet policy, is premised on the assumption that the world is ultimately one theatre. It is easy to see that we no longer can divide the world artificially into isolated fronts, insofar as we are conceptualizing threats to our interests. Short-term Soviet goals are tailored according to the opportunities presented in various theatres. By arranging these theatres hierarchically, we invite Soviet adventurism on the lower rungs.

It is thus impossible to assume that Europe can be defended if the flanks are insecure, or if the oil supply is cut off. The defense of the Persian Gulf and of the Central Front are conceptually indistinguishable, however different the forces required for protecting each.

A third point is that the world strategic picture cannot be arbitrarily divided according to threats to land and sea. For the central front is deeply affected by the naval balance: just as the naval balance, and areas to be protected by naval forces, are deeply affected by land balances. Such is what always made "arms control" in the Indian Ocean nonsensical, unless it were to include Soviet forces throughout the Southwestern quadrant of the USSR at the least. Thanks to a correct historical Western perception starting with the great age of adventure, with its consequent actions, the sea-land relationship remained highly advantageous to us until recently: Britain and, to a lesser extent, the United States, laid claims to areas and sites discovered in past centuries, with a regularity and tenacity that long kept world maps colored to our advantage, precisely because coaling stations could consequently be established, and were established, throughout the world. By contrast, as Michael McGwire has pointed out, and as Admiral Gorshkov has noted, the Tsarist adventurers failed to act with similar prudence.⁸ Only in the 1970s did their descendants begin to make good their

omissions.

For any war in Europe, if in fact one developed (for example) over Soviet attempts to bring Yugoslavia back into the fold, the United States would necessarily have to confront the Soviet Union on a global basis to have any chance whatsoever of winning. This is not to say that a tripwire strategy is sufficient in Europe. It is to say that there must be a critical mass of forces in Europe beyond which marginal defense dollars should be used where American advantages (or, more likely, Soviet disadvantages) may be greater.

There are many implications here, for example for the so-called 'swing strategy,' under which Pacific naval forces are to be swung to the North Atlantic in the event of a NATO war, on the assumption that such a war would be confined to NATO territory. As the CNO Admiral Hayward has postulated as a basic premise of U.S. naval strategy "any conflict between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces will inevitably be worldwide in scope." As we have already seen, it will be a preeminent American interest in the event of a NATO war to engage Soviet forces elsewhere, using American global advantages, confronting the Soviet Union on a worldwide basis.

In the most simple terms, the "swing strategy" envisages the shift of the major part of the Pacific naval forces to the North Atlantic to assist in fighting Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces in that theatre. It should be obvious that such a precept would be synonymous with the abandonment of our interests in the Far East, the Persian Gulf, and the broader Indian Ocean regions. Serious questions have been raised over this strategy recently in various venues. Richard Burt, for example, writes that a staff study, prepared for Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, questions several aspects of existing U.S. military policy toward the Pacific area, particularly in

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regard to a shift of forces from the Pacific theatre to the NATO theatre in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war. It is quite clear that such a strategy almost certainly leads to the abandonment of Japan and China and reduces our military credibility throughout most of Asia.

This concept of a NATO war being defined as one which could be limited to the North Atlantic area is largely due to a tendency on the part of U.S. strategists to consider U.S. military policy and strategy in compartmentalized segments rather than in a broad conceptual framework. To base U.S. strategy on the assumption that a war would be limited to the North Atlantic, when U.S. and Soviet naval forces are deployed on a worldwide basis, is to build upon a highly dubious premise. For the U.S. to defeat the Soviet Union, an opponent with large human and materiel capabilities possessing interior lines of communication, it is vital to engage the enemy on two fronts. The Germans always feared a two-front war and sought to avoid one by forming an alliance with Russia in World War II. Now, the two neighbors' roles have been reversed. We cannot escape the consequences of this position by letting the Soviets choose the venue of conflict. If we allow them to focus the conflict on the West, there is no hope that we can defeat them. The threat that they will immediately be attacked in Asia offers the hope that they will be deterred from a thrust against the NATO central front. This requirement to apply pressure on the Soviets in Asia makes it essential that the U.S. openly renounces the "swing strategy". The actual utility of the Pacific fleet to a conflict in Europe is questionable on strictly logistical grounds as well. Most estimates suggest that a NATO war would probably not last over 30 days. Since they cannot transit the Panama Canal, the time it would take to swing these Pacific forces, i.e.

carriers, is such that they would arrive too late to play a role in a North Atlantic conflict. At the same time such a 'swing' may have weakened the stability and security of the Pacific and Indian Ocean theatres.

Thus, in spite of the views of some "North Atlantic firsters" that a 'swing' is necessary for NATO defense, it can credibly be argued that the defense of NATO is inextricably tied to U.S. naval strategy and the projection of naval power to the Pacific and Indian Oceans just as it is to defending the central front and its flanks in the North and South. In any event, if the U.S. and its allies conduct an aggressive and daring global strategy, we will emerge in a much better and, conceivably, superior position to negotiate our future position.

The emphasis given to the NATO theatre in U.S. military strategy is a reflection of the priorities in strategic thinking immediately following World War II. Such a view does not reflect the growing multipolarity of the world since Western Europe has lost much of its colonial influence. In trade economies generally, as indeed in an overall sense, Europe is not as important to the United States as it once was; U.S. military strategy must begin to take into account the new world environment and sharp political and economic shifts in it. The projection of power becomes increasingly relevant given the need for a broader spectrum of response possibilities on the part of the U.S. in order to react to this increasingly multipolar world. The U.S. Navy is the best instrument for projecting force, taking into consideration these new global changes, because it is better able than other military instruments of power to deploy on a worldwide basis without the political problems which would be incurred by the use of ground and noncarrier based air forces. Naval forces were always the most suitable forces for global

deployment, but they are even more valuable for such purposes today because of the political sensitivities which attend the growing multipolarity in the world political environment. Finally, it must be said that they are the best instruments of military force with which to fashion a global strategy which would enable us to break from the concept of limited scenarios of conflict. The U.S. is at a disadvantage in suggesting that it will only counter Soviets or their clients on a limited war basis. We are always at a disadvantage in such conflicts, both politically and logistically. Only by making clear that we intend to view potential conflict wherever it starts as a matter of a global strategy are we likely to be able to counter threats aimed specifically at Europe, the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere. We must make clear that we will not permit the Soviets and their surrogates to select and limit the venue of military action. Naval forces globally deployed on the necessary level and on a permanent basis are the forces around which to build a global strategy.

The U.S. must restructure its projection strategy to meet the demands of the world's new multipolarity. U.S. sizing, composition, and deployment of naval forces, as mentioned before, still tend to reflect largely the World War II balance of political and military power. Many demands on naval forces will come in areas where the large powers may not be directly involved in hostile confrontations. These may be handled by something less sophisticated and potent than a large attack carrier. Even when needed, carrier deployments should be undertaken in a way to meet new priorities without undercutting projection to other areas, such as in the case of withdrawals from the Pacific in order to meet new contingencies like those in the Indian Ocean-Arabian Sea region.

It must be a key objective of U.S. deployment policy to prevent or inhibit those geopolitical shifts on land that are inimical to our maritime - especially naval - objectives. It will do little good to be able to defend the sea-oil lanes if no oil reaches the West from the oil producing countries.

A NATO war must be dealt with, largely, by the naval forces already in being. It must be as General Alexander Haig has said for naval and ground forces, a "come as you are war." Carriers diverted from the Pacific would contribute nothing, as we have noted. But by putting substantial pressure on Soviet forces in the Pacific, initial NATO deficiencies might be compensated for prior to their supply.

One way the U.S. could apply pressure on the Soviet Union in Asia would be to threaten their prime naval bases in the Pacific, namely, Vladivostock and Petropavlovsk - or to launch an assault on those bases the moment the Soviets attack us elsewhere. Hence, a strategy of applying and sustaining pressure on the Soviets on the Asian front will require maintaining substantial naval force in the area, for attacking Soviet military bases and for providing psychological support of Japan and China, especially those territories which are most threatened by Soviet naval and air power. The Chinese are currently tying down approximately one-fourth of the Soviet Union's total military capabilities. In this respect, China is doing as much for the defense of the central front in NATO as any other member of the alliance except the Federal Republic of Germany and the U.S. If there is a remote chance of Sino-Soviet detente, such a possibility would benefit from a Chinese perception that the U.S. was not prepared to maintain adequate naval-air forces deployed to the Pacific theatre. The prolonged swing of U.S.

forces to the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean theatre to confront the crisis is raising this issue. Such a shift of forces has been necessary because the U.S. government has failed to develop a global strategy which would permit the shift of forces from one area to another in order to compensate for the overall numerical inadequacy of U.S. naval vessels. (Since 1969 U.S. naval forces have been reduced from 1015 ships to just over 500).

Current levels of U.S. forces deployed in the Pacific are inadequate thanks to the siphoning off of carriers and other vessels to the Arabian Sea-Gulf of Oman region. They will soon have to be restored to pre-Iran crisis levels if we are to continue to inhibit the Soviets from deploying a "swing strategy" of their own, which would enable them to switch ground and air forces to the West without fear of a two-front military pressure by the U.S.

It is the People's Republic of China pinning down of sizable Soviet forces in Asia which has contributed to the U.S. shift from the so-called "two and one half" war strategy to the one now called a "one and one half" war policy. As is well known, the "one and one half" war strategy envisages the U.S. fighting a big war in the West or the East, but not in both theatres at the same time. The PRC's willingness to accept the risks of conflict with Russia could be much diminished without substantial U.S. naval deployments in the Pacific. Even before the Iranian crisis, the U.S. had barely enough forces for its security policy in this vast ocean region - the most difficult region into which we must project anywhere in the world in terms of space, logistics, and the requirement for a large basing infrastructure. If our basing structure in Japan and the Philippines should suffer from regional perceptions of our declining military capability deployed to the region, we may lose the very facilities that are absolutely vital to our ability to maintain the requisite forces to confront the Soviets with a two-front threat of war.

The presence of substantial U.S. naval-air forces in Asia must be given some credit in the Chinese decision and resolve to face the Soviets along their Asian frontier. They may play a large role in deterring a Soviet attack on the Central front or at least prevent the Soviets from being able to reinforce their forces in the event of hostilities in the NATO area. In any event, the Soviet leaders would definitely be required to assess the PRC's possible role in Asia, before considering an assault on Europe or elsewhere (e.g. in the Middle East). NATO forces in Central Europe have from the beginning been quantitatively inferior to the Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional deficiencies on the Central front the only answer would seem to be to confront the Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces with a global projection of naval forces and a strategy which endeavors to spread their forces too thin to be able to concentrate effectively against the Central front or any other area of major U.S.-Western interest.

Another reason for giving Europe a lower priority in defense planning may be made by inversion, namely by examining orders of likelihood. The notion that the Soviets would wish to take on NATO (assuming that, as far as a choice of fronts was concerned, other things were equal) assumes that they would prefer to meet the West where, however long the odds against NATO, the West would put up its stiffest fight, both because of the relative preparedness of the allies and the scope of the stakes.

If we conceive of a NATO war or any war between the U.S. and Warsaw Pact forces as a global conflict, and consider it in a broad strategic framework, it becomes obvious that forces could not be pulled from the Pacific without extremely adverse consequences. This possibility has already been of great concern to China and Japan, who look with great apprehension on the strategy that draws down deployments in the Pacific to

meet other contingencies to the West, whether in the North Atlantic or in the Indian Ocean. The overemphasis on NATO has led to the notion that forces should be drawn down in the Pacific rather than in the Mediterranean to meet the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean contingency when it could well be argued that the safest place for reductions would be in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean deployments still reflect the pre-multipolarity World War II concepts of strategic priorities; carriers there, in the words of one distinguished civilian strategist, are in any event "sitting ducks". NATO perhaps should be considered as only one, albeit vital, part of a global confrontation. Indeed NATO is thus far the safest area in the world in terms of the threat of war, as we argued above. The probability of global crisis is much greater outside West Europe, especially in the area east of Suez. The events of the last several years have graphically demonstrated a new objective critical to U.S. and NATO security, i.e. to prevent the Soviet Union from fostering an environment in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa, that would deny oil to the U.S., NATO, and Japan, and to deter the Soviets from any overt action against the Arabian peninsula and South Asia.

That the defense of NATO must in fact extend beyond NATO's treaty boundaries has always been true, but never more than now in view of increased Western dependence on overseas raw materials, and the greatly expanded reach of Soviet military power, especially naval and air capabilities. Not only is this true in terms of military strategy but in relation to the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf on which NATO countries depend. Thus, over thirty years after the implementation of the NATO pact, the alliance does not have to be defeated on the Central front; it can be defeated by the failure to maintain the political stability and

security in the Persian Gulf, and such a reality appears to be central to Soviet strategy.

The problem in the Gulf is less one of countering Soviet threats to existing regimes in the first instance, and more one of preventing the collapse or deterioration of political stability, which would automatically lessen western access to adequate oil resources in the region.

Naval forces must play a key role in undergirding regional stability. The current erosion of stability is likely to lessen their effectiveness. The Soviets would gain by seeing oil denied to NATO nations - enabling them to exploit the ensuing economic chaos to effect a more rapid shift in the geopolitical balance against the West.

The logic to the contrary is used, as Albert Wohlstetter has suggested, as a form of reassurance. With respect to the vital Persian Gulf, it is argued, the Soviets would never strike - where the West is patently at a disadvantage. That, it is suggested, would mean World War III. This sunny view of the matter can easily be extended in the manner of Pangloss. If the Soviets will not strike the West at a vital point where the West is weak, they are even less likely to strike at a vital point where it is strong. As for nonvital spots, the Soviets would be plainly foolish to risk striking for marginal gains... "Reasoning of this kind," he concludes, "is a way of cheering oneself up. It fails to take the possibility of war seriously, and it fails to understand that some possible wars which never occur can have an important actual effect."⁹

If, however, one takes the possibility of war seriously, that is, if one assumes that the proliferating signs of tension in the world, along with the actual fighting that has been occurring between proxies in recent years, betoken real problems; and if one does not assume

that, by some magic, our era has been transformed into one where such real problems do not have real consequences; and if one assumes that the Soviets have been investing at so alarming a rate in military development for other reasons than that of propitiating their arms industry; and if one assumes a certain rationality on the part of Soviet decision-makers, and thus a desire to maximize gain and minimize risk and hence potential bloodshed; then surely one would assume that the most likely place in which the Soviets would accumulate gains at our expense would be in out-of-the-way places for marginal gains (as they have been doing for the past few years at the least) where the risk of war is least; and secondly, in areas like the Persian Gulf, where the stakes are enormously higher (than say in Granada or Mozambique), and where Soviet geopolitical and military advantages are simply enormous; and last of all in Europe, where the prize is sought intact.

There is a final sense in which world politics is indivisible in its interdependence, but this is a knife which cuts on both edges, one of which is painfully sharper. For two decades Americans have celebrated the growing interconnectedness of the international system as a good and useful thing. The celebrants, imbued with the idea of progress - of democratic development in the third world, of increasing mutual advantage from trade on the part of all nations, of growing dependence by communist regimes on free world goods and technologies envisage a world knitting itself together. President Kennedy proclaimed an 'age of interdependence', which for some, including many academic analysts, became the old dream of "one world", in a new and seemingly hard-nosed model.

The principal premise is of course correct - that there is a growing interconnectedness among the nations of the world, a growth that

has been geometric in many of its dimensions in recent years. What has been seen less often is the unsavory and unwelcome other side of the coin. Dean Acheson is reported to have commented on President Kennedy's famous speech that we would come to regret the 'age of interdependence', when others threatened to cut our supplies of vital raw materials or commodities.¹⁰ And interdependence, in its strict sense, applies to inflation, coups d'etat, revolutions, kidnapping, hijacking, trade wars, just as much as to all the positive dimensions. Earl C. Ravenal has put it very well. "In this kind of world, we need more buffers between states, not more interdependence. War is the final form of interdependence in the strategic dimension, 'strangulation' in the economic dimension."¹¹

FOOTNOTES

1. Address by Alexander Haig, at the Armed Forces Policy Council, SAC-EUR, Department of Defense, Aug. 1975.
2. See Robert Anson, "The Neutron Bomb", (New Times Aug. 5, 1977.) Also see "Furor over the Neutron Bomb", (Newsweek, April 17, 1978, p 34-35.
3. As Colin S. Gray puts it, "The Soviet Union had orchestrated a massive international campaign against "the killer warhead" and "the capitalist bomb"...a campaign in which the Soviet Union picked up many well-meaning, if imperfectly reasoning, supporters in the West", quoted from Colin S. Grey "NATO Strategy and the Nuetron Bomb", (Policy Review, Winter, 1979) p 15.
4. See Craig R. Whitney, "Moscow Hopes for a Change of Partner in Detente Duet", (New York Times, May 18, 1980) Section IV, p 1.
5. See "Soviet Diplomat in Washington Interviewed on Kabul Crisis", FBIS - SOV, Jan. 15, 1980.
6. See the New York Times, April 22, 1980.
7. See the New York Times, April 4, 1980.
8. Michael MccGwire, address at Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Affairs, Washington, D.C., April 4, 1980.
9. Albert Wohlstetter, "Half Wars and Half Policies in the Persian Gulf" in W. Scott Thompson, ed. From Weakness to Strength, (San Francisco Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980) p 165.
10. As quoted by Charles Burton Marshall and Paul H. Nitze, private communication.
11. Earl C. Ravenal, "Have Carter's Critics Taken Real Risks?" (the New York Times, April 30, 1980).

Chapter 3

Third World Instability and World Politics

A paradox of strategic pertinence inheres in American policy and attitudes toward the third world during the past decade. While the central front stabilized in political terms, as Soviet conquests of World War II were legitimized midway through the 1970s in the Helsinki Accord, the third world became increasingly unstable. American interests therein were increasingly under threat. Yet precisely in the latter half of the decade, after the Helsinki Accords were signed in Europe and also after the debacle in Vietnam, the United States put its national security emphasis on Europe. Ironically, it was precisely the fall of Vietnam which signalled both to Moscow and revolutionaries wherever they were that America was vulnerable; that it was a good time to amass gains through whatever means were available, including military. But the conviction that military force should and would never be used again to affect third world struggles became literally the most compelling and inviolable policy assumption of fashion in Washington.¹ Precisely as American capabilities to deal with third world crises were consequently allowed to decline, moreover, third world military capabilities to prevent great power interference were rapidly increasing.

Small wonder that in a world of such doctrinal base, procurement followed suit. Thus in 1977, \$3.7 billion was spent on the central front, while in 1980 it had increased by 77% to \$6.6 billion; while in the same period, for example, there was a 25% net decline in Marine Corps requests

for land forces. We admitted inferiority on the European front, despite a substantial excess of NATO defense spending over that of the Warsaw Pact; but we continued to claim (as Francis J. West has pointed out²,) naval superiority, despite CIA evidence that Soviet naval expenditures were 20% higher than ours.

In a sense this is all the heritage of Vietnam, an unpopular war, after which the central front was for many the only respectable application of military dollars; even the deteriorating strategic balance was rationalized under a wide variety of headings.³ The third world, it was to be argued, would for its part be dealt with through politics and economics. In this chapter we will briefly examine the realities of the third world, as well as the assumptions which underlay official and policy choices.

I

East-West and North-South. In the previous chapter we argued that, strategically, the world is one theatre. It would follow logically that, from a foreign policy and national security point of view, East-West problems could hardly be separated from North-South ones. Yet the fashionable wisdom of recent years has been the opposite, that the problem with past American policy toward the third world was precisely the tendency to see all problems through the perspectives of East-West interests, and that these must be dealt with on their own merits,⁴ utterly divorced from the pushes and pulls of world politics. The fact that Asians and Africans saw the connection between North-South and East-West, and insisted on it, was not allowed to matter.⁵

This was not just an American predisposition; it was one reinforced by elites throughout Western Europe in the wake of their decolonization (absent, usually, France). It was universally reinforced

in international organizations. What was good for Peter was not necessarily good for Paul, however, since such disaggregation of North-South from East-West was made possible by the fact that American military power remained actively on duty, as it were, in the third world (and backed up, and was backed up by, until 1971, such theatre capabilities as that of the British in the Persian Gulf). Thus in 1975 when South Vietnam was invaded and absorbed into the north, America's subsequent retrenchment in the third world left powerful vacuums around the globe.

There is a further point. As it happened, the period of America's retrenchment coincided with the development of the East-West detente in the early 1970s; the Soviets of course see the relation as unequivocally causal.⁶ Although both Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, in their memoirs, have heavily qualified their understanding of the extent to which they expected detente to ameliorate superpower relations,⁷ the fact is that detente was oversold in the United States and taken to assume Soviet and American disengagement, or at least lack of troublesome competition, in the third world.

The Soviets of course have repeatedly assured us that they never saw it that way; and indeed such is correct. From the beginnings of detente, Western writers of realist persuasion attempted to remind the public - and government - that the Soviets continued to make their intention explicit not to allow detente to prevent themselves from assisting the "liberation struggle" that is revolutionary or subversive groups whose aims paralleled Moscow's. Hope springs eternal, and despite Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen, Indochina, and smaller struggles elsewhere, along with lesser roles in large struggles, like Iran's, there remained faith in certain American circles that a modus vivendi with Russia in the third

world could be worked out. In such circumstances and on such premises, it made sense to try to even the imbalance of forces in Europe at the expense of other far more important needs, while pursuing at the same time a SALT treaty to deal with impending imbalances at the strategic level.

Now, after Afghanistan, even Soviet writers more or less assume that Americans will no longer delude themselves. Victor Sidenko writes in

New Times

There were some in the imperialist camp who definitely hoped that international detente, which had by then germinated nicely, would bring about a decline in the liberation struggle... It was thought that the Soviet Union... would, 'for the sake of detente and normalization of relations with the West,' stop supporting the liberation struggle waged by the peoples enslaved by imperialism, forego their principles and internationalist duty to these peoples, and leave them to face imperialism alone.

It must be said that we have never given any grounds for such illusions, and it is not our fault that they existed here and there. Those who made any plans on this score clearly had disregarded what Leonid Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress...⁸

It remains to be seen whether such Soviet writers are giving too much credit to their opposite numbers in the West.

What has been inadequately understood is the pervasiveness and depth of third world instability, which Soviet policy can obviously exploit, and which by its very nature and essence is a handicap to the West. For the third world evolved out of the Western free market and liberal state system, and instability in the third world can only prejudice the orderly continuation and development of the Western system.⁹ We have identified five areas of specific and increasing third world instability which are pertinent to this study, insofar as they guarantee that the third

world still continues to be the area of world crisis and Soviet attempted gains. Additional variables, specific to the Muslim world, of great contemporary pertinence, are identified in a subsequent section. A cursory look at the third world during the past several years would suggest that, in four of the five areas, matters have worsened;¹⁰ and in the fifth the last word remains to be written.

1. Resource scarcity - As is evident in Chapter 8, the recent round of oil price increases has magnified already monumental third world economic problems, thus diminishing national capability for dealing with other challenges to statecraft. And meantime, as resources become dearer, competition for them becomes more acute. Iraqi diplomacy, made newly powerful by oil riches and the Shah's demise, attempts to extend a self-serving protection over some of its unstable but even richer neighbors. Conflict in the South China Sea is warming up between the Philippines and Vietnam, with petroleum reserves the issue. Riots in India have occurred over who gets the oil; the general deterioration of economic conditions has helped the return of an authoritarian leader to power. Conflict between Morocco and Algeria, through surrogates, increases; the issue is not just phosphates, though that is a necessary condition of it.

2. Tribalism - Centrifugal forces in the new states, activated by ethnic loyalties that far transcend those to the putative nation, have continued their increase. The Horn of Africa is a variant, where Somali clansmen in the Ogaden continue to fight, out of loyalty to their nation (Somalia) against the artificially created state (Ethiopia). Elsewhere, from the southern Philippines through Kurdish areas in the old Northern Tier, to virtually every African border, ethnic factors remain destabilizers in third world statecraft. It is possible to forecast large-scale

rearrangements of third world maps in the late 1980s and 1990s.

3. Increased Armaments - Third world leaders in the early days following independence prided themselves on their commitment to a world without force as they pledged to honor the UN charter. This was when their arsenals were nearly empty. As they armed themselves, their appetite took on traditional tastes to the point where the two most publicly moralistic states of the third world, India and Tanzania, were the first in their respective continents to invade neighboring countries (Pakistan 1971 and Uganda 1979). In the latter case the occupation goes on. "Newness" has worn off. Third world states are involved more than ever in subverting and overthrowing neighbors, or in plotting all out war. Usually factor #2, tribalism, is also involved, but as these states mature, as it were, they take on much the cast of 19th century Latin American states, prepared and willing to fight wars to the finish over the traditional principles of honor, self-esteem, and ambition.

4. Terrorism - This has become, increasingly, a transnational phenomenon. Traditionally a weapon of the weak, and as recently as a decade ago derided as the handmaiden of lost causes,¹¹ terrorism is an important factor throughout the world, though third world territory is the most fertile. There are few terrorist groups that do not have at least an indirect Soviet connection, through the training that the KGB has given to thousands of Palestinians, and who in turn have assisted groups from Ireland to Japan.¹² Although there is always a local grievance activating terrorism, the vital point to be understood in the West is how intrinsic contemporary terrorism is to the struggle between the two world systems.¹³ When Bonn becomes an armed camp, as it briefly did after the slaying of Hans-Martin Schleyer in 1976, or when Italy devotes its greatest national energies to breaking up the Brigande Rossi, damage is done to Western

capabilities. When terrorism sparks revolutions - as it did in Iran in 1977-78 and is coming close to doing in Turkey today - and when the terrorists are in many cases armed and in most cases encouraged from across the northern border,¹⁴ then one is dealing with a very crucial determinant of the future world order.

5. Regional Conflicts - Since 1960 in Africa and throughout the postwar period in the Middle East, specific pan-regional conflicts - over racism in Southern Africa and between Arabs and Israel in the Middle East - have driven regional politics and provided enormous openings for Soviet diplomacy. Recently, it appears to many that substantial progress has been made in both theatres, progress in stabilizing the regions and thus an improvement in Western prospects. The Camp David process has stabilized Israel's western front, enabling that American ally to deal more effectively with Syria and the Palestinians. The agreement was bought at a very heavy price for the United States, whose interests are not in all cases identical with those of Israel. The estrangement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, necessitated by radical pressures on Riyadh, has been costly and destabilizing for American interests. The basic division of the region, of which the Egyptian-Saudi rift is only the most visible symptom, has been deepened. It was undoubtedly a worthwhile tradeoff for American diplomacy, but one whose downside has so often been clouded by the upside as to lead to neglect of the friendly forces inimical to the Camp David process. The badly worsened state of American-Saudi-Gulf-state relations is the price.

In Southern Africa, the election of a black majority government in Zimbabwe has cooled off, at least temporarily, what remains an explosive part of the world. However, like the Camp David Accord, the removal of the Muzorewa government and its replacement by that of Robert Mugabe is not

without certain consequences for the West. It remains to be seen whether the short-term benefits of the new government will be translated into long-term stability for the region.

Instability and Accommodation in the Muslim World

One huge group of third world peoples - numbering over 700 million persons and living in an area which stretches across much of Africa and Asia, from Morocco to Indonesia - stands out by virtue of its instability. These peoples differ widely in language, culture and race, in stages of economic development and in military power; they share only one thing, the religion of Islam. Even today Islam profoundly shapes the political attitudes of its adherents; regardless of personal faith or political orientation, persons with an Islamic background have special difficulties fitting into the modern international political order.¹⁵

Although Islam is associated primarily with Arabs and the Middle East, Muslims are spread across a wide band from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the far edge of East. Indeed, most Muslims live outside the Middle East: 123 million in Indonesia; about 70 million in each of Pakistan, Bangladesh and India; and major Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union (44 million), Nigeria (35 million, and even in China (20 million).¹⁶

A glance at the Muslim world reveals a pattern of turmoil. Some states have already experienced disruption,¹⁷ others appear to be on the verge of breaking down.¹⁸ In recent years numerous wars have erupted, either between Muslims and non-Muslims¹⁹ or between Muslims only.²⁰ Finally, Muslim states such as Libya and South Yemen, as well as the PLO, have backed terrorism enthusiastically.

While clearly many factors account for the volatility of the Muslim

world, I shall concentrate on one element often ignored in political analyses: the Islamic background of these states and its role in exacerbating their instability.

Muslims, even more than other non-Western peoples, have great difficulty with modern European political ideas. A bewildering array of "isms" have come out of Europe during the past two centuries, three of which concern us here: nationalism, liberalism, and socialism. The enduring difficulty of Muslims with the nation has brought them instability; their unwillingness fully to align with one or other of the two great European social systems has made the Muslim world, in large part, ideologically uncommitted and open to political pressure.

Why do Muslims have such difficulties with European political ideas? Part of the problem lies in their long and unpleasant relationship with the Christian West. Whereas the rest of the world - East Asia, India, sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas - first came into contact with Europe about 1500 A.D., most Muslims knew Europe many centuries earlier. The Muslims and Christians fought each other repeatedly (for example, the Crusades, the reconquest of Spain, and the Turkish threat to Eastern Europe). This protracted record of animosity left a bitter legacy on both sides; the experience of European colonial rule magnified Muslim hostility to the West. Today Muslims find it difficult to accept European ideas and techniques - more difficult than do other, non-Muslim, third world peoples. Repeatedly, where Muslims and non-Muslims have simultaneously come into contact with Europeans, Muslims picked up new skills more slowly and lagged behind in adapting to modern conditions.²¹

Even more important than this general animosity toward Europe, the traditional political orientation of Muslims presents specific obstacles to the absorption of nationalism, liberalism, and socialism.

Instability

Today's international order is based on the nation state; empires and tribes used to be more common but have given way in the past century to the ideal of each people controlling its own territory and enjoying political independence. Citizens in the new order ordinarily direct their most profound loyalties to the nation (and not to their religion, kinship group, city, class, etc.).

Although the national ideal developed in the particular circumstances of West Europe over eight hundred years, it spread in the 19th and 20th centuries to the rest of the world; today it is universal, despite its rigidity (especially in regard to minorities) and its abysmal record of provoking conflict. By making enormous sacrifices at the altar of nationalism, most peoples have by now incorporated its goals tolerably well into their political systems. In East Asia, many countries have fitted themselves into the national framework quite easily (e.g. China, Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Thailand, Laos); in India, sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia and the Americas, local political traditions were almost always too weak to stand up to the national ideal. Even though, say, Africa has few real nations, no other political ideal competes with nationalism and Africans precariously maintain the artificial state boundaries drawn up by the Europeans a century ago.

In contrast to the preeminence of nationalism in all these regions, it has met strong competition in the Muslim world. The more thorough a people's familiarity with Islamic ideals, the harder its experience has been with the modern national order. Muslims did have their own political order, very powerful and fundamentally, different from the one brought by Europeans.

Before the 19th century and the massive impact of European ideas,

Muslims had virtually no notion of allegiance to their land or its inhabitants; instead, they felt most strongly for the community of all Muslims, regardless of location, and for their immediate community, the family, village or brotherhood. The Islamic religion strongly emphasizes bonds between Muslims and the gulf that separates them from non-Muslims and it virtually ignores geography. For example, a Muslim in Egypt commonly had warmer feelings for a fellow believer in India than for the Christian down the street. Islam demands that Muslims combine into a single political entity under one leader; they should not divide into local states and they must never make war against each other.²² For shorthand, we shall refer to this sentiment as pan-Islam.

Although pan-Islam proved impossible to implement - Muslims have long been too numerous and too widely scattered to fit under one government and they have fought each other without cease - its goals have exercised a deep influence on politics in the Muslim world. No matter how politically fragmented Muslims were, they maintained the ideal of a single Islamic state; the local, territorial rulers who in fact held power appeared to their Muslim subjects as usurpers who had destroyed Muslim unity and led believers to war against each other. As a result, Muslims ached for unity and denied these territorial rulers their full respect.²³

In the 19th century, as Muslims came increasingly in contact with European political ideas, pan-Islam and nationalism clashed. Pan-Islam called for a single international Islamic state;²⁴ nationalism called for a division of Muslims into ethnic units. In the 20th century Muslims in Africa and Asia acquired independence in the framework of national states left to them by the European colonialists.

Not surprisingly, the new rulers stressed the importance of the national unit, and thus their own political significance. They urged

Muslims, for the first time ever, to make territorial loyalties paramount, sometimes with success, but more often with very mixed results. Although Islamic loyalties slipped into the background, the legacy of nonterritorial, pan-Islamic feeling continues to be felt, undermining the nation state in at least three ways: by making Muslims (1) unwilling to accept the confines of their national territory, (2) unwilling to stay out of the internal affairs of other Muslim states, and (3) unwilling to be ruled by non-Muslims.

(1) The creation of Pakistan illustrates well the reluctance of Muslims to accept the geographic limits of normal statehood. Muslims who feared submergence in independent India as a permanent minority convinced the British to partition India in 1947 in order to form out of it the separate Muslim state of Pakistan. Although Muslims were concentrated at the far western and eastern ends of northern India, in two sizeable areas with large populations, they chose to establish a single Muslim state, ignoring differences between themselves in language, culture, and ethnic background, as well as a thousand-mile separation. Indian Muslims hoped to defy the territorial imperative of modern nationhood by relying on Islamic spirit instead of geographic contiguity. But they failed; pressures pulling apart the two wings of Pakistan led to war between them in 1971-72 and to the declaration of an independent Bangladesh. For a quarter century, then, pan-Islamic feeling kept the Indian subcontinent in a constant state of tension.

Pan-Arabism, a movement to unite all Arabic speaking peoples into a single state, has for decades disrupted the politics of Arab national states, which now number twenty-three. Pan-Arabism may be viewed as a secularized, modernized version of pan-Islam;²⁵ just as devotion to Islamic unity once caused Muslims to despise their local governments, Arab

unity now undermines individual Arab states.²⁶ "Pan-Arabism" in the following quote may be replaced by "pan-Islam" without any distortion in meaning: at the height of its power, from about 1956 until 1973,

pan-Arabism could make regimes look small and petty: disembodied structures headed by selfish rulers who resisted the sweeping mission of Arabism and were sustained by outside powers that supposedly feared the one idea that could resurrect the golden age of the Arabs... Allegiance to the (national) state was "tacit, even surreptitious," while Arab unity was "the sole publicly acceptable objective of statesmen and ideologues alike." What this meant was that states were without sufficient legitimacy. Those among them that resisted the claims of pan-Arabism were at a disadvantage - their populations a fair target for pan-Arabist appeals, their leaders to be overthrown and replaced by others more committed to the transcendent goal.²⁷

Arab leaders made themselves vulnerable to coups d'etat when they put the interests of their own citizens over those of the Arabs as a whole; ordinary national sentiment was illicit, so that the normal bonds of a nation could not develop and Arab politics became exceedingly volatile.

(2) Pan-Arabism sanctions the interference of one state in another's affairs and resists the widely accepted dichotomy between internal and external affairs. Every pan-Arabist leader believes he has the right and the duty to involve himself in the business of others. Thus, currently, Iraqis play dangerous games in South Yemen, Algerians support a government-in-exile against Sadat, and six Arab states actively support factions in the Lebanese civil disruptions. Pan-Arabism caused all the Arab states to take up the Palestinian cause, transforming the conflict with Israel from a local quarrel into an issue of premier international political and economic significance. The struggle against Israel has also provided an open-ended justification for interfering in a neighbor's affairs, on the grounds that he is not fervent enough in his efforts against Zionism.

Israel's existence, thus, has served as a major pretext for ambitious regimes seeking ways to augment their power. The Libyan government under Colonel Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi has made the most use of this practice.²⁸ Al-Qadhafi aspires to lead the Arab world, perhaps also the Islamic one; as the ruler of a major oil producing country, he has vast funds with which to compensate for Libya's slender human resources and to pursue his interests around the world. One may discern three levels of activity: Arab, Islamic, and international. In the pursuit of Arab unity, al-Qadhafi has tried to merge Libya with Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, the Sudan, and Syria, fomented coups in a dozen Arab states, and gone to the most virulent extremes in opposing Israel. On the Muslim level, he has financed Islamic causes in over two dozen countries;²⁹ Full-scale civil wars in Chad and the Philippines would have ended years ago if not for Libyan arms and political support for the Muslim rebels. In Eritrea, Lebanon and Thailand, Muslims have also relied heavily on Libya in their conflicts with their central governments. On the international level, al-Qadhafi has fomented revolution and turmoil wherever possible; from the Canary Islands to Grenada to Tonga, from Southwest Africa to Northern Ireland, he has consistently ignored the normal limitations of the international order. However much the Arabs and Muslims deplore al-Qadhafi's mischief, they rarely dispute his right to extraterritorial activities.

Libya is far from unique; Saudi Arabia too takes an active role at the Arab, Islamic, and international levels, though with less punch than Libya. The Saudi government spends more but it tends to support status quo rather than disruptive causes, so its mark is not as visible.³⁰

Examples of other Muslim states involved beyond their own borders are plentiful: Malaysia helps Muslim rebels in Thailand and the Philippines and takes an active interest in the Muslims of Singapore; Iran

and Pakistan are involved in the Afghan insurgency against the Soviet-backed government of Afghanistan; and Turkey invaded Cyprus to aid the Turks there against the Greeks.

(3) Even when Muslims share languages and cultural traditions with non-Muslims, they share power with ill ease; time and again, Muslim groups arise which try either to break away from the non-Muslims or to gain control over them. Breakaways have recently occurred in: Chad, Cyprus, the Ogaden, Eritrea, Thailand and the Philippines; attempts to control have taken place in Palestine, the Sudan, Uganda, Nigeria, Senegal, and Malaysia.³¹ No other religious community has so destabilized the international order.

Together, these three factors make it more difficult for Muslim peoples than for others to fit into the system of national states. Their difficulties with it will continue so long as they find no feasible alternative.

II

Nationalism and Communism - Wherein lies the attraction of Marxism-Leninism to the third world? In this section we will attempt to show why the unlikeliest peoples - even devout Muslims of the Middle East find the Soviet Union a useful ally and its ideology an even more useful servant. In the ensuing section we will show that the ups and downs of Soviet involvement may have stabilized, in a manner unhappy for the West.

Nothing has inhibited understanding of the strategic environment presented by the third world more than the assumption in the West that third world nationalism and communism are incompatible. Thus, in the first instance, it was widely believed in the United States, in the aftermath of the world war, that any delay by the Western European colonial powers in

granting independence to their colonies would hasten the spread of communism, whereas, as Dennis Duncanson has pointed out, "the opposite expectation was implicit in the writings of Lenin and was maintained by the colonial powers... whom events immediately proved right in Indochina."³² By the early 1960s, given the shifts in the economic balance and the substantial financial drain which the colonies had become, the imperial powers had little incentive, beyond their sense of responsibility, to stay on in the remaining territories. Given the continuing pressure from Washington to grant independence, they were prepared, in some instances, even to scuttle their wards. Thus the tragic events in the Congo (as it then was) unfolded in 1960 following the few months of preparation for independence which that enormous and unwieldy country had enjoyed. The consequences and attractions to communist-assisted forces which such incipient chaos provides continue until today.

It was similarly believed in America as a corollary that, once independent, the "nationalism" of the new states would inoculate them against communism; "they don't want to trade one colonialism for another," it was so often said, even as some appeared in fact to do precisely that. One conceptual problem is that 'nationalism' has seldom been defined with clarity. In fact, it was often a code-word for a form of anti-Western beliefs, whereas Americans too often saw it in the different context of European nationalism of the early 20th century. The new states, with one or two exceptions, were not nations, as we saw in the previous section.

And in practice the Soviets had no difficulty in allying themselves with radical groups - even religiously based ones - throughout the third world, even in (one might say particularly in) Islamic states of the Middle East like Syria and Iraq. This is simply because insecure rulers saw Marxism-Leninism early on as a useful tool for justifying the enlarge-

ment of their sphere of power; it became part of the syncretic jumble referred to as ideology.

Indeed here is the rub. For precisely the most unsavory elements of communist doctrine to Western liberals are the most attractive to third world leaders. In unstructured states, the leaders of the post-independence generations, rootless and often uneducated but frustrated by the corruption and lack of progress in the ruling regime, find in Leninism a clarion call to do precisely what their inclinations are leading them to: a seizure of all the power of the state, and thence the elimination of all opponents, tribal, regional or personal, in other words the crushing of all the intermediate institutions between rulers and ruled.

Sekou Toure, for 22 years the ruthless leader of the once relatively prosperous state of Guinea, has reduced his country to rubble. He has intermittently extended basing privileges to the Soviet navy and air force; and even when (as now) he warms to the West he maintains all the trappings of the communist state, by which his regime legitimizes itself. Personal rule in the tropics and Soviet advantage are, increasingly, mutually reinforcing.

In Ethiopia the process has gone even further. As one of the present writers observed elsewhere

Western observers noticed that the Dergue, the group of officers that came to power in 1974, was composed of vicious men, that warfare existed on the streets of Addis Ababa, that the empire of Haile Selassie was falling apart, and that the country's few competent administrators would be the first to go. The Soviets noticed something completely different - certain crucial similarities with their own history (and, interestingly, seasoned Marxists like Italy's Napolitani saw it in precisely the same way); just as they themselves had murdered the Romanovs, the Dergue shot most of the royal family and let the Emperor waste to death rather quickly; as they themselves had accosted the Russian Orthodox Church and broken its back so had the Dergue broken the Coptic church; as they had eliminated the nobility and rid the country of potential

"imperialist stooges," no matter how competent, so had the Dergue. Then, in early 1977, emerged the most important similarity. One officer proved himself willing and able to take the "hard decision," the essential, Leninist chore: ruthlessly eliminating all those colleague-opponents at the top who could not stomach the "revolutionary" road. A Colonel Haile Mengistu Meriam simply walked into the cabinet room and shot everyone in cold blood. Mengistu had needed no instruction on Marxism, apparently, to learn the game of politics in Ethiopia, where politics is taken very seriously: but Moscow had found its man. While the West was filled with revulsion, the Soviets busied themselves planning the largest arms shipment in African history.³³

Islam and Marxism

Regardless of an individual Muslim's faith or politics, he is heir to a long-established Islamic tradition of moral superiority. From the very inception of Islam in the 7th century onward, its adherents have considered their way of life vastly better than anyone else's and could not imagine learning from non-Muslims about organizing society or government. Despite many knocks in modern times, such feelings still run strong; even atheists from an Islamic background are unwilling to concede that non-Muslims have developed a way of life more successful than their own. Muslims often adapt modern ways to suit their own needs but rarely acknowledge that they found something new abroad.

In the realm of political ideology, this has several consequences. First, much of what Muslims do take from the West is claimed as their own: socialism, democracy, even nationalism are all traced back to the Qur'an and early Islamic history. Second, Muslims avoid taking over an alien ideology in its entirety, but adopt only parts which then become relabeled: Gamal Abdel Nasser's socialist ideas constituted something he called "Arab socialism," an alleged improvement on the European variants. Third, governments run by persons coming from Islamic backgrounds distance themselves from the great competing ideologies of our age, liberal

capitalism and Marxist socialism. With a few exceptions - Turkey one way, Albania and South Yemen the other - Muslim states have not moved firmly into one camp or the other. For the most part, they form tactical alliances with the great powers. Egypt, for example, shifted its friendship from the USSR to the USA over the past ten years without making fundamental changes in its mixed political and economic systems. Most Muslim states fall into a vague grey area of international politics.

This tendency to disdain alien cultures causes Muslim states to have less fixed ideological positions concerning relations with the non-Muslim world; they are therefore on the whole more sensitive to political changes than are other states. Standing less firmly on an ideological base, they accommodate to force more readily. Such a pattern of accommodation emerges most clearly among those states controlled by Muslims who actively work to achieve the goals of Islam. These 'Activist Muslims', unlike nominal or reformists Muslims, take seriously the precepts of Islam dealing with public life and strive to put them into effect.³⁴ While their actions may appear irrational or completely out of touch with international mores, such as during the hostage crisis, these actions are usually reflective of underlying changes in the balance of world power.

Many Western observers assume that activist Muslims must ultimately turn to the West against the Soviet bloc because of shared cultural elements. In particular, Islam and the West esteem religion, the family unit and private property; against these, the Marxists call for historical materialism, the state and communal property. We do not dispute these common features, but they must be considered in the context of two other facts: Muslim activists despise all alien cultural influences and they share as much with Marxists as with liberals.

Activists dislike both ideologies coming from Europe, liberal and Marxist, because they are convinced that Islam provides a perfect guide to life. For them, the challenge is to properly understand the Islamic message in order to apply it. Islamic doctrines set out political goals (unity of Muslims under a single leader, warfare only against non-Muslims, etc.) but not the methods by which to achieve them. The more fervently Muslim, the less likely will a person look to ideologies from Europe for assistance in implementing Islam; to the contrary, alien ideas merely divert Muslims from the true path and should be ignored. Thus for example, does Khomeini think.

Others bring in European ideas after sanitizing them. Dr. 'Ali Shari'ati, the intellectual inspiration of young Iranians in recent years, worked to reconcile the benefits of socialism with the ideals of Islam.³⁵ In a less sophisticated but equally determined manner, Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's "Islamic socialism" does the same.³⁶ Both Shari'ati and al-Qadhdhafi argue that socialism need not imply atheism; one can withdraw from Marxist thought the denial of God's existence and retain the socialist program intact.³⁷

Not only do activist Muslims dislike all alien cultures, but they dislike liberalism and Marxism about equally. Despite repeated assertions that Islam and Marxism conflict in every way,³⁸ they share two important qualities: anti-Western sentiment and political idealism. Muslims and Marxists have mounted the two great challenges to Western civilization: Muslims fought Christian Europeans for centuries around the Mediterranean (Spain, Sicily, the Levant, Southeastern Europe); in more recent times, Marxists fought to replace Western civilization with a new order. These two groups led the assault on European colonialism earlier in the century; today, the Soviet Union and Muslim members of OPEC present the main threats

to the political and economic well-being of the West. No other religious or ideological group has challenged Europe so intensively; none other has watched the West prosper with such frustration. Muhammad and Marx each brought a message claiming to supersede the Christian, capitalist civilization of Europe. Their adherents cannot understand why it still fares so well. We often overlook the depth of hostility toward ourselves felt by both these true believers. They will continue to share a bond of antagonism toward the West so long as the West thrives.

Our open way of life defies the highly structured patterns required by Islam and Marxism. Anarchic individualism and devotion to free speech create a mix of the sublime and the ridiculous which alienates activist Muslims and Marxists in roughly parallel ways, as do our visible sexuality, conspicuous consumption, psychological orientation, and our exaltation of the novel and the different.

Activist Muslims and Marxists share more than antagonism to the West; they make comparable claims to all-embracing systems of life, claims which no liberal Western government makes. Although their visions of proper living differ profoundly, the key fact is that both view political authority as a means to attain specific goals. Unlike Western governments, which leave each individual enough freedom to choose his own destiny, activist Muslim and Marxist governments define the goals themselves. Accordingly, they both view dissent as a evil and strongly discourage it; they use every possible means to induce their subjects to cooperate with the government, including persecution, exile or death.

Both Muslims and Marxists pursue noble-sounding goals for their societies: Muslims seek a world in harmony with God's laws; Marxists eliminate God and concentrate on economics, but they foresee a society

similar to the Muslims' in many ways. Each of them hopes to eradicate common failings by restructuring society. Islam tries to eliminate economic exploitation by outlawing interest on money; Marxism prohibits profits for the same reason. In the end, neither succeeds, for both interest and profits are vital to a functioning economy. They can be disguised but not eliminated. The same applies to taxation: Islamic taxes specified in the Qur'an are insufficient for an industrial or agricultural economy; Marxist taxes err in the other extreme by being so heavy that they destroy incentives to excel. In each case, concessions to reality must be made.

Because governments must implement the Islamic and Marxist systems, they become involved in nearly every aspect of life. Islam and Marxism have something to say about family relations, education and warfare, therefore all these activities have political significance and are subject to political manipulation. Each of them therefore faces the likelihood of slipping into totalitarianism (that is, government control of everything), a temptation to which they frequently succumb.

Other similarities follow from these: the universal aspirations of the two lead them both to disdain national boundaries, they esteem the needs of the community over those of the individual and prefer egalitarianism over freedom. This last implies that activist Muslims often have a strong socialist streak - thus the several attempts, noted earlier, to reconcile socialism to Islam. ¶

The point of this discussion is not to demonstrate that Islam and Marxism are similar but that, contrary to most analyses, Islam shares as much with Marxism as it does with liberalism. Activist Muslims are not predisposed to align with the West against the Soviet bloc; their affinities and antagonisms being roughly equal, they cancel each other out. Much more important than these are the practical, specific needs

perceived by Muslim leaders. Acting in a world dominated by great powers which are fundamentally unfriendly to Islam's way of life, activists choose foreign policies which best insure its survival. Their international relations are self-interested and motivated by Realpolitik.

Looking at the American and Soviet positions in the world, activist Muslims, as many others, are coming to the conclusion that Soviet might is increasing and that they must prepare for the changes that this will bring in coming years. A clear pattern of accommodation can be discerned in the actions of the leading activist rulers: those in Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.

Iranian leaders are keenly aware of their own vulnerability, due to Iran's strategic and economic significance, their failing economy, and the almost complete paralysis of the administration and armed forces. Despite these constraints and the demands of ideology, Iranian foreign policies do reflect the fears and interests of its new rulers. While Khomeini and his followers scream against America, its past role in Iran, its allies (e.g. Israel), and verbally abuse its president, they say relatively little against the Soviet Union. They tread lightly on such subjects as the atheism of the Soviet leaders, continued Russian rule over 45 million Muslims in the Soviet Union, and the recent invasion of Afghanistan. This deference follows from the recognition that Iran's future will be in large part determined by relations with its powerful northern neighbor.³⁹

Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi's fervent Islam has not prevented him from playing games with the great powers. In the first years of his rule, after 1969, he maligned the atheists running the Soviet Union, but, with time, he found them easier to deal with than the Western leaders; and more sympathetic too, for they tended to align more with Libya on international issues (especially the conflict with Israel). Since 1975, Libya's weapons

have come predominantly from the USSR; they arrive in such quantities that Libya could serve as a Soviet arsenal in case of war either in the Mediterranean area or in Africa.

The government of Saudi Arabia clings to Islam as an ideology and as the rationale for the state's existence (paralleling the Soviet dependence on Marxism); this is the reason given for its persistent refusal to establish diplomatic ties with any Communist country. But Saudi Arabia did enjoy diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union before the Second World War - when these were deemed advantageous. The Saudi position does not represent an immutable doctrine but a flexible response. Saudi leaders recently decided to warm up to the Russians again, allowing overflight rights, improving relations with several Soviet client states, and dropping hints of formal diplomatic ties.

Zia ul-Haqq, the Pakistani dictator, has tried to shore up his faltering control of the country with Islam. He declared an ambitious program of Islamization in 1977, though so far only superficial steps in that direction have been taken. Islamization is no impediment, however, to accommodation of the Soviets over the Afghanistan invasion. Zia ul-Haqq rejected \$400 million in U.S. military aid on the grounds that this would provoke the Soviet Union without protecting Pakistan; this is perhaps a shrewd political decision, but it is one unaffected by Islamic goals. Also, Pakistan is closely allied with the Communist Chinese and receives arms from them.

In conclusion, a survey of activist Muslim regimes shows them to be among the most likely to accommodate to power; the same holds true, less consistently, for all Muslim regimes, regardless of political orientation. A Muslim background affects the conduct of modern states in two crucial ways, making them more volatile and more sensitive to changes in the political climate.

III

Soviet Tenacity and the Third World - As a result of experience in Pakistan 25 years ago, Professor Burton Marshall termed the new state "unstructured" and presciently observed that such states, in the nature of things, would have low "contractual capability." They would hardly constitute dependable allies given their internal instability; indeed it was necessary to term them "second-class allies" precisely in order to differentiate them from those of the first order on whom greater reliance could be placed.

In recent years, precisely this undependability has provided the basis for a corollary assumption of policy - namely that no concern need be felt over the defection of third world states to the Soviet orbit, as they would not last long therein.

The belief that the Soviets will in fact always prove themselves expelled from third world states is based on what happened in Egypt and Somalia, and in Ghana and Sudan before them. Thus there is a hard factual starting point. But historical precedent alone is insufficient justification for allowing such an assumption to stand, especially during a period of growing Soviet activity. One must look in the first instance at the states from which Moscow was expelled. In Egypt Moscow had a decade and a half of privileges through its involvement and aid, which were in no way obviated by the eventual expulsion.⁷ It ultimately was thrown out at least in part because it was unwilling to pay the price of accommodation to new Egyptian needs - but which it could well have done had greater opportunities (as for example in the subcontinent and in the Horn) not beckoned. In Somalia, Moscow used its aid to the military there as the price of entry

to the Horn, while the Somalis openly used the aid to further their own irredendist aims; when a vastly more substantial opportunity opened for the Soviets in the potentially more truly radical situation in Ethiopia, Moscow was pleased to risk its ethnically based stake in Somalia for the much bigger, more ideologically useful one next door.

But the key fact is that Soviet involvement in the third world has reached a new stage, one in which Moscow's tenacity of purpose may well pay off in a far more substantial manner than hitherto. For the Soviets are now involving themselves in a comprehensive manner only where their situation control is commensurate with the risk.

Unlike the United States, which tried to quit the game when the going got rough in Vietnam, the Soviet Union learned from its mistakes throughout the third world. It learned how little it could rely on supposedly charismatic - but usually in reality simply narcissistic - leaders for a permanent footing (Ghana); it learned what bad will Soviet soldiers and sailors created ashore (Egypt); and it found how difficult it is to ride an ethnic tiger (Somalia). It learned how ineffective it was at giving economic aid - which it therefore virtually ceased to offer.

Moscow, in sum, by the mid-1970s, had learned what not to do. The new vacuum created by the Western withdrawals of power - Britain from East of Suez, the U.S. more generally - helped tell it what it could do. This was to get control of geographically critical states using tools that would not unduly upset the quiescent state of Western opinion. Cuban troops, for example, could serve the same purpose Soviet troops would have, but without alarming the West as much, and thus accomplishing much more. Even East German security assistance is rationalized in the West on the basis of increasing differentiation of East European-Soviet interests.

As Frank Fukuyama has demonstrated, the Soviets have thus in several cases achieved a meaningful hold on several crucial states, by escalating the stakes.⁴⁰ Even where they have failed to accomplish their high goals, as in Iran, they have managed despite everything to remain the preferred superpower partner, precisely because they are perceived as the most durable. An African diplomat recently stated privately that, at the most recent conference of the Organization of African Unity, "not one head of state would have dared criticize the Soviet Union" - any more than any third world state would kidnap Soviet diplomats or burn down a Soviet embassy.

In this section, we will briefly examine one geographic sphere, the Caribbean, from a power projectional perspective. For even here, where geography is vastly more favorable to the West, the Soviets have been able to expand their influence.

Soviet Power Projection In The Caribbean

Recent world events have brought into sharp focus regional trends that have been in place for a number of years. Among the most strategically significant of these is the changing balance of power in the Caribbean. We are currently witnessing no less than the maturation of a Soviet forward base system in what has historically been considered an American Lake. The pattern that is emerging is familiar to other parts of the world, but represents a divergence within the Western hemisphere: for twenty years, the Cuban revolution was contained - suddenly, Granada and Nicaragua have experienced leftist revolutions and coups, and those new governments are firmly in place. El Salvador is currently in a state of civil war, and political violence is rampant in Jamaica. The question is

not so much whether the Caribbean is ripe for revolution, but whether the Soviet Union, with Cuba as a proxy, can translate political unrest in the area into strategic gains.

The geostrategic value of the Caribbean is largely, but not solely, a function of its proximity to the U.S. Fifty percent of the U.S.'s imported oil transits Caribbean waters.⁴¹ Much of this oil is transferred from super tankers to smaller ships at deep water harbors on the islands. The Caribbean Sea bisects the North and South Atlantic, and of course, is essential to passage through the Panama Canal. The Caribbean offers a prime basing area for patrolling North America's eastern seaboard: current U.S. strategy for a European war rests upon safe and secure passage of troops and arms across the North Atlantic. The control of the Caribbean is a prerequisite to any such strategy.

Soviet Activity

One of the steadier rhythms of modern history synchronizes major Soviet efforts in the Caribbean with the inauguration of American presidents. The coordination of two seemingly independent phenomena has given rise to a theory that the Soviets view the Caribbean as a 'testing ground' on which to try the nerves of new presidents. If true, 1981 could well be a year of crisis in the region.⁴²

The earliest incident of Soviet involvement in the Caribbean is too well documented elsewhere to require elaboration here.⁴³ Let it suffice to say that it is important to view the Cuban missile crisis not only as a victory for the U.S., but as a valuable lesson in power projection for the Soviets. For, in contrast to this first blundering attempt, ensuing efforts have been marked by steadily improved timing, appropriate stealth,

and an appreciation for American domestic politics. As a result, they have met with unprecedented success.

It was in 1969, only months after President Nixon took office, that the first Soviet naval squadron entered the Caribbean since 1962. The nine Soviet ships visited three ports, and stayed in Caribbean waters only 32 days. Over the next decade, Soviet warships would visit the Caribbean 19 times. Thirteen of these visits would include submarines.⁴⁴

In the fall of 1970, the Soviets began construction of a nuclear submarine base at Cienfuegos Bay on Cuba's southern shore. The establishment of such a base would facilitate the operation of the Soviets' Yankee-class submarines, which patrol the North American coast line. When American intelligence reports made Soviet intentions clear, the Nixon administration moved to negotiate a halt to construction, considering the Soviet action a violation of the 1962 agreement.⁴⁵ The Soviets denied that the structures at Cienfuegos were for servicing nuclear submarines and construction was halted. It is significant though, that whatever had been built at Cienfuegos was left intact. For, later in the decade, the nuclear submarine base would become a reality.

Between 1974 and 1978, Soviet naval activity in the Caribbean declined. Soviet preoccupation with other areas of the world, such as Angola (1974) and Ethiopia (1977) returned the Caribbean to its historical peripheral status. In addition, the Soviets were naturally supportive of a rapprochement between the U.S. and Cuba, as Cuba's need for economic support became more and more of a drain. Finally the negotiations over the Panama canal had Soviet approval, and the Soviets did not wish to jeopardize its chances for success.⁴⁶

In 1977, President Carter declared a halt to overflight surveillance of Cuba. In 1979 the fruits of this policy were revealed. An August 17 satellite picture confirmed the presence of the now-famous Soviet brigade, 2500 to 3000 men in three under-strength battalions armor, artillery, and infantry.⁴⁷ In October, intensified U.S. surveillance revealed the construction of a second naval pier at Cienfuegos. The expanded facility's size casts further doubt on the public rhetoric that the base is used for training purposes only.

The exact purpose of the Soviet brigade is probably a mix of several possible functions - from a political point of view, the ostensible purpose may well be irrelevant. The brigade, though well-armed and equipped, lacks any sealift or airlift capacity.⁴⁸

While it received less publicity, the expansion of the Cienfuegos base is potentially more threatening. During a crisis, it is speculated that the Soviets could transfer submarines from their northern fleet, normally based at Sevodvinsk, a north of Murmansk, to the Cuban base, in order to threaten American ships moving out of East Coast and Gulf ports.⁴⁹ The U.S.'s tacit acceptance of the base rests on the technicality that, because no Soviet submarines are now moored at Cienfuegos, the base does not constitute a violation of the 1962 agreement.⁵⁰

Cuban Capability

Cuba's ability and willingness to project military power into far away climes is usually thought to be dependent on the Soviet Union. The notion that Cuban activity in Africa would not be possible without Soviet air support and, more generally, Soviet military aid, does not take into account recent improvements in Cuban military capability. It is instructive to remember that the Cubans moved their first troops into Angola with their own transportation, only later did they rely on Soviet logistical support.⁵¹

Cuban ground forces number about 90,000 men on active duty, with perhaps 180,000 reservists, many of whom have seen duty in Africa. The Cuban air force consists of over 200 modern aircraft, including MIG-27s.⁵² The incident involving the sinking of a Bahamian patrol vessel and the strafing of her crew in May, 1980, should lay to rest any doubts that the Cubans are unwilling to use their superior military might to cow their less well-armed neighbors.⁵³

Cuban apologists point to the fact that no overt Cuban military action has taken place to date within the Caribbean. It should be made clear that this has not been for lack of capability. The most recent addition to the Cuban air force of An-27s has further upgraded their airlift capability. With the cementing of alliances with Grenada and Nicaragua, it is likely that, should those regimes be threatened, Cuba would respond to an invitation to intervene. The Soviet role in such an action is a matter of conjecture. It is doubtful that Soviet troops would be involved - but logistical support and increased arms supply are more likely.

The Political Climate

The domino theory has perhaps no greater witness than the Caribbean in recent years. In no other geographic sphere has the linkage between events in proximate countries been so linear. This is surely facilitated by the relative weakness of the governments involved, and the economic frailty of the countries themselves. Yet the over-riding causal factor must remain the growth of Soviet presence in the area and the corresponding perceived lack of American will to uphold allies not only in this sphere, but elsewhere as well.

The Caribbean and Central American states as a group represent one of the most politically volatile areas of the third world. In the words of one

official, the area is "America's Balkans",⁵⁴ and just as explosive as that part of southern Europe prior to World War I. While it may be true (as is argued by many US officials) that the major problem for these governments is economic, poverty is not without its political and military consequences.

The most significant event in the area in recent years was the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua in the summer of 1979. The junta that succeeded him was firmly backed by Cuba, but initially publicly eschewed any ties with the Soviet Union. Tomas Borge, interior minister and member of the Sandinista army's general command, said in August, "we don't want to buy arms from socialist countries so as not to give pretexts in the sense that we are aligning ourselves politically (with the Communists)."⁵⁵

American aid was slow in coming, owing to Congressional doubts as to the true nature of the regime. In April, 1980, the only two moderate members of the five person junta resigned from the government, leaving the top posts firmly in the hands of leftists.⁵⁶ Soon after, the first cooperative agreement was signed between Moscow and Managua. Meanwhile, Cuba continues to send doctors, teachers, military equipment, and military instructors.

The success of the Sandinista junta in Nicaragua is at least partially tied to the outcome of events in neighboring El Salvador. In October, 1979, a bloodless military coupe placed young officers and moderate civilian leaders in power. In January, 1980, the Christian Democratic Party joined them in power. While trying to chart a moderate route to land reform, financial reform, and a degree of democracy, the JNG faces opposition from both the extreme right, whose economic interests are threatened by proposed reforms, and the leftists who want a Cuban-style

revolution. Political violence has escalated in recent months as tensions rise. At least one right wing coup attempt has been blocked by US efforts, and El Salvador has remained receptive to U.S. aid, which, in the wake of the Nicaraguan Revolution, seems to be more forthcoming. This spring, the Carter administration approved \$5.7 million in military aid, and \$50 million in economic assistance. Observers on the scene are pessimistic about the outcome, however, from the point of view of U.S. interests.⁵⁷

In the Caribbean proper, Cuban influence is on the rise. In Grenada, a small country even by Caribbean standards, Maurice Bishop, a London-educated lawyer, ousted Prime Minister Eric M. Gairy in 1979. Only 54 soldiers were needed to storm and occupy the palace. Initially welcomed by moderate interests on the island, Bishop quickly jailed at least 70 political opponents, suspended the constitution, and shut down the island's only independent newspaper; 350 Cuban advisers arrived including engineers, who began building airport, large enough for military jets. It is currently speculated that the airport will serve as a military base for the Soviet Union.

In Jamaica, political violence has escalated thanks to the upcoming presidential election this fall that will pit current president Michael Manley against the more moderate Edward Seaga. Manley's Marxist proclivities were confirmed in a speech made in Cuba in August, 1979.⁵⁸ There are currently 300 Cuban advisers now serving in Jamaica, including a 15 member unit from Cuba's Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI). The Soviet Union has a 60-man embassy staff on the island and is suspected of including KGB agents to keep Manley informed of opposition activity on the island.

Jamaica's economy is among the most beleaguered of all in the Caribbean. Recent cutbacks of U.S. aid and IMF reluctance to advance more

icans will certainly affect the outcome of upcoming elections, if they are held at all. There is reason to believe that, if Manley were convinced that elections would result in his defeat, he would move to consolidate power, possibly by outlawing the opposition.

We began this section by reviewing the strategic importance of the Caribbean, an area whose strategic value would increase by an order of magnitude in the event of a U.S. foreign war. At no time in modern maritime history has the U.S. been less able to ensure control of the area than now. To rectify this situation, several steps have been taken⁵⁹:

- o Surveillance of Cuba by the SR-71 Blackbird spy plane has been renewed.
- o A Caribbean Task Force has been headquartered at Key West, which by the end of the summer of 1980, will be equipped with the first of a number of Hydrofoil missile patrol boats.
- o Economic aid to the area has been stepped up including a proposed 10-20 million in military credit sales and military training aid.

IV

Another variable affecting Soviet involvement in the third world is its relative degree of economic, cultural, or political involvement therein compared to that of the West. As one can see from the accompanying tables, Soviet involvement is smaller by, in some cases, an order of magnitude or more. This fact has permitted the argument to be made on both sides against the notion that there is in fact any large scale threat to Western interests. Thus, for example, in 1975 before the most recent phase of Soviet involvement in Southwest Asia, Senator Edward Kennedy wrote that

"the Soviet Union is not in a position to wield much leverage vis-a-vis the Persian Gulf energy situation. It will not import significant quantities of oil and natural gas from the area for the foreseeable future - nor are its goods likely to be sought after by the oil producers."⁶⁰ By logic and historical experience, one might have argued, in contrast, that it is the lack of dependence on that source of energy, combined with its geographic proximity, which in fact gives Moscow leverage in the Persian Gulf region.

When four years later, it was apparent that Moscow would remain extremely interested and active in the area, and that in the medium term it might well need oil therefrom, its mischief-making was once again explained (this time by a high civilian official of the Defense Department) in terms of the fact that "the Soviets have no interests to speak of in the region, and thus can afford to make trouble."⁶¹ The assumption again was that their lack of interests in the Middle East made their trouble almost benign instead of all the more dangerous to us.

FOOTNOTES

1. See W. Scott Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of Soviet and U.S. Capability (New York: NSIC Agenda Paper, 1978) Chapter 5.
2. Presentation, Conference on the Future Role of Naval and Marine Forces, April 1980, Georgetown University, Center for Strategic and International Affairs.
3. For example, see "Excerpts of SALT Comments by Vance and Brown", (Washington Star, July 10, 1979) p 5, and "Joint Chiefs Said to Assure Carter of Support for Treaty" (New York Times, June 20, 1979 p 1.
4. See Samuel Huntington, "Foreign Aid: For What and For Whom" (Foreign Policy, Winter, 1970-71) esp. p 130-31.
5. As a Nigerian put it at an ISA National Defense Ministry Conference, "We Africans have been conquered and reconquered for five hundred years. If there is one thing we have learned in this period it is who is winning and who is losing. It's the only way we can survive." Cited in W. Scott Thompson, "Africa For the Africans" (Commentary, Sept. 1978).
6. See Igor Glagulev, "The Soviet Decision-Making Process In the Arms Control Negotiations", Orbis (Winter 1978).
7. See Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980), p 266-267, and Henry Kissinger, White House Years.
8. "Down the Arc of Instability" New Times (Moscow: Feb 1980) Emphasis added.
9. See W. Scott Thompson, "The Projection of Soviet Powers" in Defending America (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
10. See W. Scott Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of Soviet and U.S. Capabilities, also see Chapter 6 for a more tentative examination of these variables.
11. See Boyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerilla, Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice (New York, Knopf, 1971).
12. See W. Scott Thompson, "Political Violence and the 'Correlation of Forces'", Orbis, (Winter, 1976) p 1270-1288.
13. See Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980) p 37-41 for a current and well argued statement on this old theme.

14. See Robert Moss, "The Campaign to Destabilize Iran", Conflict Studies, #101, November 1978, and Brett Silvers and W. Scott Thompson, "The Challenge to Ataturk's Revolution", paper presented to the Symposium "NATO After Three Decades" The Turkish Atlantic Treaty Association, June 25, 1979.

Conversations with Security officials in Turkey in July 1979 indicated the existence of an extensive Soviet role in certain aspects of contemporary Turkish terrorism.

15. We distinguish between two political consequences of Islam: those that affect all persons coming from an Islamic background and those specific to Muslims actively pursuing Islamic goals.
16. Richard V. Weekes, ed., Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey Westport, Conn., 1978), Appendix 1. We have amended some figures.
17. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Uganda.
18. Malaysia, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, the Sudan, Libya.
19. Arab-Israel, Pakistan-India, Turkey-Greece and Cyprus, in the Philippines, Thailand, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Chad.
20. Libya and Algeria against Morocco in the Western Sahara, Libya-Egypt, the two Yemens, Iraq-Iran, Kurds-Persians in Iran.
21. Some examples of this come from Malaysia, India, Lebanon, and Nigeria.
22. An account of Islamic ideals may be found in E.I.J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam: An Introductory Outline (Cambridge, England, 1958) or Majid Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law of Islam, 2d ed. (Baltimore, 1955).
23. Elaboration of this may be found in Daniel Pipes's forthcoming Slave Soldiers and Islam: The Genesis of a Military System (New Haven, 1981), Chapter 3.
24. In regard to its non-national orientation, Islam may be compared to Marxism.
25. Sylvia Haim, "Introduction" in Arab Nationalism: An Anthology, ed., Sylvia Haim (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962).
26. The unique qualities of Arab nationalism become more apparent when one notes that the far-flung speakers of other languages (e.g. Spanish, Chinese, English) do not make comparable attempts to unify.
27. Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," Foreign Affairs, (Winter, 1978-79) p. 355.
28. Other important examples: Egypt under Nasser and Iraq since 1978.
29. For details, see Daniel Pipes' articles: "Saudi and Libyan Muscle," New York Times, November 8, 1979; "This World is Political!! The Islamic Revival of the 1970s," Orbis 24 (1980), p 29-32; "Southeast Asia's Islamic Movements," Eight Days, July 1980; "Saudi and Libyan Power, A New International Force?" (forthcoming).

30. Udo Steinbach, "Saudi Arabiens neue Rolle im Nahen Osten, Aussenpolitik 27 (1974), p. 202-13.
31. For most of these conflicts, information must be found in daily press reports; so far, they have not been studied in depth.
32. Unpublished paper, private correspondence with the author.
33. See W. Scott Thompson, "The Soviets' African Waltz" The American Spectator (November 1978) p 9.
34. Nominal Muslims take none of Islam's precepts too seriously, though their faith may be sincere; reformists are open to Western influences to varying degrees.
35. His Insan, Islam va Maktabha-yi Maghribzamin has been translated by R. Campbell as Marxism and Other Western Fallacies: An Islamic Critique (Berkeley 1980).
36. Explained in Part II of his Green Book, The Solution of the Economic Problem: "Socialism."
37. Marx had to deny the validity of religion in order to establish socialism as the last state in a long evolution (slavery-serfdom-capitalism-socialism); Shari'ati and al'Qadhdhafi need not because they see socialism as an inherent to Islam and therefore dispense with Marx's ideas of historical development.
38. For example, Shari'ati, Marxism, p 84.
39. For a fuller discussion of Iran's actions, see Daniel Pipes, "Khomeini, the Soviet and U.S." The New York Times, May 27, 1980: "Khomeini's Foreign Policy," Eight Days, 28 June and 5 July 1980.
40. Frank Fukuyama, "The New Soviet Strategy", Commentary, December, 1979.
41. See "Powder Keg at Our Doorstep", US News and World Report, May 19, 1980, p 21.
42. See Walter Pincus, "The Next Cuba Crisis: 1981", The Washington Post (October 28, 1979) p B-1.
43. See for example, Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969; also Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown 1971).
44. See James D. Theberge, "Soviet Naval Presence in the Caribbean Sea Area" in Problems of Sea Power As We Approach the Twenty-First Century, ed by James L. George (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research) p 184.
45. Ibid. p 189. See Also The New York Times December 3, 1975; January 5, 1971; January 6, 1971 and November 15, 1971.
46. James B. Theberge, p 192.
47. See David Binder, "Soviet Brigade: How U.S. Traced It" New York Times (September 13, 1979) p 76.

48. See "Harold Brown Talks With The News" The Miami News (October 9, 1979) p 26. According to the secretary, "The present ones, two or three thousand Soviet troops in Cuba, even though they have some tanks and some armoured personnel carriers, are not going to do any damage anywhere except in Cuba, so that by themselves they are not a matter of great concern."

Also see the text of President Carter's speech on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, "We Are Confident of Our Ability to Defend The Nation," The Washington Post (September 8, 1979), p 8.

49. See Drew Middleton, "Allies Foresee Wartime Peril in Cuban Base", The New York Times (December 3, 1979) p 5.
50. See UPI, "Soviets Begin Building New Cuban Navy Pier At Cienfuegos Site" The Washington Star (October 31, 1979) p 8.
51. Roger W. Fontaine, "The Regional Projection of Military Power The Caribbean" (conference paper, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 28, 1980), p 27.
52. Ibid. p 22.
53. See Lewis H. Diaguid, "4 Die As Cubans Sink Patrol Boat In the Bahamas" The Washington Post (May 12, 1980) p 14.
54. See Graham Hovey, "Caribbean Outlook Found Grim" The New York Times July 2, 1980.
55. Robert Suro, "Nicaragua Wants US Arms to Avoid Any Hint of Soviet Ties, Sandinist Says" The Washington Star (August 13, 1979) p 3.
56. See "Central America: Why Such A Hotbed" US News and World Report (May 19, 1980) p 23.
57. Interviews by W. Scott Thompson, Spring, 1980.
58. See "Troubled Waters: Challenges for the US and Targets for Cuba" Time (October 22, 1979) p 45.
59. See "Navy To Send Hydrofoils To Duty In Caribbean" Richmond Times-Dispatch (April 1, 1980) p B-3, and "Carter Plan, Latin Command and Steps Up Watch On Cuba" The New York Times (October 2, 1979) p 1.
60. Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control?" Foreign Affairs (October, 1975) p 20.
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Chapter IV

THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1980's: A CONTINUING THEATER OF CONFLICT

Introduction

The remainder of the 20th century will be a period of immense difficulty for the developing countries. The promise of development which existed during the 1950's and 1960's has given way to despair as the rapid and continuing increases in energy prices threatens their prospects for survival. In addition the seemingly intractable problems of population growth and urban decay erodes annual incremental progress. Many of the states in the developing world are also undergoing political transitions from the leadership of their post-independence period to a generation of leaders which grew up during the frustrating failures of the 1970's. This group does not share the ideological outlook of the previous decision-makers.

Their perspectives are parochial; where views are shared, it is in a regional context rather than the global view which gave birth to UNCTAD in the early 1960's. The ideological fragmentation is a result of differing stages of development which, at some international levels, turns developing countries into competitors rather than colleagues. The world balance of power is no longer bifurcated. In its place are differing power centers, the U.S., U.S.S.R., China, OPEC nations, Western Europe, and Japan, which continue to compete but at a reduced intensity. The nations of the world are becoming

more insular in their outlook. The insularity, particularly of the United States, has provided opportunities for some states to expand their interests.

The 1980's promises to be a period during which the United States attempts to reassert its power in the world militarily while pursuing parochial economic interests at home. This may not be possible. The interests of the Third World will continue to be economic rather than military. Because of their global fragmentation, they are also less likely to pursue the types of military alliances which the U.S. has favored in the past. Alliances are formed by nations with similar concerns. Those concerns today are economic, not political. But because of the United States' own concern for its economic condition, it is less likely to pursue the types of economic alliances, eg. North-South forums, which require economic concessions, eg. lowered trade barriers and increases in aid, for their formation. The United States appears poised to enter the 1980's with the wrong policy--reduced economic aid and increases in military assistance--at the wrong time.

The inadequacy of such a policy can best be understood by reviewing the changes which have occurred to differentiate Third World interests during the last thirty years, as well as the economic and social problems these countries will face in the coming decade.

A Process of Differentiation

The failure to develop a common set of regional geopolitical variables resulted from the increasing differentiation of states, and thereby of state interests, because of varying levels of development over the last twenty years. In the late fifties and early sixties when most of the developing countries were gaining

their independence, they shared common interests: the desire to attain freedom and to assert their independence from the interests of their former colonialists (many did so by developing ties to the Communist countries). They also shared a similar stage in development: most of the developing countries were poor, their populations rural, their economics essentially agricultural, with a trade sector oriented around one or two primary product exports. During the sixties and the seventies, this common situation of poverty among developing countries changed dramatically.

This change in the third world became apparent after the 1973-74 oil embargo and the attendant oil price increases. An attempt was made at recategorizing the less developed countries (LDCs) in terms of the impact of the oil price increases on their development prospects. This attempt proved inadequate in accurately describing the differing nature of every developing country.¹

The twenty years which most LDCs have had since gaining their independence has meant the emergence of an entire new catalogue of characteristics for describing the differences between states. It is no longer sufficient to describe states as Low, Middle, or High Income. Now their resource bases must be considered: are they net oil importers or exporters? Are they mineral resource exporters or primary product exporters? Are they semi-industrialized or agricultural? These terms, specific in nature, indicate the wide range of economic characteristics which are now used to differentiate the members of the international system. The jargon of development is not irrelevant to a discussion of the political implications of differentiation.

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COMPARATIVE POWER PROJECTIONAL CAPABILITIES: THE SOVIET UNION A--ETC(U)

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
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The increase in differentiation accompanied a decline in ideology as a determinant of the Third World behavior. Homogeneity among developing countries permitted states to act internationally as blocs, and bloc behavior required a neat ideological division between North and South, East and West, which clearly demarcated interests. The rise of differentiated levels of development among LDCs meant the collapse of bloc interests and the decline of ideology as a factor in state behavior. LDCs no longer functioned as blocs but in terms of specific national interests called into question by the crisis of the moment. In most cases the specific interest of LDCs was determined by economic constraints. What will be the economic constraints determining Third World behavior in the 1980s? If these constraints could be summed up in one word, it would be Energy. Higher oil prices and diminished oil supplies and their impact on the international economy will be the primary determinants of LDC growth in the 1980s. More precisely, they will determine the failure of most developing countries to significantly develop during this period. This failure to develop will bring on a new wave of political instability in the Third World. This period of instability coincides with a cooling of relations between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the tensions between these two antagonists give every indication of spilling over into the Third World. The increasing willingness and capability of the Soviet Union, or one of its surrogates, to interject military power directly into a Third World state, as they have in Afghanistan, Angola, and Ethiopia, make it important from a Western perspective to understand the sources of instability in the

Third World and to attempt to foresee those countries which are likely to be arenas of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the following sections, instabilities in the Third World will be more closely examined. First, factors creating the present economic crisis will be studied and their degree of impact on various states outlined. An evaluation of the seriousness of these economic problems, especially those relating to trade and demography, will be made. Subsequently, an analysis will be made of the factors contributing to political unrest in the Third World. Soviet influence and interest, and the reasons thereof, in developing countries in the 1980s will also be studied in this section. A case study appraisal of three countries, the Philippines, Turkey, and Zaire, will follow.

II. Problems in Development

That development has eluded most of the world's population is no surprise; that development has occurred in some states of the Third World is surprising. The appearance of success should not mask the problems persisting among even those few states fortunate to develop, e.g. South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico, and Venezuela. These problems show every sign of deepening in the 1980s as the world faces its greatest economic crisis since the Great Depression.² For those LDCs not so fortunate, the economic situation promises only continued deterioration. The latest World Bank predictions (which certainly err on the optimistic side) see a decline in growth for most of Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, with only the middle income

East Asian countries able to adjust relatively well to international economic pressures.³

A review of growth rates among LDCs illustrates clearly those countries in most difficulty: the greatest decline in growth for the 1970-1977 period among the low income countries has been in Mozambique, Madagascar, Uganda, and Angola; low growth rates have also been experienced over the same period in Burundi, Zaire, Niger, Sierra Leone, Central African Republic, Benin, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh. Among the middle income countries, the lowest growth (at least below 3%) has been in Ghana, Chile, Liberia, Zambia, and Argentina. (See Table 1 for growth rate comparisons).

The World Bank projects average annual percentage growth of GNP, at 1977 prices, in accordance with two scenarios. Even the high scenario is not overly optimistic and depends on increases in international trade, energy production, investment, and capital imports.⁴

Growth of GNP per capita					
		Low Case		High Case	
		1980-85	1985-90	1980-85	1985-90
1970-1980					
5.6%	Low Income Oil Importers				
		1.0	1.3	1.7	2.4
	Middle Income Oil Importers				
		2.0	2.4	2.6	3.5

Accordingly, there are sizeable doubts as to whether even the lowest of these growth rates will be met. (See Table 2, LDC Growth of Gross Domestic Product, 1970-1990).

Major Constraints on Growth: Trade and Demography

The developing countries face serious constraints on their growth rates in two major areas: trade and demography. In trade erratic commodity prices, rising external debt, the impact of higher energy costs, and declining development assistance will all provide almost insurmountable difficulties for their efforts to increase their growth rates at least through the 1980s. In demography, the pressures of rising population and growing urbanization allow little room for maneuver as demand increases for already limited resources. Even given the World Bank's best case scenario, by the year 2000, 470 million people will be living in absolute poverty.

Issues of Trade

The major trading problems of the 1980s - commodity price declines, rising external debt, and higher energy costs - will affect each developing country differently depending upon the level of its involvement in the international economic system.⁵ Developing countries may be said to fit three broad types: first are the large developing countries with a sufficiently developed internal market that their dependence on foreign markets as an outlet for their goods is relatively low (e.g. India, China, Brazil); these countries also usually contain sufficient domestic resources for their development (e.g. coal in India); foreign exchange however can be a restraining influence on development because of the need of these countries to import foreign technology and capital goods.

Secondly, there are the small, resource-rich LDCs who tend to be major primary product exporters (e.g. the Philippines); these coun-

tries have open economies in the sense that they need to earn foreign exchange in order to provide for some of their import needs; in the long term these countries may also develop their own industries but in the meantime they remain highly susceptible to international economic developments.

Thirdly there are the small, resource-poor LDCs; those which have developed have done so by developing their domestic industry with an orientation toward exporting (e.g. South Korea); those that have not developed are exporting a few primary products but have little room for diversifying into other products or for developing an industrial base (e.g. Senegal). Included in this last grouping are those countries which might be considered development marginals (e.g. Niger): they have no resources to speak of, are extremely poor, and their future depends on foreign assistance and aid. In the next section the problems of all LDCs will be examined according to the effects that trade developments in the eighties will have on them.

Problems in Trade

Trends in both the volume and prices of LDC exports have been unfavorable; recent price trends in exports have been very erratic.⁶ The volume of primary product exports has grown by very little since 1973. The decline in developing exports was from 6.4% during 1965-1973 to 3.6% between 1973-1977. A major decline in primary product exports occurred in 1975-1976, the period of the United States recession.

Reasons for the decline are several. All developing country exports have suffered in recent years from slow and erratic growth in the developed countries, compounded by increased protectionism,

inflation, and exchange rate instability in those countries. Severe problems for primary product exports resulted from unfavorable international market conditions, adverse weather, and such other supply difficulties as inadequate incentives for production and low investment priorities by LDC government planners. Growth of manufactured good exports has also slowed, down from 15% during 1965-1973 to 11% between 1974-1977, because of slower economic growth and protectionism in the developed countries.

LDCs are highly dependent on access to developed nation markets as well as favorable growth in those countries. In 1976 nonfuel primary commodities accounted for 35% of total merchandise exports of LDCs and 65% of those exports went to developed countries. Manufactured exports are increasingly important to LDC growth prospects. In 1970 manufactured goods accounted for 27.5% of LDC exports (excluding petroleum), in 1977 the figure was 42.6% (but relatively few LDCs account for the majority of manufactured exports).⁷ (See Table 3, Major LDC Primary Product and Manufactured Good Exporters.) With the long term growth of primary product markets expected to decline, the expansion of manufactured good exports is vital for LDC growth. In 1976 the developed countries imported three-fifths of the total LDC manufactured exports.

The World Bank assumes that the developed countries will grow at an average 4.2% per annum in the 1980s and projects manufactured exports for LDCs on that basis.⁸ The growth rate for LDC primary product exports is predicted to return to historical levels if developed countries' growth momentum recovers, if there is an improvement in weather, and if there are incentives to increase

production. Even to attain these levels will require major policy reforms and discipline by developing countries. The capability of LDC governments to initiate such reforms is questionable. In this light the decline in LDC terms of trade should continue. (See Table 4, LDCs with Declining Terms of Trade.)

Growing Indebtedness

External debt is a problem of a few LDCs, mainly middle income countries. Many developing countries borrowed heavily on both a concessional and nonconcessional basis in the international capital markets following the 1973-1974 oil price hikes. By the end of 1977, their total external debt liability was approximately 320 billion. Between 1973-1977, medium and long term debt increased at 21.5% per annum. Some of this was to cover the increased cost of oil imports, some of it for use as a hedge, i.e. "anticipatory" borrowing, against future problems in the capital market, and some to cover unpredictable changes in foreign exchange earnings. Debt is not a problem as long as a country can meet its obligations to repay. But its ability to repay is dependent on its capability to use the money it borrows to increase production, i.e. GNP.

In order to understand the dimension of the international debt situation and its relevance to political stability certain aspects of the situation should be considered. These aspects relate not only to the worsening maturity structure of a particular state but also the the relation of a state's debt problems to the larger international financial community. What are the prospects for continued growth in commercial lending and can the international monetary and financial community handle efficiently liquidity crises in debtor nations?

What is the likelihood of an increase in both the quality and the quantity of Official Development Assistance (ODA) with special reference to the needs of the poorest states? The answers to these questions are outside the control of the LDCs and depend on trends in the developed world which provide the financial assistance and control the international lending institutions.

The proportion of debt owed to private creditors has increased from 47% in 1970 to 60% in 1977. Almost all the debt (94%) owed to private sources by the end of 1977 was held by the middle income LDCs. (See Table 5, External Public Debt of LDCs, 1970 and 1977.) Middle income states have increasingly tied their future development prospects to Western financial assistance. This is a two-way street. For not only are the LDCs dependent on maintaining their creditworthiness with the West, but the financial stability of some of the international banks is becoming dependent on stability among these countries.⁹

For the middle income countries as a group this debt does not yet appear to be onerous: debt service as a percentage of exports (an indicator of a country's ability to repay) did not significantly increase between 1970-1977. But for those twenty-four out of fifty-four middle income countries whose debt service ratio did increase, their debt service ratio has more than doubled during the same period. Looking at the low income countries, the ratio has almost tripled for twelve countries (out of thirty-seven). (See Table 6, Debt Service Ratio Increases Among LDCs.) There is cause therefore for serious concern about the external debt situation of some developing countries.

During 1977-1978, international liquidity allowed a more rapid expansion than previously of private lending (largely through banks) and helped to ease lending terms, thereby extending the availability of loans to a wider number of middle income countries and lengthening the time for maturity (two-thirds of the Eurocurrency credits obtained in 1978 had maturities of over 7 years; this was true of only 13% in 1977).¹⁰ Four-fifths of the external financing for middle income countries in 1976 was met by loans at market terms with private sources accounting for over 85% of this lending. But the maturity structure of medium and long term debt is worsening: nearly 50% of the total debt outstanding, including undisbursed, was by the end of 1977 scheduled to be repaid during 1978-1982 (private debt was 70% of this amount). Repayment will have to be made during a period of slower growth in the developed countries and, consequently, of lower demand for middle income country goods.

The World Bank believes that the middle income countries will be able to meet this repayment schedule. If not, defaults will result and loans will likely be rescheduled at reduced terms. The commercial banks can do little else. A number of developing countries have experienced repeated debt reschedulings in recent years and that number will certainly grow. Since 1974, 18 countries have had to seek multilateral debt negotiations. Their inability to repay resulted not from a higher rate of borrowing but because of slower export growth which prevented them from servicing their debt. Such reschedulings are not in themselves important indicators of political instability, but often as part of the rescheduling package, a country is forced to agree to an austerity package imposed by the commercial lenders or by the International Monetary Fund

(IMF). When in June 1976 the Peruvian government announced austerity measures, riots followed and a national emergency declared. More importantly, the involvement of Western commercial interests - however indirectly - in the economic policies of a developing country threatens to make them a target for any future dissatisfaction among the populace.

Because of the rising level of debt service, the growth of private lending will probably be low in the 1980s. Net private lending has been projected to grow at an average annual rate of approximately 10% in current prices (under 3% per annum in real terms) for 1975-1985.¹¹ The slowdown in lending growth does not reflect restraint on the part of the LDCs however. Rising debt service burdens and more careful risk appraisal by banks are making it more difficult for LDCs to borrow.¹² Some countries may experience liquidity shortages, particularly those countries with significant debt problems now: i.e. Peru, Sudan, Turkey, Zaire, and Zambia. Other countries with high debt but as yet no liquidity crunch may encounter problems: especially Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Philippines.

On the whole, private debt is unevenly distributed among the LDCs with seven countries accounting for over 50% of the outstanding debt to private creditors: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Spain, and Yugoslavia. In the past some of these countries have defaulted and their debt had to be renegotiated. The number of countries requiring debt renegotiations will increase, particularly given worsening maturity structures as well as uncertainty concerning the continued viability of commercial funds. In the future,

LDCs are going to require more reserves rather than less in order to maintain growth. Rising energy costs have caught them in a vicious circle: higher costs require more reserves, more reserves require more loans, more loans mean an external debt problem. The circle can only be broken if production increases.

While most of the middle income LDCs will be relying on commercial banking to fulfill their funding requirements, the low income (and even some of the poorer middle income countries) will depend on Official Development Assistance for their external capital needs: "[F]or low income countries, the level and pattern of future debt service precludes the taking on of significant new amounts of debt on other than concessional terms..."¹³ After the 1973-1974 embargo, many LDCs turned to the new-found wealth of OPEC to augment their assistance requirements but OPEC has responded niggardly to their needs, giving its aid for the most part to those states it traditionally loaned to. (See Table 7, Total Official Flow of Resources to Individual Developing Countries and Territories from OPEC Countries and Arab/OPEC Multilateral Institutions, 1974 to 1977.) Aid from the OECD countries continues to provide the bulk of official development assistance. But aid from OECD as a percentage of GNP has been declining and will likely decline in the future as the Western countries suffer from their own economic crises. (See Table 8, OECD Aid to LDCs.)

The period of 1979-1980 appears identical to that of 1973-1974: a large increase in oil prices coupled with a recession in the industrial countries will force many LDCs to return to borrowing heavily on the international capital market in order to finance the increase

in their oil costs as well as their normal import requirements. In the past it has been argued that as long as the LDCs were able to increase their production and as long as Western demand for their goods continued, the external debt problem was not a serious one, that even if balance-of-payments problems did arise they could be rectified through traditional monetary policies, e.g. exchange rate adjustments. But production is not increasing in the LDCs and Western growth may achieve at best an average growth rate of 3.3% per annum, not the 4.2% the World Bank supposes. Some projections see no growth at all for the U.S. between 1979-1985.¹⁴ The LDCs will find it difficult to survive without another round of borrowing. In the past ready access to capital has permitted many LDCs to postpone the difficult structural adjustments needed to develop realistic economic policies in light of their problems. In the future they will not be permitted that escape.

Energy In The Third World: No Fuel for Development

The increased cost of energy will place a severe financing burden on all but a few developing countries. This increased burden will seriously retard their economic and social development. However, what will happen if supplies are not adequate? If there is a shortfall in supply, the size of the LDC market share will be limited. They will be bid out of the market by richer countries. Without energy the LDCs have no hope of developing.

Currently, the developing countries have the fastest growing rate of energy consumption. It is their development fuel. Although starting from a lower level of consumption, they are becoming a large

market for the world's energy. Should the projections of their current development plans be reached (improbable though they may be), by 2000 the LDCs will need 35-40% of the world's oil supplies.¹⁵ Even if alternative energy sources are developed, oil will still be needed to fulfill 50% of their total energy requirements by 2000.¹⁶ But if traditional trends in development continue, between 2000 and 2020, oil consumption among non-OPEC LDCs will be comparable to present levels of U.S. consumption (18 million barrels a day).

Although the size of the LDC share in the current oil market is relatively small compared to the developed countries, it is of greater importance.¹⁷ (See Table 9, LDCs With Energy Imports as a Percentage of Merchandise Export Earnings Greater Than 20%.) Whereas developed countries have a capacity to conserve energy and develop the expensive new technologies needed to make energy more efficient, the LDCs must rely on traditional patterns. They face critical problems in four areas: the rising cost of imported oil, the lack of investment funds to develop their indigenous energy resources, a second "energy crisis" in traditional fuels, and a supply shortage.

The rising cost of imported oil is one of the primary causes for the LDC external debt problem. Since 1973, the LDCs have carried large current account deficits and have faced a deteriorating terms of trade. (See Table 10, LDCs with Negative Current Account Balances). In 1979 the non-oil exporting LDCs had a balance of payments deficit of \$43 billion, compared to \$31 billion in 1978.¹⁸ The LDCs now need \$10 billion to cover their present oil deficit. With the prospect of a 30% increase in some oil prices, this deficit will greatly increase in 1980. (See Chart 1 Petroleum Prices, 1972-

1979.)

In the past some LDCs have hesitated to pass on the full cost of the increase in price for imported oil to their consumers because of the dampening effect it would have on many of their development projects as well as the possibility that such increases would cause consumer protests.¹⁹ An increase in domestic prices has caused riots in such countries as the Sudan, Thailand, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines.

The most severe impact of higher energy costs has been felt indirectly, especially on the food chain.²⁰ High energy costs affect those countries which depend on imported food and those which depend on agricultural development. Those LDCs which import food now must use foreign exchange instead for oil imports. Additionally, the cost of food has risen in exporting countries as a result of the indirect effects of energy costs on their production process. (See Table 11, Major Food Importing LDCs.) High food import bills also limit the foreign exchange available to finance the capital equipment needed by industrializing LDCs (e.g. Chile, Jamaica, and Zambia). But the greatest impact is on those LDCs now trying to bring about a "Green Revolution" in their agricultural sector (e.g. India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand).²¹

Oil is a direct input into fertilizer, insecticide, and water production and it is also an indirect input into their cost through the farm, road, rail, and barge system used to distribute grain, fertilizers, and insecticides. For example, it is estimated that oil price increases have raised farmers' production costs by 30% in India and Pakistan. The higher costs of fuel and fertilizer will force the costs of grain production alone in India from \$140 a ton to \$155.²²

The higher costs of agriculture, especially in fertilizer production, means that countries such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Niger, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Zambia, and India, will produce less of their own food, leading to a decrease in primary product production and indirectly to an increase in the possibility of famine.²³

Lack of investment has been a serious constraint on LDC energy resource development. The annual investment requirement for non-OPEC LDCs needs to increase by 50% in real terms over current rates for energy supply to equal demand in the year 2000. Total capital requirements to achieve this self-sufficiency are estimated at \$125 billion.²⁴ Such large capital requirements for energy resource development places an additional burden on the international monetary system: resource development is a capital intensive, high risk business. Most LDCs lack a viable indigenous energy resource program. They lack the skills necessary to formulate the complex plans for energy development, the political will to make the hard decisions about policy, and the funding to implement what plans they do develop. Without such programs, LDCs have to rely on the willingness of international banks to lend and the multinational oil companies to invest.

While not facing up to their future energy needs, LDCs confront what might be considered a second energy crisis" in traditional fuel sources.²⁵ LDCs depend on traditional fuels (wood, agricultural wastes, animal dung) for their energy needs and these traditional sources are rapidly being consumed. Despite the fact that traditional fuels supply only 5% of world energy consumption, they account for approximately one-half the fuel needs of the oil

importing LDCs - in some rural areas it can account for more than 85% of energy consumed. About one-half of the world's population cooks with non-commercial energy. Such traditional fuel sources are highly inefficient - much of the usefulness of the fuel consumed is lost to the consumer because of traditional methods of burning it.

Additionally, there is also a growing scarcity of some traditional fuels, especially firewood.²⁶ The crisis in firewood is especially acute in parts of South Asia, the African states bordering the Sahara, Central America, and the Caribbean. Ninety percent of the people in these areas rely on wood as their primary fuel. Demand pressure on such fuels has led to an increase in deforestation and desertification: land erosion and siltation are a direct result of overreliance on traditional fuels. As a consequence, not only does the earth become less productive but also a greater period of productive time is spent in the search of fuel by the consumer. The lack of non-commercial energy is a hidden crisis in the LDCs because its exact dimensions are not well understood.

Supply shortages provide the final dimension to the LDC energy problem. Although OPEC is now planning on production cutbacks, even without such cutbacks it has been estimated that world oil production would peak before 2000 and by 2020 there would be less oil produced than currently.²⁷ OPEC cutbacks could reduce production in 1980 below the current 31 million b/d (nonOPEC production add about 20 million b/d to that figure) but present high inventories should allow sufficient supplies in 1980 without conservation.²⁸ However, the World Energy Conference recently predicted a reduction by one-third in conventional oil production.²⁹ In the medium- and long-term,

production cuts and supply interruptions (such as currently occurring in Iran) will conspire to make the world oil market tight. After 1985, world demand for oil should exceed supply.³⁰

The developing countries will be forced to outbid the rich nations for their share of world oil if supplies are restricted. In such bidding, they will no doubt lose. Instead the LDCs will involuntarily be compelled to reduce the amount of oil which they imported, consequently affecting their production growth.³¹

Some developing countries may be able to overcome their energy problems by developing their own indigenous oil sources. The World Bank estimates that the oil-importing LDCs which now have approximately 2% of the world's proven reserves may ultimately account for 15%.³² But oil and other energy resources are unevenly distributed. For example, although LDCs have almost 15% of the world's proven coal reserves, India alone accounts for half that amount.

Even despite new discoveries, supply will not equal demand for energy in the Third World. The developing countries are facing a serious energy crunch when they can least afford to-- just when for many the pace of their development seemed to be accelerating. Development does require an increase in energy consumption-- it is inescapable. The Industrial Revolution was based on cheap energy supplies. There is grave doubt if the LDCs can duplicate such a feat with expensive energy.

Demography Issues: Too Many People, Not Enough Resources

The population problem in LDCs is often recognized but its true dimensions and its impact of political stability are seldom considered. Population, urbanization, and living standards are in-

extricably intertwined. The pressures of rising population are accelerating a process of urbanization in the Third World before the necessary infrastructure can be developed to support the increase in people and before production can be increased to give them employment. Increases in living standards appear to be marginal: they seem to accrue to a select few while the majority live in poverty. The result is a promise of instability, providing the ground where the seeds of revolution can take root.

In this section the problems of population growth and urban development are considered. The impact of an increase in the youthfulness of most LDC populations on demands for social change is also examined.

Population: Too Many

Of the projected increase in world population between 1975-2000 of approximately 2 billion, more than 1.5 billion will be from the developing countries. Of that amount, low income Asian countries will provide the bulk of the increase, 680 million, while Sub-Saharan Africa will add 330 million, and Latin America an additional 250 million.³³ These of course are only approximate figures but if past population projections are to be any guide, population growth rates have been consistently underestimated. (See Chart 2, Population Estimates and Projections, 1950-2000.)

Several points need to be clarified. The first point concerns the impact of population pressures on living standards. The rapid increase in population is straining efforts to raise these standards. An annual population growth of 1% requires a compensating increase in annual income of 4% just to maintain existing levels of income. The

second point concerns the impact of population on the nature of the labor force. Despite peaking population growth, 500 million people will be added to the LDC labor force between 1975-2000. The high and increasing rates of population growth experienced in the late 1960s and 1970s will not be reflected in labor force growth rates until the 1980s and 1990s. In effect this is a delayed time bomb waiting to explode on LDC efforts to develop. It now takes less than thirty years for the LDC labor force to double. (See Chart 3, Labor Force Estimates And Projections 1950-2000.)

Unlike the period of the Industrial Revolution, today's Great Transformation must contend with a more rapidly growing labor force characterized by youthfulness. The high rate of unemployment experienced by first-time entrants into urban labor markets is as high as 20% for 15 to 24 year olds.³⁴ The frustration of the expectations these youths have is an important factor in determining urban unrest. The so-called "students" holding Americans hostage in Iran are for the most part unemployed, young urban workers.

The rapid increase in labor force has another important implication for LDCs: the continued expansion of the public service sector. Because of the lack of resources, the centralized structure of most LDC political systems, the greatest demand for jobs tends to be upon government institutions. In the poorer LDCs, a government job provides one of the few areas of growing employment opportunities. The inefficiency which results from the over-expansion of government bureaucracy tends to hinder other development efforts. The most extreme effects of population pressures are most clearly observed in urban areas.

Urbanization: Too Many in Too Small A Place

The LDC urban population is expected to grow from 650 million in 1975 to 1,600 million in 2000. This rapid increase in urban population size is a result of several factors: the natural growth of population, as examined above, the process of industrialization which draws upon labor from agricultural areas, and exogenous factors such as the Sahelian drought in Sub-Saharan Africa which forced many nomadic and agricultural peoples into urban areas. See Chart 4, Urbanization Estimates and Projections For Developing Countries, 1960-2000.

The rapid increase in urban populations is manifested in projections concerning city size. In 1950 only one city in the Third World had a population over 5 million compared to five such cities in the developed world. By 2000 at least 40 cities in developing countries will have populations of 5 million or more compared to 12 in the developed world and at least 18 cities in LDCs will have populations greater than 10 million.³⁵ (See Table 12, LDCs With Cities Or Over 500,000 People.)

Between 1950-1975, urban areas in LDCs absorbed approximately 400 million people. Between 1975-2000, they must absorb about 1 billion. This is true even though the rate of urban population growth is expected to decline after 1975. The importance of the impact of urbanization on growth and stability in the Third World cannot be underestimated.³⁶ (See Table 13, Urbanization Rates And Urban Population Growth, 1950-2000.) The urbanization process has been characterized by its rapidity, its high cost, and concentrated population settlement.

The excessively rapid pattern of urbanization has been caused by the large numbers of rural-urban migrants. While some studies show that these migrants are better educated and more highly motivated relative to those people who remain in rural areas, they also come with higher expectations and are perhaps less capable of adapting to urban pressures than those in cities. The result of frustrated expectations among unemployed workers provides a ready body for social unrest.

Urbanization has also heightened the disparity between the rich and the poor, not only between peoples but also between regions in the country. Economic activity in LDCs tends to be highly concentrated among, at most, a few major metropolitan regions. Other regions of the country viewing such concentrations feel neglected, leading in some cases to demands for autonomy. The high concentration of individual wealth gives visual proof to often just claims that a nation's wealth is being exploited by a few. The demands for social justice which result cannot be easily contained.

The rapid concentration of people in urban environments has also made development of these areas more difficult. Basic social and human infrastructure projects strain national budgets as population demands spiral out of control. Most LDC cities were built in and planned for another era. In some cases, they were constructed on terrain physically limited, such as on islands or peninsulas. The cost of providing basic but sufficient transportation, sewage disposal, water, and electricity outstrip the financial capability and talent of most LDC administrations. As in other areas of development problems, differences do exist among LDCs in their patterns of urbanization. The middle income countries of Latin

America are the most urbanized with over one-half of the current populations now living in urban areas. By 2000, three-fourths of their populations will be in cities. These cities will continue to grow with high wealth concentrated in strongholds surrounded by poverty. The SubSaharan African states are the least urbanized. Urban growth is a recent phenomenon and urban poverty will probably remain a relatively minor problem compared to rural areas. This does not mean that pressures will not remain, only that they may be more manageable. The low income Asian countries are also still predominantly rural; cities as yet do not provide the attractions for migrations as in other countries. However, in the low-income Asian countries where currently nearly one-half the LDC population now lives, the work force is expected to expand by over 120 million between 1977-1990. In middle income Asian countries urbanization is becoming a major problem. See Table 14, LDCs With High Urban Populations and High Average Annual Growth in Urban Populations.

Problems of urbanization do not result from high population per se but from the failure to develop employment opportunities. It is the rapid increase in labor force coupled with insufficient industrial growth which is leading to an increase in unemployment in urban areas. With over 20% of the 15 to 24 year olds unemployed in countries like Colombia, Kenya, and the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, urban problems are going to continue.

The high rate of unemployment is due in part to the character of population growth. In most LDCs more than 30% of the additions to urban population during the 1960s were migrants from rural areas. An even larger percentage occurred in some African states: more than 60%

in Ghana and Tanzania and more than 70% in the Ivory Coast.

In LDCs urbanization is taking place faster than it did in the developed countries where it took several decades, permitting the creation of economic, social, and political institutions; these are institutions which LDCs must now develop almost over-night to cope with higher population growth despite their lower incomes. Concurrently, there are fewer opportunities for the international migration of the unemployed. LDCs are caught in a bind which makes prospects for continued poverty the only possible outcome.

The number of poor is staggering. One-third of the total population from developing countries live in absolute poverty (below \$50 per capita GNP using World Bank standards). Almost three-quarters of Asian populations live in absolute poverty. In countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines, and Turkey, 15 to 30% of the populations live below the line of absolute poverty. Growth, moreover, in both GNP and exports has been greatest in those LDCs with less than one-third the total LDC population.

In its latest report the World Bank gives three scenarios projecting the number of absolute poor by 2000. But even under their high growth scenario, in 1990 the average income per person in LDCs would be less than 1/12th that of someone living in a developed country. In low income countries, the proportion slips to less than 1/40th the income. The income per person in the low and middle income states of Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase at the average rate of less than 1.5% during the 1980s. Most of the poor in these countries exist in rural areas where it is difficult to reach them with development programs.³⁷ (See Table 15).

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The World Bank projections may also err on the optimistic side. Population is growing rapidly and it has been underestimated in the past. The legacy of insufficient agricultural research and development will make it difficult to implement new programs. Ecological and climatic conditions are also difficult to predict. Deficiencies in physical and institutional structures of LDC governments are likely to remain. The future of many middle income countries is closely linked to international economic conditions. Should the growth of developed countries slow below predicted levels, the growth of all LDCs will also suffer.

The gap between the rich and the poor internationally may not cause international instability but the gap internally could lead to domestic instability. This gap is impossible to avoid: growth disenfranchises both the rich and the poor while the lack of growth concentrates wealth in a few.³⁸ Growth or the failure to grow are more important causal factors of instability than population growth and urbanization. For example, some areas of the world are dense but not unstable (i.e. Asia) while other areas are of relatively low population density (i.e. Africa and Latin America) but are highly unstable. The operative word, of course, is "relative". There is no evidence that population density can lead to external violence, but the pressure which density or rising density puts on internal resources can lead to violence.

Urbanization and population growth are likely to be a cause of problems in only a few states, mainly in Africa because of the lack of preparation or resources that these countries have to contend

with urban growth. While population densities will remain high in Latin America, nations on this continent are better equipped to satisfy the needs of their urban areas. Countries which will have major problems will be Pakistan, Guinea, Sudan, Angola, Ghana, Nigeria, Philippines, Zambia, Morocco, Ivory Coast, South Korea, Malaysia, and Turkey.

Conclusion: Prelude To Disaster

Economic conditions are an important, though little understood, cause of instability. The crisis in Iran is a case in point: instability was caused not so much by dislike for the Shah but because of the failure of his development policies. Food riots in Egypt and India, dissatisfaction with the Marcos rule in the Philippines, the revolution in Ethiopia are all evidence that instability is related to dissatisfaction with the rate and/or direction of change.³⁹ The economic problems now sweeping the globe are likely to exacerbate any tendency toward instability in the Third World. There is little that can be done to rescue the developing countries from their economic plight. The future depends on appropriate decisions taken now. But decision-making is notoriously slow in LDCs. Problems put major pressure on government policy-making apparatus. Heavily bureaucratic and opportunistic, most LDC governments are incapable of governing. They are instruments for maintaining elite groups in a position of authoritarian control and are ill-equipped to deal with forces of international economics which are for the most part outside their control anyway. The demands of poverty will put increasing pressure on government structures which allocate resources. One

result of these demands will be more communal conflict as various groups demand a greater share of a relatively smaller "pie". With elites having already proved themselves in many instances incapable of governing, control at the center for most developing countries will decline in both coherence and quality. A second result will be fragmentation of states - especially those states already marked by a high degree of heterogeneity (owing in part to the illogical borders drawn by departed colonialists). With individual demands on state resources increasing as effective government declines, communal conflict will overflow state borders.

The exorbitant international oil price increases of recent months-which may well continue-- are another reason for a gloomy prognosis concerning LDC stability. The recently announced 30% increases by some countries coupled with production cutbacks will in the medium term produce lower growth for the non-oil producing LDCs. The end of the recent OPEC pricing meeting in Venezuela without an agreement on common pricing or relief for the poorer LDCs means only a continuation of higher prices. High continuing rates of inflation worldwide will in many instances worsen LDC terms of trade. The collapsing or contracting markets for LDC output will slow their growth. The international commercial banking system has shown an increasing unwillingness to continue to lend to LDCs given their already high levels of debt incurred during the first round of oil price increases in 1973. In private meetings high officials of the World Bank and other major Third World lending agencies have expressed serious doubts concerning the international financial stability of most LDCs.⁴⁰ Falling commodity prices and soaring

debt levels appear to guarantee future financial instability among the Third World countries.

An Optimistic View?

There is, however, a more optimistic outlook which should be considered. In this more pleasant scenario the 1980s are viewed as a period of transition in the Third World. Growth for the middle-income, semiindustrial developing countries will be slowed but not halted and the lower income countries will survive through increased bilateral and multilateral development assistance. According to this interpretation, there are fundamental differences between the world of the 1973-1974 price hikes and that of the 1978-79 price hikes.

First, the size of the oil import bill for the non-OPEC LDCs, while higher in absolute terms in 1979, does not represent as great a transfer in real income to OPEC as it did in 1973-1974. Inflation has eroded the real cost of oil. Second, a greater number of LDCs are now oil producers. Since 1973, at least fourteen additional LDCs are now net oil exporters (Angola, Bahrain, Brunei, Congo, Egypt, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, Peru, Syria, Trinidad, and Tobago, Tunisia, and Zaire); therefore, any increase in oil prices represents an improvement in their terms of trade. Third, recession in the United States will not immediately cause a recession in Europe and Japan so that developed country demand for LDC goods will continue (though at reduced levels). Over 41% of all exports from non-OPEC LDCs are sent to Japan and Europe and only 24% are sent to the United States. The U.S. is an important market for goods from Latin America and Asia but of lesser importance for goods from the

mainly raw material producers of Africa, the least developed countries. Even for Asia and Latin America, the impact of a U.S. recession may be minimized depending on the individual country's trading relationship with the U.S. There would have to be a strong trading relationship, a high income elasticity of demand for their goods, and a high export to GNP ratio for a U.S. recession to have a sizeable impact. In addition two-thirds or more of trade in both Latin America and Asia are with trading partners other than the U.S. Fourth, most non-OPEC LDCs have shown substantial improvement in their balance-of-payments situation since 1973-1974 (again except for Africa). They can count now on drawing down on their reserves to pay for increased oil costs in the near term. Thus, some economists predict only a temporary slowdown in LDC growth as a result of higher oil prices and a mild U.S. recession.⁴¹

Is The Optimism Justified?: The Pessimistic View

There are several caveats to the more optimistic scenario. First, it is an aggregate analysis: as a group, prospects for the non-oil LDCs are not as bad as supposed; however, when countries are examined individually, serious problems for many become apparent. Second, discussion of the magnitude of the oil import bills neglects to examine the indirect costs of higher oil prices, especially in the area of fertilizer pricing, which will have a dampening effect on production. While it is true that oil imports account for only approximately 20% of the merchandise imports for LDCs, the cost of the remaining 80% is influenced by oil prices indirectly as a cost of production. Third, while the middle income

LDCs may suffer most from a U.S. recession, they may in fact be the least capable politically of withstanding a decrease in growth: more highly urbanized than the poorer LDCs, their populations expect continued growth; as their living standards decrease - even incrementally - they are more likely to protest than those with nothing to lose. Fourth, the likelihood of higher oil prices is coupled to the possibility of supply reductions. OPEC countries are now contemplating across the board reductions in their output; with less oil to go around, prices will be bid up and some LDCs may be forced out of the oil market. Fifth, enhanced balance-of-payments situation ignores the fact that much of the LDC reserves are a result of loans from private financial institutions. Of course, funds were borrowed when inflation was lower; now that inflation is higher, borrowed money has "cheapened." But even as cheap money, it must be paid back and thus represents a long term drain on most LDCs current accounts. As much of it was borrowed at the same time for the same period, repayments tend to be bunched, arriving at a time when the LDCs are least capable of repayment. Sixth, while the U.S. recession may or may not be as mild as some hope (with the attendant problems), U.S. growth rates are not likely to remain as high as in the past. Most observers agree that the U.S. is in for a period of diminished rates of growth - in the medium terms perhaps lower than 2.5% per annum.⁴² Demand for LDC goods is not likely to be as great as previously experienced. While as a whole, the LDCs may appear to be surviving the current economic crisis, certain countries will experience a more prolonged period of crisis. Which countries will these be and what will be the

impact of their problems on world stability?

Many of the states experiencing instability in the 1980s will be U.S. allies. The list is global: Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia in Southeast Asia; Pakistan in South Asia; Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa; almost everyone of the Sub-Saharan African states, especially Liberia, Senegal, Ghana, Zaire, Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad, and the Sudan; Central America promises to be in a period of almost total instability while in South America, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, and Chile figure prominently on lists of problem states.

This period of crisis will provide the Soviets with "targets of opportunity" in the Third World to which the U.S. must be prepared to respond. In the following section political unrest in the Third World will be more closely examined, followed by an analysis of Soviet influence in the Third World and the likely nature of their future involvement in Third World conflicts.

Ailing Economies: Seed Beds for Political Unrest

The evolution of the Third World as the battleground for Soviet-American conflict must be reviewed in an historical context. Certainly, instability in the Third World has in the past provided opportunities for Soviet adventurism but not over the same range as exists today. This results not so much because of the internal dynamics of state behavior but because of changes in the international system as a whole. These changes have been evolving since the early 1950s.

In the Fifties and Sixties, the world's problems were viewed in terms of political and military solutions. The world's economy

was relatively stable, founded on a system of fixed exchange rates anchored on the dollar's convertibility. For the industrial nations, it was a period of recovery from war and rapid growth. Prosperity promised to continue; the depression had taught us finally how to manage the economy using Keynesian methods. In developing countries development was not a question of how but when and at what rate. New nations were more concerned with political institutionalization than with economic development; development was a given. The main issue for the LDCs was who would control the development process under what political system. The Soviets and the Soviet bloc was generally quiescent in the international system. Their involvement in international trade was minimal. The Soviet involvement in the Congo in the early 1960s resulted in failure and caused the Soviet leadership to reduce for the moment their involvement, or at least their visibility, in other Third World countries. The appeal of the communist system to the Third World came about not because of any direct involvement of the Soviets but because the socialist system required (1) centralized control which satisfied the needs of the small political elites in LDCs, (2) permitted the newly independent states to express visibly their freedom from the system of their former rulers, and (3) the socialist system appeared to promise more rapid development. Any prestige or power accruing to the Soviets in the Third World in the 1950s and early 1960s was thus not a result of their own efforts.

The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period of transition in the international system. Political and military solutions had proved inadequate responses to the world's problems, particularly in development. The world's economy seemed to be both the problem

and the solution. The international economy was highly unstable. Exchange rates floated; the dollar was under constant attack as the world's coin, and recession occurred.

The abrupt takeover by OPEC of control over its own resources signalled to the other developing countries that they could accomplish the same with their own natural resources. The failure of UNCTAD, established back in 1964, to provide the LDCs with an international forum for gaining economic concessions was now given renewed emphasis as cartels became political weapons to gain economic ends. Paraphrasing Che Guevara, the call was for "One, Two, Three, Many Opecs!" Visions of several commodity cartels excited many LDC leaders. However, these cartels were still viewed from a political perspective. It was the South versus the north with OPEC providing leadership for other LDCs in this area. But OPEC failed to lead, being concerned more with its own development problems. Other commodity cartels did not develop. Some new controls were placed on relations between the North and the South but still the LDCs remained dependent - even OPEC - on the Western multinational corporations, technology exports, and especially on Western markets for their goods.

All was not calm during this period in the West, which was being torn both politically and economically. On the economic front, a recession hit most of the industrial West although West Germany and Switzerland escaped. The divergent effects of the economic downturn in the West encouraged disagreements among the Western alliance over other policies. On the political front, there was disunity in NATO on its appraisal of the Soviet threat.

No longer was wholehearted support given the U.S. by its allies. The Vietnam War had proven American fallibility and now that the industrial states' economic prosperity appeared to be in question there was even greater reason to doubt American leadership.

It was within this atmosphere that Soviet efforts in the 1960s to modernize their military forces and rethink their military strategy came to fruition. Their efforts have placed them at a distinct advantage in this moment of diminished Western capacity and interest in the Third World. Third World leaders are questioning American resolve to counter Soviet aggression.⁴³ The Soviets appear to have the capability now to assert their hegemony with minimum risk of Western reaction.

In the following section the nature of Soviet influence and interest in the Third World will be analyzed. In addition, the critical interest of the West in Third World resources will be discussed.

Soviet Influence in the Third World

The 1980s will see a renewed effort by the Soviet Union to establish a foothold in the Third World. As current leadership in developing countries changes and as economic problems aggravate political instability, the Soviets will be presented with many opportunities to assert influence with minimum cost. The increasing erosion of confidence in the U.S. abroad will also result in a lower risk to the Soviets of direct intervention in developing countries. Our failure to mobilize world opinion against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan illustrates the continued world lack of

raith in U.S. leadership.

The Soviets however are not wild risk-takers and the opportunities for influencing Third World developments provide equal occasion to the West to exercise influence too if it is willing to act aggressively. But the present situation is different from the past for three reasons: first, the Soviets now have the capability to act directly in Third World affairs; second, they now have a policy of using their naval and other military forces as a political instrument,⁴⁴ and third, the Soviets now have the will to operate. Past patterns of Soviet intervention in the Third World may only provide a partial guide to their behavior patterns in the 1980s.

The past should have indicated that the Soviets would have avoided direct military involvement in a LDC. The Afghanistan situation has dramatically disproven this view. In the past, the Soviets would have concentrated advisers in several specialized and critical sectors of the military. These advisory units have often been their most serious failure because of the failure of Soviet advisers to establish rapport with local nations. Their failure in Egypt in 1974 is especially indicative of this. There is no doubt that the Soviets have been learning from their past mistakes, establishing better rapport with local nationals while keeping a lower profile.⁴⁵

The increasing military capability of the Soviets to project military force will by its very nature lead to greater involvement. It has been estimated that the Soviet air fleet could support more than one ally in a long drawn out local war, with a high rate of attrition, while using only 15% of its available military cargo

planes. This capability does not imply that the Soviets will always use this capability.

Where the past can be a guide is in indicating that the Soviets will continue to prefer low-risk targets in the LDCs, planning carefully their involvement to minimize the expenditure of Soviet resources. They have not in the past, and will not in the future, invest large resources in economic aid and military assistance. They do not have the resources to offer (and will in the future continue to lack those resources), and they do not have to invest resources to attain their objectives. The Soviets have found that the minimum amount of resources provide them with the same access as the the more substantial resources which the U.S. invests.

The Soviet Navy has been in the forefront of the recent Soviet efforts to gain influence in the Third World. The bulk of Soviet port visits has been to developing countries with about 85% of those visits to countries bordering the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans. On an average, thirty countries are visited annually. However, this is a recent occurrence. Between 1953-1963, Soviet visits averaged at ten annually, with 70% of those trips to Western Europe. The increase in port visitations has been since the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Anne Kelly calculates that 80% of these visits are for operational reasons, and the remainder for creating goodwill. One of the operational reasons has been to seek naval facilities, especially for submarines. Soviet submarine visits to developing countries are a comparatively recent phenomenon since 1965.⁴⁶

The Soviets used the excuse of a Portuguese amphibious attack on their ally Guinea (Conakry) in November 1970 to form a West African Naval Patrol beginning in December 11, 1970. This patrol

lasted until the midsummer of 1971. Soviet naval salvage and mineclearing ships were dispatched to Bangladesh from April 1972 to June 1974. This mission included 22 ships at one point. While the effectiveness of naval diplomacy is indirect and its use in peacetime little corresponds to its capability in wartime, the willingness of the Soviets to respond to unplanned opportunities, such as the Guinea episode or mineclearing requirement in Bangladesh, with the use of naval forces indicates a capability previously lacking.⁴⁷ (See table 16, Cases of Coercive Soviet Military Diplomacy.)

Soviet interest in the Third World is different from previous occasions not only in capability but also in objective. The Soviets will increasingly require Third World resources, not only for their own economic needs, but for their Eastern European allies. Because of the secrecy of the Soviet system, it is difficult to make exact evaluations concerning the Soviet economy,⁴⁸ but there are strong indications that the Soviets will be either importing oil in the 1980s or, at least, not exporting as much oil to Eastern and Western Europe as they have in the past. Secondly, the Soviets will continue to depend on expanded fishing opportunities in the Third World to supplement protein sources for its own population, and thirdly, the Soviets will become concerned about obtaining valuable raw materials, especially, minerals from the Third World.

Recent Central Intelligence Agency predictions have the Soviet Union ceasing all oil exports and becoming net oil importers in the 1980s. They see the Soviet oil output as stagnant or declining in every region but Western Siberia and estimate that by 1982 the

Soviets will import 700,000 b/d (they are presently exporting about 1 million b/d). Total Soviet output may fall to 10 million b/d by 1985.⁴⁹ The Oil and Gas Journal recently referred that the Soviets will not reach their 1980 target production of 12 million b/d.⁵⁰ The real question for the Soviets is whether or not the rate of growth of the increase in raw materials production will continue. At least in relation to crude oil, the answer appears to be no. Although there has been a decline in the rate of growth of production of most Soviet raw materials, this decrease does not however reflect diminishing supplies but rather production and development constraints in bringing on-stream existing resource bases.

The Soviets are self-sufficient in all but six major minerals (bauxite, barites, antimony, fluorspar, tin, and tungsten) and even for these six, the Soviets produce at least 50% of their requirements. In the past their policy has been to attain mineral self-sufficiency at whatever cost, and while they will probably continue this policy domestically, it may be at some cost to their allies who have previously relied on Soviet supplies.

The Soviet Union has warned Eastern Europe that it could no longer continue to act as a prime supplier of raw materials. The 1970s saw a decline in energy exports and ferrous metal exports (especially iron ore) by the Soviets.⁵¹ Such declines will likely continue. While the Stalinist policy of economic independence still prevails in the Soviet Union, the Soviets may be forced into Third World raw material markets in order to keep their allies supplied.

Soviet energy exports to Eastern Europe remain one of the strongest ties which bind these satellite countries to Soviet domination. Should energy exports decline and Eastern Europe forced to seek other essential exports elsewhere, their attachment to the Soviet Union may weaken.⁵² For this reason, the Soviets could well become more actively engaged in the Third World raw material market, a market which carries none of the negative connotations (or ties) of trade with the West.⁵³

This involvement in Third World resources is already apparent with Soviet fishing fleets operating in Third World waters. As Chart 5 shows, Soviet involvement in Third World fishing industries has been extensive. The Soviet Union obtains approximately 50% of its annual fishery harvest from the shores of other nations. In 1950 the Soviet fishing fleet traveled an average of 200 miles. By the late 1960s the fleet was traveling 4,000 miles.⁵⁴ In 1976 Herman T. Franssen predicted that Soviet fishing grounds would spread to the littorals of the South Atlantic, South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean.⁵⁵ By 1978 they already had. These areas hold the greatest promise for increased yields.

Despite the Soviet fishing industry's ability to increase its catch without frequent port calls, they have sought port visitation rights in nearly all the developing countries with whom they have fishing agreements. They have even provided large amounts of their catch in exchange for access to markets and ports in the Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.⁵⁶

The value of the Soviet fishing fleet to the health of the Soviet economy cannot be disputed and the Soviets have been willing to protect the vital nature of this activity with its military

forces. In January 1969, three Soviet combat ships were used to obtain the release of two Soviet fishing boats seized by the Ghanaian government as spy boats. Michael MccGwire has suggested that the Soviets might use their navy to protect their fishing rights.⁵⁷ In the past the Soviets have had major disputes over these fishing rights with Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Pakistan, Japan, Canada, Australia, and the U.S.⁵⁸

With the exception of the fishing industry, the direction of Soviet investment in the Third World has not yet been toward raw materials. Soviet trade with developing countries has also not been significant in comparison with the West, although it is difficult to estimate the exact size of trade. The 1970-1978 period indicates a decreasing share in the market. The World Bank foresees no major change in the trade orientation of centrally planned economies. The communist countries purchased only 6% of LDC merchandise exports in 1976. Soviet trade patterns are aimed at obtaining hard currency so trade with developing countries fluctuates in favor of the West. However, as trade opportunities with the West, particularly the U.S., become more difficult to initiate, the Soviet Union will more than likely move to more barter-trade deals with the developing countries, exchanging their manufactured goods for LDC raw materials.

In the 1970s there was an expansion of Soviet direct foreign investment in developing countries. The primary function of this investment has been to encourage exports of Soviet machinery, technology, and equipment while gaining access to raw materials.⁵⁹

The Soviets appear to be moving from specific aid projects to expanding zones of influence based on more general economic relations with the developing countries.⁶⁰ As of March 1979, the Soviets located six, wholly or jointly owned companies for natural resource development in the Third World. These companies are in Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Singapore, and Iraq.⁶¹ The number of total Soviet ventures in LDCs has been estimated at twenty-five with a total capitalization of \$30-35 million.⁶² At the same time, the Soviet Union has been increasing its commercial and financial presence in developing countries. In 1971 the Moscow Narodny Bank opened a branch office in Singapore. And the Soviet merchant fleet has been garnering a larger size of Third World trade each year by providing lower rates than Western companies.

One of the major issues of the 1980s will be the potential for superpower conflict over control of Third World resources. The threat of raw material supply cut-offs is real. Considerable attention has focussed on the issue of protecting vital oil resources, yet little attention has been paid to the potential for supply disruptions in non-fuel minerals or to the growing Soviet dependence on Third World resources.

Dependence of the West on key raw materials is not new. Needs change as economic structures alter. Military needs change with technological developments. After World War I, the industrial world was seemingly dependent on a few deposits for the then strategic raw materials of coal, iron ore, lead, copper, and petroleum. During World War II, tin, rubber, mica, and tungsten

were considered by the U.S. as strategic materials. New sources of supplies were discovered and definitions of strategic raw materials changed. There is no doubt that definitions will continue to change as our technology and economy develops.

For the present, the key strategic raw materials on which our national security depends are obvious.⁶³ These materials are divided into three broad categories: energy resources (principally oil, natural gas, and uranium), nonfuel minerals, and renewable resources. The strategic problem for the remainder of the century will be to secure access to these raw material supplies.

Western dependence on oil and natural gas imports will continue and grow. OECD countries import 33.6% of their total energy supplies and, more importantly, they import 64.4% of their total oil supplies. Another often over-looked problem is Western dependence on foreign sources for uranium supplies. While present supplies appear sufficient, the failure to develop new sources may in the future jeopardize the West's nuclear power expansion program.⁶⁴ The U.S. alone is currently heavily dependent (more than 50% of demand) on foreign sources for twenty major mineral commodities. (See the attached Chart 6). A third major concern is our dependence on renewable resources. However, this is not yet a major problem for the West. It is a Soviet concern because of their expansion of fishing industry.

The concern over uranium supplies and over non-fuel minerals such as titanium illustrates an often over-looked dimension to the material dependence problem: time. The issue is not just the adequacy of present supplies, but how to ensure future access to supplies. Both the Soviets and the West must project future supply

vulnerabilities.

Our primary objective is to ensure uninterrupted supplies. Thus, our two concerns are (1) internal instability in producer states and (2) competition with the Soviets who may try to deny us supplies. The focus of our attention must be on instabilities in producer states. The major area of instability is the Third World.

While it is true that most of the U.S.' important non-fuel mineral imports come from other developed countries (mainly Canada and Australia), the U.S. is dependent on Third World suppliers for the more critical resources.⁶⁵ One-third of the world's proven mineral resources are found in the Third World. Much of this vast area has yet to be surveyed and there is no doubt that, after closer examination, resource base estimates will expand. Even now, rich mineral deposits in the LDCs are left unexploited while lesser quality deposits are mined at higher cost in more friendly and more stable states. Current production in many LDCs is inefficient because of a lack of investment and organization. Production could be expanded if the West invested more capital in their development.⁶⁶

Some international economists point to the growing interdependence between the industrial nations and the developing nations as cause to downplay fears of commodity supply disruptions. The West needs LDC resources to grow and the LDCs need the export earnings for their own growth. In the past, the Soviet Bloc has not provided a major market for LDC exports so the LDCs have had no choice but to trade with the West, but this may be changing.

There are indications that the Soviet perception of the Third World is altering, as earlier outlined. Previously, the Soviets

perceived a shared interest with the Third World. Through aid and doctrinal supremacy, they could liberate the Third World from Western domination. This Soviet view altered in the 1970s as they began to accept first the concept of a single world economy (although still divided into a socialist and capitalist subsystems) and secondly, the concept of economic diversity among LDCs. As a result of growing Soviet involvement in world trade, they may now share the same desires as the West for continued supplies of raw materials at stable prices and share the same fears of commodity cartels which might disrupt these supplies.⁶⁷

Soviet influence in the Third World can be expected to expand in the 1980s as they search not only to expand their power, but also to secure new sources of resources. Many of these resources will be to supply the needs of their eastern European allies as the Soviets reduce their exports to these countries. The struggle to obtain resources will bring the West and the Soviets into conflict in the Third World.

Political Unrest Within The Third World

The LDCs themselves were in disarray. Development was not occurring as they had anticipated. Some countries, for example, the Sahel region of Sub-Saharan Africa, were hit by climatic changes while other countries achieved growth but not at the rates they had expected. Unrest among the populations of these countries at their failure to develop is growing. The 1980s will continue the pattern of the 1970s of coups, counter coups, and abortive coups as elites struggled for control of a ever-shrinking supply of re-

sources. As the aging leadership of many of these countries passes away, the intensity of the struggle will magnify.

The recent April 1980, coup in Liberia is an example of this continuing cycle of internal instability as a result of economic problems and the failure of traditional elites to respond to new demands. Table 17 shows the growing and continuing number of coups and countercoups in the Third World. Illustrative of the primacy of economic causes for political problems is the large number of "economic" refugees which have fled Third World countries during this period. (See Table 18). In this environment the Soviets will be in a position to use their military capability to intervene in distant lands. Now they have the capability of intervening almost at will with varying degrees of involvement. The cost of such involvement will also increase, not because of Western actions, but because Third World states are also developing a more sophisticated military capability. Afghan herdsmen have shown what a few traditional weapons can do against heavy Soviet armament and firepower. Because of this, the Soviets will continue to prefer intervening in Third World states "by invitation" where a convenient pro-Marxist coup has paved the way to respectable requests for aid and assistance.

The new technology in armaments and the increasing arms trade to the Third World heightens the probability of the 1980s being a decade of inter-Third World wars, wars occurring on a greater scale than such models as the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The attached Table 19 gives some indication of the spread of sophisticated armaments to the Third World. Despite the disintegration of the

Iranian armed forces, any future conflict between Iran and, for example, the now larger, more disciplined forces in Iraq would result in considerable carnage. Instability in neighboring states will make the advantages of military action for territorial aggrandizement, more obvious to those countries possessing the appropriate military capability (as in Iraq). At the same time, such enhanced military capability makes the costs of great power involvement in a Third World conflict even greater.

As the table shows, many developing countries now possess sea-to-air and sea-to-sea missile capability which could seriously restrict great power efforts to impose naval blockades or carry out amphibious actions on Third World territory. The U.S. and the Soviet Union would be making a grave mistake if each based its military strategy solely on the basis of each other's capability. If the Third World is to be a future arena of great power conflict, the military capability of these developing states must be considered.⁶⁸

In the last decade there has been a growing fragmentation of the Third World bloc. The reason for this fragmentation is in the varying needs of individual nation-states because of their differing resource bases, both human and natural. For example, most mineral-based LDC have reached middle income status primarily because of the income generated by the mining of one product, (as in Angola, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Zaire, Zambia, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Jamaica, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela). Income level does not determine stability as the above list of states shows.

The Vietnam War was probably the single greatest cause of the fragmenting support for U.S. policy. The United States was hurt economically by the inflationary policies used to finance the war, while it was wounded internally by the debate over the correctness of its war policy. Watergate provided the final twist of the sword in the wound of U.S. national self-respect.

Against this backdrop of international change, the Soviets were in a position to take advantage of U.S. weakness and lack of resolve and they did. As the attached table 20 of Soviet "firsts" illustrates, the Soviets moved fairly rapidly to exploit the opportunities which Western weakness provided them. The debate has been between the North and the South, not the East and the West, leaving the USSR free to exploit any opening at will. The Third World, well aware that the Soviets would not be major aid donors or trading partners, did not bother to attack the Soviets but instead used the East-West conflict as additional leverage in their debate with the industrial countries. The Soviets were left free to experiment with their forces, develop the capability to project their power, and test the limits of interventionism while freed from fears of confrontation with the U.S. Such fragmentation tends in the long term to favor the West for reasons of aid, trade, and investment. However, economic relations will not be decided on a strictly bilateral basis. Multilateral organizations will be used as mediums of exchange (i.e. the IMF, GATT, and the EEC). Aid will be channeled more through multilateral groups as the external debt situation of developing countries becomes so immense that no single lending organization will want to risk the exposure. In

addition, there will be an increasing amount of intra-Third World trade supplanting their traditional trading partners.

In the long-term the Soviets cannot hope to replace the West as the developing world's source for aid, trade, and investment. The major targets for Soviet intervention must be the poorer LDCs where a minimum of aid can provide great influence. (See Table 21 LDCs Receiving Soviet Aid). The industrial nations also have the least interest in the poorer LDCs.

The richer LDCs would constitute a large drain on limited Soviet resources. For the most part, the Soviets do not want or need LDC goods nor can they provide much that the LDCs desire (though this is likely to change as trade with the Soviet Bloc increases). Even those countries which the Soviets do infiltrate will still turn to the West for trade and economic support.

While the "Third World" identity will continue to provide a powerful ideological motivating force among LDCs, especially in an international setting, the West will find it increasingly possible to identify a set of common interests. Such common interests will result from the mutual benefits of trade in primary products and semi-manufactured goods in labor-surplus LDCs and from the fact that the West will be the only source of aid for all of the LDCs. The Soviet economy is still primitive while the Chinese will increase their aid only marginally as a counter to a Soviet presence. The LDCs, particularly in a time of energy scarcity, will have to turn to the West for innovation and change if they are to adapt to increased scarcity.

The LDCs are still economically dependent on the West for the opportunities Western markets provide for their exports and for the

investment capital and aid which the West provides. But in a period of diminished growth in the West, demand for LDC goods will be restricted and willingness on the part of commercial lenders and multinational corporations to provide investment opportunities will also be limited. What aid is obtained will be for the most part through multilateral agencies. Western governments will find it difficult to justify large sums for aid while reducing the social welfare programs in their own countries.

The period of reduced standards for LDCs occurs at a time when expectations have risen greatly. After two decades of Western exportation of its vision of the future, the population of the Third World is now demanding a share in the goods which they only see a few elites in their own countries receiving. Expectations have risen at a time when growth prospects are diminishing. The call for more goods will only be satisfied by revolution in the name of social justice.

Much of the leadership of the Third World is in transition. The old, pre-independence movement leaders are giving away to a younger set schooled in Marxist-Leninist ideology and the inequities of Western capitalism. This transition can already be seen in countries of strategic importance to the U.S.: South Korea, Liberia, Nicaragua, Iran, and Ethiopia, but it will assuredly also be occurring in this decade in other states of geopolitical importance to the West: the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Panama, and Haiti. Such changeovers are rarely peaceful as the current situation in the former set of countries makes obvious.

TABLES

- 1 LDC Growth Rate Comparisons
- 2 LDC Growth of GDP, 1970-1990
- 3 Major LDC Primary Product and Manufactured Good Exporters
- 4 LDCs with Declining Terms of Trade
- 5 External Public Debt of Developing Countries
- 6 Debt Service Ratio Increases Among LDCs
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- 21 Third World Countries Receiving Military and/or Economic Aid from the Soviet Bloc

TABLE 1

LDC GROWTH RATE COMPARISONS
(Average Annual Growth Rates In Percent)

	1960-70	1970-77
<u>Low Income Countries</u>		
<u>Africa</u>		
Ethiopia	4.4@	2.5
Burundi	4.5	1.4+
Zaire*	3.6	1.9+
Mozambique	4.6	-5.0
Niger	2.7	1.8+
Sierra Leone	4.2	1.9
Tanzania	6.0	4.5
Benin	2.6	2.0+
Madagascar	2.9	-0.3
Central African Empire	1.2	0.9+
Uganda	5.9	-0.1+
Angola *	4.8	-10.4
Togo	8.5	3.1
<u>Asia</u>		
Bangladesh	3.6	2.3
India	3.6	3.0
Pakistan	6.7	3.6
Sri Lanka	4.6	3.1
<u>Latin America (None)</u>		
<u>Middle Income Countries</u>		
<u>Africa</u>		
Cameroon	4.7	3.4
Ghana	2.1	0.4
Liberia	5.1	2.7+
Zambia	5.0	2.8
Rhodesia	4.3	3.3
Ivory Coast	8.0	6.5
Tunisia	4.6	8.4
<u>Asia</u>		
Papua New Guinea	6.5	5.0
Singapore	8.8	8.6
Taiwan	9.2	7.7
Hong Kong	10.0	8.2
<u>Latin America</u>		
Honduras	5.1	3.5
El Salvador	5.9	5.1
Colombia	5.1	6.4
Guatemala	5.6	6.0
Nicaragua	7.2	5.8
Peru *	5.4	4.6
Mexico *	7.3	5.0
Chile	4.5	0.1
Argentina	4.2	2.9
Trinidad and Tobago*	3.9	3.4
Venezuela	5.9	5.7

* Countries which are now net oil exporters.

@ Figures in these columns refer to 1961-70 rather than 1960-70.

+ Figures in these columns refer to 1970-76 rather than 1970-77.

Note : not all countries included as information unavailable.

Source : IBRD, World Development Report, 1979.

TABLE 12

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES : GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

1970-1990

(average annual percentage growth rates, at 1975 prices,

	1970-76	1977@	1978@	1975-85@	1985-90
Low Income Countries	3.4	5.7	3.4	4.7	4.9
Africa	2.6	4.0	3.4	3.7	3.8
Asia	3.5	6.0	5.7	4.9	5.1
Middle Income Countries	6.2	4.6	5.0	5.3	5.8
ALL LDCs	5.7	4.8	5.1	5.2	5.6

@estimates based on preliminary and incomplete data

Source : world Bank, World Development Report 1979,
Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 3.

TABLE 3

Selected LDCs in which Primary Products or Manufactured
Good Exports are a Large Percentage Share of Total Merchandise Exports

	Primary Products	Manufactured Goods
<u>Low Income</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1976</u>
Ethiopia	98	
Mali	99	
Burma	99	
Malawi	96	
Tanzania	91	
Sri Lanka	86	
Central African Emp	82	
Kenya	88	
Uganda	100	
Indonesia*	98	
<u>Middle Income</u>		
Egypt	73	
Cameroon	90	
Ghana	99	
Honduras	90	
Nigeria*	99	
Thailand	81	
Yemen Arab Rep	87	
Philippines	76	
Congo, People's Rep	87	
Papua New Guinea	99	
Morocco	84	
Ivory Coast	92	
Colombia	78	
Ecuador	98	
South Korea		88
Nicaragua	84	
Tunisia	74	
Malaysia	84	
Algeria*	99	
Turkey	76	
Mexico	69	
Jamaica	44	56
Chile	95	
Taiwan		85
Costa Rica	71	
Brazil	75	
Uruguay	66	
Argentina	75	
Trinidad and Tobago*	94	
Hong Kong		97
Singapore	54	46

*LDCs large oil and gas resv. Not all LDCs included for lack of info.
SOURCE: Table 9, p. 142-143, IBRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1979

TABLE 4

LDCs with Declining Terms of Trade

	Terms of Trade 1970 = 100	
<u>Low Income</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1977</u>
Bangladesh	155	68
Somalia	107	75
Upper Volta	75	95
Zaire	61	67
Burma	101	83
India	104	83
Niger	90	78
Pakistan	93	80
Sierra Leone	89	83
Benin	89	89
Mauritania	112	79
Sudan	100	97
<u>Middle Income</u>		
Egypt	104	93
Ghana	92	93
Honduras	91	91
Liberia	194	93
Thailand	118	75
Senegal	91	95
Philippines	73	68
Zambia	50	59
Morocco	103	90
Jordan	99	88
South Korea	78	76
Dominican Rep	77	79
Peru	63	84
Jamaica	100	87
Lebanon	78	83
Chile	53	50
Taiwan	79	80
Panama	89	81
Uruguay	99	74
Argentina	101	87
Brazil	7.6	11.8
Uruguay	11.0	17.1
Argentina	7.5	10.0
Venezuela	6.7	12.2
Singapore	7.6	15.5
Greece	8.9	9.9

SOURCE: Table*15, IBRD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1979, STATISTICAL ANNEXES, pp. 154-155.

TABLE 5

External Public Debt of Developing Countries
(Outstanding and Disbursed)

Countries Where External Public Debt as a
Percentage of GNP Has Increased

<u>Low Income</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1977</u>
Ethiopia	9.5	14.4
Nepal	0.3	5.4
Somalia	41.1	92.6
Burundi	3.0	7.0
Chad	11.8	22.0
Rwanda	0.9	13.1
Upper Volta	6.3	18.6
Zaire	17.1	52.8
Burma	4.7	12.5
Niger	8.7	15.8
Pakistan	30.5	44.9
Sierra Leone	14.3	32.0
Tanzania	19.4	32.0
Benin	16.0	20.5
Sri Lanka	17.1	27.8
Guinea	65.2	66.5
Haiti	10.3	10.7
Madagascar	10.9	11.1
Central Afr Emp	9.1	25.0
Mauritania	16.8	111.7
Sudan	11.3	35.4
Togo	15.3	38.1
<u>Middle Income</u>		
Egypt	23.7	69.2
Cameroon	13.0	28.6
Yemen, P.D.R.	0.3	50.3
Honduras	12.9	30.7
Thailand	4.9	5.8
Senegal	12.1	20.5
Philippines	9.2	14.4
Zambia	34.2	59.5
Congo, People's Rep	48.6	74.4
Papua New Guinea	10.4	23.2
El Salvador	8.6	10.2
Morocco	21.1	36.0
Bolivia	46.4	39.2
Ivory Coast	18.2	34.6
Jordan	19.0	29.4
Ecuador	13.3	19.2
South Korea	21.5	26.9
Nicaragua	19.3	40.3
Peru	14.0	38.4
Tunisia	37.3	39.9

TABLE 5 (cont'd)

Malaysia	10.0	6.7
Algeria	18.5	42.5
Mexico	9.7	26.5
Jamaica	11.5	28.7
Chile	24.0	24.6
Taiwan	10.6	13.4
Panama	19.0	60.6
Costa Rica	13.8	26.5
Mali	88.1	67.5
Malawi	38.7	35.9
India	14.8	14.7
Afghanistan	58.0	34.9
Lesotho	9.2	7.5
Kenya	20.3	19.7
Uganda	9.8	5.9
Indonesia	26.7	25.6
Ghana	22.6	5.5
Liberia	52.5	37.6
Nigeria	6.4	2.2
Colombia	18.1	13.5
Paraguay	16.7	15.4
Guatemala	5.7	4.6
Dominican Rep	14.7	14.6
Turkey	14.4	9.5
Trinidad and Tobago	12.5	8.6

TABLE 6

Debt Service Ratio Increases Among LDS

<u>Low Income Countries</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1977</u>
Benin	2.2	5.9
Mali	1.2	4.0
Somalia	2.1	10.7
Burundi	2.5	2.8
Chad	3.1	9.3
Zaire	4.4	10.0
Niger	3.8	4.0
Central African Emp	3.2	4.5
Mauritania	3.2	22.6
Uganda	3.4	3.9
Indonesia	6.4	11.9
Togo	2.9	11.8
Total # Low Income 37 av.	12.4	7.6
Middle Income Countries 12 av	3.2	8.5
Cameroon	3.1	6.6
Honduras	2.8	6.9
Senegal	2.7	8.4
Zambia	5.5	18.6
Congo, People's Rep	7.4	9.6
El Salvador	3.6	5.9
Morocco	7.7	10.9
Bolivia	10.9	20.6
Ivory Coast	6.7	12.2
Nicaragua	10.4	13.8
Dominican Rep	6.4	7.0
Peru	11.6	30.3
Malaysia	3.6	6.5
Algeria	3.2	15.5
Mexico	23.6	48.1
Jamaica	2.5	14.9
Lebanon	0.5	0.7
Chile	18.9	32.4
Panama	7.7	12.2
Venezuela	2.8	7.5
Greece	7.2	9.6
Israel	12.3	16.1
Singapore	0.6	0.8
Spain	3.6	4.5
Total Middle Income 54 av.	9.1	9.2
Subtotal (24)		

SOURCE: WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1979, pp. 150-151

TABLE 7

Total Official Flow of Resources to Individual Developing Countries
from OPEC Countries and Arab/OPEC Multilateral Institutions, 1974
to 1977 (Net Disbursements - Millions)

	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>1977</u>
<u>Africa</u>				
Angola	-	-	20.75	
Benin	5.75	-	3.55	
Burundi	3.03	1.20	0.10	
Cameroon	2.71	17.40	8.00	
Cape Verde	-	0.10	1.30	
Chad	12.68	3.71	1.42	
Comoros	-	-	3.59	
Congo	-	-	4.17	
Equatorial Guinea	15.00	1.20	-	
Ethiopia	1.33	1.21	-	
Gabon	-	26.30	3.15	
Gambia	1.11	0.35	2.10	
Ghana	-	-	0.01	
Guinea	37.20	5.94	1.42	
Guinea-Bissau	2.79	3.21	.350	
Kenya	-	-	0.01	
Liberia	-	2.00	-	
Madagascar	7.33	-	-	
Mali	9.70	25.54	3.00	
Mauritania	50.84	25.76	146.88	
Mauritius	-	-	0.01	
Mozambique	-	1.07	1.60	
Niger	.98	14.10	6.26	
Rwanda	-	8.47	0.96	
Sao Tome + Principe	-	0.10	-	
Senegal	39.10	1.34	9.10	
Seychelles	-	-	0.04	
Sierra Leone	0.06	0.03	0.20	
Somalia	77.89	87.91	40.12	
Sudan	196.11	250.61	301.52	
Tanzania	-	0.20	-	
Togo	1.76	2.00	3.55	
Uganda	14.21	31.34	5.55	
Upper Volta	6.12	0.21	1.00	
Zaire	50.57	20.27	21.10	
Zambia	1.88	-	-	
Total, South of Sahara	531.39	524.79	581.54	498.69
Total, North of Sahara	1158.71	3159.29	1446.51	1081.73
<u>Latin America</u>				
Barbados	-	0.27	-	
Bermuda	-	0.08	-	
Costa Rica	20.00	17.09	26.08	
El Salvador	-	22.76	20.76	
Guatemala	-	30.38	29.43	
Honduras	5.00	26.11	10.74	
Jamaica	-	12.50	25.00	
Mexico	-	6.90	41.00	
Nicaragua	-	19.11	14.10	
Panama	-	23.40	20.70	

TABLE 7 (Cont'd)

	<u>1974</u>	1975	1976	<u>1977</u>
Grenada	-	0.42	0.01	
Argentina	50.00	-	-	
Bolivia	-	-	4.50	
Brazil	27.50	23.05	-	
Guyana	30.00	10.35	5.00	
Peru	-	15.30	17.90	
<u>Asia</u>				
Afghanistan	28.57	21.63	14.67	
Bangladesh	34.79	61.14	10.94	
India	235.00	203.70	499.55	
Maldives	-	0.20	2.84	
Nepal	-	0.30	0.10	
Pakistan	336.87	458.39	840.76	
Sri Lanka	21.00	63.00	32.03	
Hong Kong	3.50	1.80	0.03	
Indonesia	1.06	-	21.92	
South Korea	19.06	-	26.73	
Malaysia	-	3.04	4.90	
Philippines	17.03	-	-	
Thailand	-	0.02	75.60	
Vietnam	-	40.00	6.11	
Total, All Countries (including not listed)	3932.65	6444.30	6147.12	4623.57

SOURCE: OECD, DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION REVIEW, 1978, pp. 268-269

TABLE 8

OECD AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
(as a percentage of GNP,

	1950	1965	1970	1975	1976	1977	Estimated			
							1978	1979	1980	1981
OECD	As Percentage of Donor GNP									
94 Italy	.22	.10	.16	.11	.13	.10	.08	.09	.09	.08
95 New Zealand23	.52	.41	.39	.34	.35	.34	.35
96 United Kingdom	.56	.47	.36	.37	.38	.37	.40	.41	.42	.43
97 Japan	.24	.27	.23	.23	.20	.21	.23	.24	.25	.26
98 Austria	..	.11	.07	.17	.12	.24	.28	.28	.29	.29
99 Finland	..	.02	.07	.18	.18	.17	.18	.19	.21	.22
100 Netherlands	.31	.36	.61	.75	.82	.85	.82	.91	.96	.99
101 France	1.38	.76	.66	.62	.62	.60	.57	.60	.60	.61
102 Australia	.38	.53	.59	.60	.42	.45	.45	.45	.47	.47
103 Belgium	.88	.60	.46	.59	.51	.46	.52	.54	.56	.59
104 Denmark	.09	.13	.38	.58	.56	.60	.75	.70	.73	.76
105 Germany, Fed. Rep.	.31	.40	.32	.40	.31	.27	.31	.33	.33	.33
106 Canada	.19	.19	.42	.55	.46	.50	.52	.49	.50	.50
107 United States	.53	.49	.31	.26	.25	.22	.23	.22	.22	.22
108 Norway	.11	.16	.32	.66	.70	.82	.90	.98	.99	1.00
109 Sweden	.05	.19	.38	.82	.82	.99	.88	.95	.99	.99
110 Switzerland	.04	.09	.15	.19	.19	.19	.20	.21	.21	.22

Source : World Bank, World Development Report 1979,
Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 157.

TABLE 9

LDCs with Energy Imports as a Percentage of Merchandise
Export Earnings Greater than 20%

<u>Low Income</u>	<u>1976</u>
Bangladesh	29
Ethiopia	27
Mali	25
Chad	27
India	26
Mozambique	28
Benin	43
Tanzania	22
Sri Lanka	24
Madagascar	22
Kenya	54
Sudan	26
<u>Middle Income</u>	
Thailand	28
Morocco	23
Jordan	54
South Korea	23
Dominican Rep	24
Tunisia	23
Turkey	58
Jamaica	34
Chile	25
Brazil	43
Uruguay	39
Portugal	38
Yugoslavia	22
Trinidad and Tobago	51
Greece	48
Singapore	38

SOURCE: IBRD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1979, WASHINGTON, DC, 1979,
pp. 138-139

TABLE 10

LDCS with Negative Current Account Balances
(Before Interest Payments on External Public Debt)
Million US Dollars

<u>Low Income Countries</u>	<u>1977</u>
Bangladesh	-265
Ethiopia	- 70
Nepal	- 5
Somalia	- 31
Chad	- 26
Upper Volta	- 71
Zaire	-486
Burma	- 93
Malawi	- 34
Vietnam	- 6
Pakistan	-578
Sierra Leone	- 33
Benin	- 94
Guinea	- 15
Haiti	- 51
Madagascar	- 16
Mauritania	-113
Sudan	-443
Togo	- 73
<u>Middle Income Countries</u>	
Egypt	-529
Cameroon	- 40
Yemen, PDR	- 92
Ghana	- 26
Honduras	-113
Liberia	-145
Nigeria	-853
Thailand	-1039
Senegal	- 73
Philippines	-724
Zambia	-157
Congo, People's Rep	-182
Morocco	-1743
Bolivia	-120
Ivory Coast	-295
Paraguay	- 52
Ecuador	-322
Guatemala	- 50
Nicaragua	-122
Dominican Rep	-242
Peru	-670
Tunisia	-476
Algeria	-1935
Turkey	-3155
Mexico	-547

TABLE 10 (cont'd)

Jamaica	- 9
Lebanon	- 23
Chile	-290
Panama	- 82
Costa Rica	-189
Brazil	-378?7
Uruguay	- 40
Venezuela	-1820
Singapore	- 41

SOURCE: IBRD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1979, pp 150-151

TABLE 11

Major Food Importing Developing Countries
Percentage Share of Total Merchandise Imports

<u>Low Income Countries</u>	<u>1976</u>
Bangladesh	42
Mali	19
Burundi	19
India	28
Pakistan	21
Sri Lanka	36
Haiti	31
<u>Middle Income Countries</u>	
Egypt	28
Yemen Arab Rep	28
Papau New Guinea	23
Morocco	20
Jamaica	23
Hong Kong	18

SOURCE: IBRD, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1979, pp 144-145

TABLE 12

LDCS with Cities of Over 500,000 People

<u>Low Income</u>	<u>Number of Cities 1975</u>
Bangladesh	2
Ethiopia	1
Upper Volta	2
Burma	1
India	28
Mozambique	1
Vietnam	3
Afghanistan	1
Pakistan	6
Tanzania	1
Sri Lanka	1
Guinea	1
Haiti	1
Kenya	1
Uganda	1
Sudan	1
Angola	1
Indonesia	6
<u>Middle Income</u>	
Egypt	2
Ghana	1
Nigeria	5
Thailand	1
Senegal	1
Philippines	2
Zambia	1
Rhodesia	1
Morocco	2
Bolivia	1
Ivory Coast	1
Colombia	4
Ecuador	2
Guatemala	1
South Korea	6
Nicaragua	1
Dominican Rep	1
Peru	1
Tunisia	1
Malaysia	1
Algeria	1
Turkey	3
Mexico	6
Jamaica	1
Chile	1
Panama	1
Costa Rica	1
Brazil	12
Uruguay	1
Argentina	5
Hong Kong	1
Venezuela	2
Greece	2
Singapore	1

SOURCE: IBRD, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT,
1979, pp. 164-165

TABLE 13

URBANIZATION RATES AND URBAN POPULATION GROWTH 1950-2000

	Urban Population as Percentage of Total Population			Average Annual Percentage Growth of Urban Population		
	1950	1975	2000	1950-60	1970-80	1990-2000
Developing Countries	20.6	31.1	45.8	4.0	4.0	3.5
Industrialized Countries	62.4	74.4	83.6	2.0	1.2	0.8
Capital Surplus Oil Exporters	16.9	55.5	77.9	7.9	7.1	3.1
Centrally Planned Economies	20.7	34.4	49.2	5.2	2.7	2.4
World	29.0	39.3	51.5	3.5	2.8	2.6

Source : World Bank, World Development Report 1979,
Washington D.C., 1979, p. 72.

LDCS WITH HIGH URBAN POPULATIONS

State	As a Percentage of Total Population	Average Annual Growth (in percent)
Low Income Countries		
Mali	17	5.3
Somalia	27	5.0
Chad	14	6.8
Zaire	35	5.4
Malawi	20	18.4
Vietnam	20	5.2
Pakistan	26	4.1
Sierra Leone	21	5.6
Benin	23	10.4
Guinea	16	6.2
Central Afr. Emp.	36	5.1
Mauritania	23	14.4
Sudan	20	6.9
Angola	18	5.7
Togo	15	5.4
Middle Income Countries		
-- Cameroon	27	8.0
Ghana	32	5.1
Honduras	32	5.3
Liberia	30	5.6
Nigeria	18	4.6
Philippines	34	3.5
Zambia	34	5.4
Congo	36	3.0
El Salvador	40	3.1
Morocco	37	4.1
Bolivia	30	4.2
Ivory Coast	33	9.3
Colombia	66	3.9
Paraguay	38	3.3
Ecuador	42	4.1
Guatemala	37	3.6
South Korea	49	5.4
Nicaragua	50	4.5
Dominican Rep.	46	5.4
Peru	63	4.5
Malaysia	30	4.8
Algeria	54	6.8
Turkey	43	4.7
Mexico	63	4.6
Jamaica	46	3.6
Chile	79	2.5
Taiwan	51	4.4
Panama	51	4.1
Costa Rica	41	3.3
Brazil	61	4.5

Source : figures derived from the IBRD, World Development Report, 1979.

TABLE 15
LEVELS OF ABSOLUTE POVERTY UNDER ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS,

YEAR 2000

Base Scenario			High Scenario		Low Scenario	
	% of Population	Millions of Absolute Poor	% of Popu- lation	Millions of Absolute Poor	% of Popu- lation	Millions of Absolute Poor
Low	22	400	17	340	26	520
Middle	10	160	8	130	12	190
All LDCs	17	600	13	470	20	710

Source: IBRD, World Development Report 1979,
Washington, D.C., p. 19.

TABLE 16

Cases of Coercive Soviet Military Diplomacy, May 1967-February 1976

Date	Place	Action
May-June 1967	Eastern Mediterranean	"Attentional" show of force by 2 anticarrier warfare (ACW) task groups, matching 2 US carrier task groups, during Arab-Israeli war.
June 1967	Syria	Threat of Soviet airborne intervention to deter Israeli march on Damascus.
July-September 1967	Egyptian ports	Soviet combatants put into Port Said and Alexandria to deter Israeli attacks.
October 1967-October 1973	Egyptian ports	Combatants return to and maintain presence in Port Said and Alexandria after Israeli shelling of Port Suez.
1967	Yemen	Soviet pilots help quell royalist insurrection.
January-February 1968	Sea of Japan	"Attentional" show of force against US fleet reacting to North Korean seizure of USS Pueblo.
January-February 1969	Gulf of Guinea	"Compellent" show of force off Ghanaian coast during negotiations on release of detained Soviet trawlers.
April 1969	Sea of Japan	"Limiting" show of force against US naval reaction to North Korean downing of US EC-121 aircraft.
December 1969	Somali ports	Soviet ship visits to demonstrate support for new post-coup regime in conditions of domestic tension.
April-May 1970	Somali ports	USSR extends ship visits to Somali government that felt threatened by internal opposition allegedly in league with Ethiopia.
April-August 1970	Egypt	Intervention by Soviet air defense units in "war of attrition," to force cessation of Israeli deep-penetration air raids.
1970	Sudan	Soviet helicopter pilots assist government in putting down black autonomy movement in southern Sudan.
September-October 1970	Eastern Mediterranean	"Limiting" show of force by 4 Soviet ACW task groups against US 6th Fleet during Jordanian crisis.
December 1970-1971	Eastern Atlantic	Soviet West Africa patrol established to deter further naval attacks on Republic of Guinea from Portuguese Guinea (Bissau).
1971-present	Eastern Atlantic	West Africa patrol continues, apparently to provide domestic support to unstable government of Republic of Guinea.
May 1971	Sierra Leone	Soviet port call at Freetown during period of domestic instability.
December 1971	Indian Ocean	Soviet ACW task group deployed, apparently to counter British carrier task group during India-Pakistan war.
December 1971	Indian Ocean	Additional Soviet ACW task group deployed during war to counter US carrier Enterprise task group.
May-June 1972	South China Sea	"Attentional" show of force in reaction to US mining of Haiphong harbor.
April-July 1973	Mediterranean	Protected sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria.
Summer 1973	Arabian Sea	Protected sealift of South Yemeni troops from capital to eastern region bordering Oman, for probable use in Dhofar rebellion.
October 1973	Eastern Mediterranean	Deterrent show of force by 5 Soviet ACW task groups; matching 5 US attack carrier and amphibious task groups, during Arab-Israeli October war.
October 1973	Eastern Mediterranean	Soviet combatants steam into war zone off Syrian coast after Israeli attacks on Soviet ships in Tartus.
October 1973	Syria	Threat of Soviet airborne intervention to deter Israeli advance on Damascus.
October-November 1973	Gulf of Aden	Soviet "attentional" show of force against US naval reaction to Arab blockade of Bab el Mandeb straits in Red Sea.
November 1974	Latakia, Syria	Soviet combatants temporarily put into this port in connection with tension surrounding Syrian refusal to renew mandate for UN troops on Golan Heights.
November 1975-February 1976	Eastern Atlantic	Combatants deployed off the coast of Congo (Brazzaville) to protect sealift of military supplies to favored faction in Angolan civil war.
January-February 1976	Central Atlantic	Soviet ACW task group deployed in connection with Angolan civil war, to counter anticipated US carrier task group, which did not appear.

SOURCE: James M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World," Problems of Communism, January/February 1979, p.20.

INSTABILITY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Year	Coup	Counter-Coup	Attempted
1957			
Africa			
Asia	x		
Latin Am.	xxx	x	xx
1958			
Africa	x		
Asia	xxx		x
Latin America	x		xxxxxx
1959			
Africa			xx
Asia			
Latin America	x		xxxxxx
1960			
Africa			x
Asia	xxxx	x	xx
Latin America	xx		xxxxxxxx
1961			
Africa			x
Asia	x		
Latin America	xxxx		xxxx
1962			
Africa	x		x
Asia	x		x
Latin America	xxx		xxxxxx
1963			
Africa	xxx		xx
Asia	x		
Latin America	xxxxxx		x
1964			
Africa	xx	x	x
Asia	xx	x	x
Latin America	xx		x
1965			
Africa	xxxxxx		
Asia	x	x	xxxx
Latin America	x		x
1966			
Africa	xxxxxxxx	x	xxx
Asia	x		x
Latin America	xx		x
1967			
Africa	xxx	x	xxxxxx
Asia	x		
Latin America			
1968			
Africa	xxx	x	
Asia			
Latin America	xx		x
1969			
Africa	xxxx		xxxxxx
Asia			
Latin America	xxx		x

TABLE 17
(continued)

Year	Coup	Counter-Coup	Attempted
1970			
Africa		x	xxxxxx
Asia	x		x
Latin America	xxx		xxxxxx
1971			
Africa	x		xxxxxxxxxx
Asia	x		
Latin America	xx		xx
1972			
Africa	xxxxx		xxxxxxx
Asia	xx		x
Latin America	xx		xxxx
1973			
Africa	x		xxxxxxxxxxxx
Asia	xx		xx
Latin America	x		xx
1974			
Africa	xxx	x	xxxxxxx
Asia			x
Latin America			xx
1975			
Africa	xxx		xxxxxxxxxx
Asia	xxx	xxx	
Latin America	x		xx
1976			
Africa	x		xxxxxxxxxxxx
Asia	x		xxx
Latin America	x		xx
1977			
Africa	x	x	xxxxxxxxxx
Asia	xx		xx
Latin America			x
1978			
Africa	xxx		xxxxxxx
Asia	x		
Latin America	xx	x	
1979			
Africa	xxxxx		
Asia	xxxxxx		
Latin America	xxxxx		

Sources : New York Times Index, Keesing's Contemporary Archives,
Statesmen's Yearbook, Facts On File.

TABLE 18

ESTIMATES OF REFUGEES, WORLDWIDE BY COUNTRY

Country	Range of estimates of refugees leaving their country	Comments	
Africa :			
Angola	132,000 - 550,000	Early 1978. Many seen to have resettled.	
Burundi	152,000		
Equatorial Guinea	112,000 - 127,000	Many Guinean exiles have resettled. Some recent returns reported. This is a 1975 estimate of departures of those holding British passports. Highly uncertain. Thousands of Jehovah's Witnesses from Malawi hiding in Zambia and Mozambique.	
Ethiopia	562,000 - 830,000		
Guinea	3,000 - 1,000,000		
Kenya	45,000	Does not include whites.	
Malawi	15,000		
Namibia	23,000 - 33,000		
Rhodesia	102,000 - 140,000		
Rwanda	175,000		
South Africa	1,000 - 2,000	Data prior to Amin's overthrow in 1979.	
Sudan	14,000 - 16,000		
Uganda	20,000 - 100,000		
Zaire	358,000	Argentinians. 1976-nationals of other Latin American states. 1973-78. 1959-78 (most through 1975). Between 10,000 and 20,000 have returned. High estimates of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic bring the range up to nearly 1 million out of the country. Data as of January 1979. Information in June 1979 indicates that an additional 15,000 have fled in the face of predicted conflict.	
Latin America :			
Argentina	35,000 - 40,000		
	5,000 - 10,000		
Chile	80,000		
Cuba	810,000		
Haiti	333,000 - 938,000		
Nicaragua	50,000		

TABLE 18 - (continued)

Country	Range of estimates of refugees leaving their country	Comments
Middle East and North Africa :		
Cyprus	155,500 Greek Cypriots 700 Maronite Cypriots 37,250 Turkish Cypriots	UNHCR, 1978 placed with country.
Iraq	35,000 - 135,000	1975.
Palestinians	1,757,269 registered UNRWA 180,252 not registered	1978. 1978.
	1,500,000 other	1978 - in o parts of th
Western Sahara	5,000 - 200,000	Moroccan fi 5,000 - 15, Polisario f 100,000 - 20 UN estimate 52,000.
Asia :		
Burma	200,000	Exodus to Ba in 1978. Ab 100,000 were ed processed ready to reti Burma in late This number c illegal emig was estimated 1978. Many o s consider th these emigran do not qualify refugees.
China	25,000	1975 - April 1 1957 - 1960. T who left are s leaving their country of fir asylum for res ment in third 1978.
Indochina	over 1,000,000	
Tibet	100,000	
West Irian	600	

SOURCE: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WORLD REFUGEE CRISIS:
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S RESPONSE, WASHINGTON D.C.,
AUGUST 1979.

TABLE 19
ADVANCED WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE THIRD WORLD

State	Type of Weapon System
Africa	
Angola	
Army	SA-7 SAM
Air	Sagger ATGW
Ethiopia	AA-2 Atoll AAM
Army	SA-2/3/7 SAM
Navy	AT-3 Sagger ATGW
Gabon	2 ex-Sov OSA-II FAC(M) with Styx SSM
Navy	1 FAC(M) with SS-12 SSM
Ghana	
Navy	*4 Lurseen FAC(M) : 2 with Exocet,
	2 with Harpoon SSM
	2 Kromantse ASW corvettes
Ivory Coast	
Navy	4 large patrol craft with SS-12 SSM
	(2 Franco-Belge type, 2 Patra)
Kenya	
Army	*8 Swingfire ATGW
Air	Sidewinder AAM
Morocco	*32 Hughes 500 MD Defender hel with TOW
Army	1000 BGM-71A TOW ATM
	10 Chaparral, Crotale SAM
Air	SA-7
	Sidewinder
	R.550 Magic AAM
	*AD system
Mozambique	
Army	Sagger ATGW
	24 SA-6/7 SAM
Nigeria	
Navy	2 Vosper MK 9 missile corvettes
	*3 Lurssen S-143 FAC (M)
	*3 La Combattante-3 FAC (M)
	*36 MM-38 Exocet Sh ShM
	*18 OTOMAT ShShM
	*18 Seacat ShAM
Air	AA-2 Atoll AAM
Senegal	
Navy	24 SS-12 ShShM
Sudan	
Air	AA-2 Atoll AAM
Tanzania	
Army	SA-3/6 SAM
Uganda	
Army	Sagger ATGW
	SA-7 SAM
Air	AA-2 Atoll AAM

TABLE 19
(continued)

State	Type of Weapon System
Zambia	
Air	1 SAM unit with 12 Rapier, 3 Tigercat
Tunisia	
Army	SS-11 ATGW *M-113 APC with TOW 60 *1,200 TOW ATGW * 328 Chaparral SAM
Navy	3 P48 large patrol craft with SS-12 SS
Asia	
Afghanistan	
Army	Sagger, Snapper ATGW SA-7 SAM AA-2 Atoll AAM
Air	AA-2 Atoll AAM
Bangladesh	
Air	AA-2 Atoll AAM
Brunei	
Army	Rapier/Blindfire SAM
India	
Army	SS-11 ATGW ENTAC ATGW 40 Tigercat SAM 4 Leander frigates with 2 Seacat SAM 2 ex-Br Whitby frigates with Styx SSM 3 ex-Sov Nanuchka corvettes with SSM, S. 48 SSN-2 Sh ShM 54 SSN-9 ShShM 16 ex-Sov Osa-I/II FAC(M) with Styx SSM *92 SSN-11 ShShM *36 SSN-2 ShShM *90 SSN-9 ShShM *5 ex-Sov Osa I/II FAC(M) *6 ex-Sov Nanuchka corvettes
Air	AA-2 Atoll AAM AS 30 ASM 20 SAM sqns with 120 SA-2/3 *R-550 Magic AAM
Indonesia	
Army	ENTAC ATGW
Navy	9 ex-Sov Komar FAC(M) with Styx SSM (2 in reserve) *Exocet SSM
Malaysia	
Navy	2 frigates (1 ASW with Seacat) 4 Perdana FAC(M) with Exocet SSM *4 Spica-M FAC(M) with Exocet SSM, Blowpi SAM *Gabriel-2 SS. Sidewinder AAM *Supersidewinder AAM
Air	

State	Type of Weapon System
Pakistan	
Army	Cobra ATGW 9 Crotale AMX-30 SAM *200 BGM-71A TOW ATM
Navy	AM-39 Exocet ASM *40 ASROC ASW msls
Air	AIM-9J Sidewinder AAM R.530 AAM R.550 Magic AAM
Philippines	
Army	Hawk SAM
Air	Sidewinder AAM
Singapore	
Air	2 SAM sqns : 1 with 28 Bloodhound 2, 1 with 10 Rapier *200 AIM-9L Super Sidewinders AAM
Thailand	
Army	*TOW ATGW
Navy	1 frigate with Seacat SAM 3 Lurssen 45-metre FAC(M) with Gabriel-2 *3 FAC(M) with MM-38 Exocet SSM AIM-9J Sidewinder
Air	
Latin America	
Argentina	
Army	SS-11/12, Bantam, Cobra, Mamba ATGW Tigercat SAM
Navy	1 ex-US Brooklyn cruiser with Seacat SAM 2 ex-Fr A69 "Avisos" frigates with Exocet SSM 12 Sea Dart ShAM *18 Gabriel-2 ShShM, 72 Seawold ShShM/ShA Bantam ATGW 10 Tigercat SAM
Marines	
Brazil	
Army	Cobra-2000 ATGW 4 Roland SAM
Navy	2 Niteroi destroyers with Seacat ShAM 4 Niteroi destroyers with Exocet SSM 1 ex-US Fletcher destroyer with Seacat S 1 ex-US Sumner destroyer with Seacat ShA 2 ex-US Gearing destroyers with ASROC R.530 AS-11 ASM 566 AS-11 ASM 566 AS-12 ASM
Air	*34 AS-11 ASM *34 AS-12 ASM
Chile	
Navy	2 Almirante destroyers with Exocet SSM, Seacat SAM 2 Leander frigates with Exocet SSM, Seacat SAM
Air	Sidewinder, Shafrir AAM AS-11/-12 ASM

TABLE 19
(continued)

State	Type of Weapon System
Ecuador	
Army	*18M-730 Chaparral SAM
Navy	3 Lurssen type FAC(M) with Exocet SSM
	*Exocet SSM
Air	R.550 Magic AAM
Peru	
Army	SA-3 SAM, mobile
	SA-7 SAM, portable infantry
	*SA-3/-7 SAM
Navy	1 ex-Neth De Ruyter cruiser with Exocet
	2 ex-Br Daring Destroyers with Exocet S
	2 Lupo frigates with OTOMAT SSM, Albatros SAM
	*6 PR-72P FAC(M) with Exocet SSM
Air	AS-30 ASM
Venezuela	
Army	SS-11 ATGW
Navy	1 Aragua destroyer with Seacat SAM
	1 Lupo frigate with Otomat SSM, Albatros SAM
Air	3 Vosper Thorneycraft FAC(M) with Otomat R.530 AAM

* On Order.

SOURCE: ISSUES OF MILITARY BALANCE, IIS.

TABLE 20

SOVIET "FIRSTS" IN THE THIRD WORLD

Egypt, 1955	First overt arms deal with a third world client.
Yemen vs. Aden, 1957-59	First military aid to a noncommunist nation engaged in conflict.
The Sumatran rebellion, 1958	First military aid to a noncommunist combatant when U.S. supported opposing side with arms.
Congo crisis, 1960	First military involvement in Africa. First Soviet transport of foreign troops to a the scene of battle.
Laotian Civil War, 1960-61	First direct supplying of frontline troops.
Yemeni Civil War, 1962-69	First confirmed use of Soviet fighter pilots in combat. First case of Soviet advisers remaining in the center of a battle.
Nigerian Civil War, 1967-70	First major military intervention in Africa.
War of Attrition, 1967-70	First case of Soviet personnel firing SAMs in combat.
Yom Kippur War, 1973	First massive resupply effort to a belligerent (massive meaning that over 200 pieces of heavy equipment were involved). First major intervention against a U.S. ally. First time Russians fired offensive, surface-to-surface missiles in combat.
Angolan Civil War, 1975-75	First major use of Cuban troops in a Soviet military intervention. First massive Soviet intervention in Africa.
Ogaden War, 1977-78	First time high-level Soviet commanders directed a foreign intervention.

TABLE 21
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES RECEIVING
MILITARY AND/OR ECONOMIC AID
FROM THE SOVIET BLOC

	(million US \$)					Academic Students From LDCs Being Trained as of 12/78	
	Military Technicians in LDCs 1978	Military Personnel From LDCs Trained in Soviet Bloc 1955 - 78	Economic Credits & Grants to LDCs 1954-78	Economic Technicians in LDCs 1978			
Africa							
Algeria	1,015	2,245	1,240		11,350	1,925	
Libya	1,950	1,330			22,600		
Morocco	10		2,268	2,089		255	
Mauritania			18		60	515	
Tunisia			306			340	
Egypt		6,250	2,330		1,000		
Sub-Saharan Africa							
Angola	20,300	60	105	77	9,900	815	
Eq. Guinea	190	200	1			250	
Ethiopia	17,900	1,640	200	45	1,150	2,195	
Guinea	300	930	322		735	1,160	
G-Bissau	205	100	11		350		
Mali	180	365	113	1	475	490	
Mozambique	1,030		22	2	1,150	360	
Benin		20	5			255	
Guinea-Bissau		75				250	
Cameroun			8			155	
Congo		440	88			1,255	X
Ghana		180	199		95	590	X
Nigeria		730	87		11,625	1,950	X
Sierra Leone			28		10	425	X
Somalia		2,555	170		50	95	X
Sudan		350	305	24	125	1,600	X
Tanzania		1,830	61	3	365	790	X
Togo						290	
Zaire						275	
Zambia		85	71	12	145	320	
Botswana						25	
Cape Verde			4	3		315	
E. Afr. Emp.			3			510	
Chad			5			410	
Gabon			2	2	10		
Kenya			48		25	645	X
Liberia			20	6	10		X
Madagascar						765	
Mauritius			5			145	X
Niger			2	10			
Rwanda			1			260	X
Senegal			43		100	170	
Uganda			16			350	
Upper Volta			6				
Togo & Pr.					160		
Morocco						20	
Seychelles						800	
Somalia							X

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TABLE 21 (continued)
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES RECEIVING
MILITARY AND/OR ECONOMIC AID
FROM THE SOVIET BLOC

(million US \$)

	Military Technicians in LDCs	Military Personnel From LDCs Trained in Soviet Bloc	Economic Credits & Grants to LDCs	Economic Technicians in LDCs	Academic Students From LDCs Being Trained as of 12/78.	Fl in Ac
	1978	1955 - 78	1954-78	1978	1978	
Latin America						
Argentina	10		30		80	
Bolivia	150	725	241	195	595	X
Brazil			514			X
Chile			121	125	170	
Colombia			709	200	70	
Costa Rica			383	10		X
Cuba			292		1,020	
Guatemala			27		550	
Honduras			19	28	825	
Mexico			66	115		
Nicaragua			35			
Panama			83			
Paraguay			33	21	105	
Peru					135	
Salvador					25	
Venezuela					125	
Yemen		315	1,851	5,100		X
Yemen	1,350	4,330	1,198	6,865	485	X
Yemen	155	1,180	156	38	155	670
Yemen	1,550	1,095	270	96	1,575	680
Yemen	2,580	4,945	1,722	150	5,925	3,830
Yemen			8			
Yemen			26			
Yemen			5			
Yemen			9		495	
Yemen			2,776	1,285	1,500	
Yemen						
Yemen	700	4,010	1,302	2,075	1,505	
Yemen		445	463	105	1,100	X
Yemen	150	2,285	2,737	1,200	1,130	X
Yemen		45	1,047	225	635	205
Yemen		10	251	80	125	310
Yemen			30		5	525
Yemen		9,270	506			
Yemen		30	42			
Yemen			189	140		
Yemen			10			
Yemen			66			X


SOURCE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COMMUNIST AID ACTIVITIES IN NON-COMMUNIST LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1978, September, 1979

CHARTS

- 1 Petroleum Prices, 1972-1979
- 2 Population Estimates And Projections, 1950-2000
- 3 Labor Force Estimates And Projections, 1950-2000
- 4 Urbanization Estimates And Projections For
Developing Countries, 1960-2000
- 5 Soviet Fishery Aid To Developing Countries
- 6 U.S. Net Import Reliance Of Selected Minerals
And Metals

CHART 1


PETROLEUM PRICES, 1972 - 1979



SOURCE: WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 1979
Washington, D.C. 1979, p. 11.

CHART 2


POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, 1950-2000



SOURCE: WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1979
Washington, D.C., 1979, p. 57

CHART 3

LABOR FORCE ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS, 1950-2000







Source : World Bank, World Development Report 1979, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 48.

CHART 4




URBANIZATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1960-2000

Urbanization Levels

 Urbanization Level 1950
  Increment in Urbanization Level 1950-1975
  Increment in Urbanization Level 1975-2000



Average Annual Growth of Urban Population

 Growth Rate 1950-1960
  Growth Rate 1970-1980
  Growth Rate 1990-2000




CHART 5

SOVIET FISHERY AID TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

State	Port Facility	Processing Facility*	Education	Research	Ships ⁰
Angola	X		X	X	X
Bangladesh					X
Chile	X		X		X
Cuba	X		X		X
Egypt	X		X	X	X
Guinea-Bissau	X		X		X
India	X			X	X
Iraq	X	X			X
Mauritania			X	X	X
Mauritius			X	X	
Morocco	X	X		X	
Peru	X	X		X	
Senegal			X	X	
Somalia	X		X	X	X
Sri Lanka		X	X		
Yemen	X		X	X	
South Yemen		X			


* Category includes actual construction only, not merely access rights.

⁰ Includes all ships transferred from the Soviet Union by grant, loan lease or concessionary sale.

SOURCE: From Judith E. Hughes, The Soviet Fishing Industry, A Vital "State Industry", unpublished M.A.L.D. thesis for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, 1978. pg. 50

CHART 6

U.S. NET IMPORT RELIANCE OF SELECTED MINERALS AND METALS AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION IN 1978



*NET IMPORT RELIANCE = IMPORTS - EXPORTS
+ ADJUSTMENTS FOR GOVT AND INDUSTRY STOCK CHANGES

**APPARENT CONSUMPTION = U.S. PRIMARY
+ SECONDARY PRODUCTION + NET IMPORT RELIANCE

BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
(import-export data from Bureau of the Census)

SOURCE : Bureau of Mines, United States Department of Interior,
Status of the Mineral Industries, Washington, DC, October 1979, p.36

FOOTNOTES

1. The Most-Seriously-Affected (MSA) LDCs are:

Afghanistan	Guinea	Nepal
Bangladesh	Huinrs-Niddsu	Niger
Benin	Guyana	Pakistan
Burma	Haiti	Rwanda
Burundi	Honduras	Senegal
Cameroon	India	Sierra Leone
Cape Verde	Ivory Coast	Somalia
Central African Empire	Kampuchea	Sri Lanka
Chad	Kenya	Sudan
Egypt	Laos	Tanzania
El Salvador	Lesotho	Uganda
Ethiopia	Madagascar	Upper Volta
The Gambia	Mali	Western Somoa
Ghana	Mauritania	Yemen]
Guatemala	Mozambique	Yemen, Dem.]

2. See "After Decade of Growth, Third World Faces Grim Future, Washington Post, A13, June 6, 1980.
3. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), World Development Report 1979, Washington, D.C., 1979, p 3.
4. IBRD, World Development Report 1980, Oxford University Press, New York c1980, p. 6.
5. The IMF estimates that oil importing developing countries will have an \$80 billion trade deficit in 1981, compared to \$68 billion in 1980 and \$38 billion in 1979. One-fifth of the total deficit will be from oil imports, the rest will be because of worsening terms of trade with the West. Financial Times (London) July 8, 1980, p 3.
6. For a more favorable view, see Asian Wall Street Journal, April 22, 1980, p 6 "Most Developing Nations Faring Better, Even After the Price Collapse This Year." Tin exporters such as Malaysia and Indonesia, sugar exporters such as the Philippines and Cuba, and coffee exporters such as Brazil and Colombia are doing better than the copper exporters (Zaire and Zambia).
7. IBRD, Commodity Trade and Price Trends, Washington, D.C., August 1979, Report No. EC-166/79, p 3 and p 5.
8. OECD is projecting only a 3.3% growth. With lower growth may come an increase in trends towards protectionism which would further restrict LDC trade. See "I.M.F. Report on Trade Assails Protectionist Acts," The New York Times, August 21, 1979, p D-3.

9. But the average maturity period for loan commitments of public debt decreased during 1973-1977 for loans from private financial institutions and private bond markets. Jeffrey A. Katz, Capital Flows and Developing Country Debt, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 352, IBRD, Washington, D.C., August 1979, p 35.
10. See David O. Beim, "Rescuing the LDCs," Foreign Affairs, July 1977, p 725. Turkey has recently expressed displeasure over I.M.F. imposed economic policies. See "I.M.F. Pressure Embitters Turks," The New York Times, December 15, 1979, p 33.
11. Katz, Ibid., p 45.
12. See "Banks Trim Loans to Third World Amid Fears of Repayment Problem," New York Times, April 14, 1980, p 1. Non-oil importing LDCs have increased their external debt from \$142 billion in 1974 to \$315 billion in 1978 with 61% of the total privately borrowed. \$57 billion is owed to U.S. banks. Also see "Central Bankers Wave On Oil Prices," New York Times, April 16, 1980 p D-1. And "A New recycling crisis for petrodollars." Business Week, June 23, 1980, p 120.
13. See Bernard Nossiter, "Poor Nations Drop Oil-Price Plan," New York Times, November 18, 1979, p A-20.
14. "OECD Study Foresees Oil-Induced Growth Lag," The New York Times, July 19, 1979, p D-3.
15. Ann Crittenden, "Getting the Gloomy Picture of Energy and the Third World," The New York Times, November 11, 1979, p E-8.
16. Palmedo, Philip F., Nathans, Robert, Beardsworth, Edward, and Hale, Samuel Jr., Energy Needs, Uses and Resources In Developing Countries, BNL Report No. 50784-UC-13, Policy Analysis Division, National Center for Analysis of Energy Systems, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, N.Y., March 1978, p 31.
17. See "Energy Costs Stunt Brazil's Development." New York Times, February 3, 1980, p 57. "India Short on Power to Fuel Its Growth," New York Times, February 3, 1980. "Growth of South Korea's Economy Hinges on Search for Oil Supplies," Asian Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1980, p 1.
18. "Output Dip Worsening, I.M.F. Says," The New York Times, September 17, 1979, p D-1 and p D-6.
19. See Carey Winfrey, "Oil Price Rises Put Kenya's Economy in Jeopardy," The New York Times, August 27, 1979, p A-1 and p A-11.

20. See Maurice B. Green, Eating Oil, Energy Use in Food Production, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, c. 1979.

All recent projections predict increased food imports for the developing world. By 1985, one group predicted a shortfall of cereal production in developing marketing economies (excluding China and the centrally planned countries) of 85 million tons on a net basis and 100 million tons on a gross basis. (See International Food Policy Research Institute, "Meeting Food Needs in The Developing World," Development Digest, V 15, N. 2, April 1977, p 9). More recently, it has been predicted that by 1990 the LDCs will need to import 145 million tons of food annually - nearly twice their present level of imports, and there is considerably uncertainty on how they will manage to pay for those imports given the present debt situation. (See Financial Times, "Present imperfect, future grim", February 13, 1980, p 16). The heart of the food problem is in the low-income developing countries where 60% of the LDC population lives, especially India, Bangladesh, and Sub-Saharan Africa. (See Francis X. Murray, ed. Seminar On World Food Supply, Health, and Nutrition, The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., February 1977, p 7).

21. Seth S. King, "Oil Increase Will Be Felt All Along the Food Chain," The New York Times, August 19, 1979, p E-3.
22. Palmedo, et al, Energy Needs, p 55-56. See also Gordian Associates, Inc., LDC Energy Supply/Demand Balances and Financing Requirements, Final Report, Gordian Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C., February 27, 1978, p 176. See The World Food Situation And Prospects to 1985, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Foreign Agricultural Economic Report, No. 98, Washington, D.C., December 1974.
23. Food production must increase at a greater rate if nutritional needs of the poor are to be met. A World Bank study predicted continued and widespread malnutrition in Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. See Odin Knudsen and Pasquale L. Scandizzo, Nutrition and Food Need in Developing Countrysies, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 328, May 1979, p 20-21.
24. Palmedo, et al, Energy Needs, p XIV.
25. See Erik Eckholm, The Other Energy Crisis: Firewood, Worldwatch Paper No. 1, Washington, D.C., Worldwatch Institute, September 1975.
26. See Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies (WAES), Energy: Global Prospects 1985-2000, McGraw Hill, New York, 1977.
27. "Study Grim On Outlook For Energy," The New York Times, November 20, 1979, p D-11.
28. James Tanner, Wall Street Journal, "Ample World Oil in '80 See By Many Experts; Flat Demand Predicted," December 7, 1979, p 1 and p 37.

29. For a less pessimistic view, see Henry Giniger, "U.N. Conference is Optimistic on World's Energy," The New York Times, December 9, 1979, p 23.
30. R. Vedavalli, Petroleum and Gas in Non-OPEC Developing Countries: 1976-1985, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 289, IBRD, Washington, D.C., April 1978.
31. The effects of energy shortages are already lowering production in India. See "Growing Energy Gap in India is Crippling Industry," The New York Times, December 16, 1979, p 24.
32. IBRD, World Development, Ibid, p 39.
33. Population growth rates may be declining worldwide according to a new study. See "World Fertility in Rapid Decline," The New York Times, July 15, 1980, p C-1.

The Council on Environmental Quality and the U.S. Department of State's report The Global 2000 Report to the President, Entering the Twenty-First Century, Washington, D.C., General Printing Office, 1980, projects that even under their lowest-growth scenario, world population will increase by 46% to 5.9 billion by 2000. LDC's shares of world population will be 79% in 2000 V. 1, p 8.

34. Ibid, p 72.
35. IBRD, World Development, Ibid, p 164-169.
36. Hollis B. Chenery and Donald B. Keesing, The Changing Composition of Developing Country Exports, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 314, IBRD, Washington, D.C., January 1979, p 2.
37. See "World Bank advocates socialism, permissive lending policies," International Currency Review, V. 11, n. 4, September 1979, p 15-24.
38. Ahinwalia, Montek S., Carter, Nicholas G., and Chenery, Hollis B., Growth and Poverty in Developing Countries, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 309 (revised), IBRD, Washington, D.C., May 1979. Despite the expansion of world output, the poor receive little benefit, in part because the distributional pattern of past growth by-passes the poorest groups. High LDC growth ignores the poorest countries (who have a greater concentration of poor). Equally, the growth programs being implemented in most LDCs may be implicitly biased against the poor, p 2.
39. In January 1975 riots broke out in Egypt to protest the 50% rise (over two years) of prices in basic commodities and food, despite massive government subsidies. In January 1977 the announcement that subsidies on food and other basics would be reduced by half

provoked further riots, resulting in the deaths of 79. The government withdrew its planned reductions. (See The Economist, January 22, 1977, p 59, and January 29, 1977, p 59-60). The 1973-1975 drought in Ethiopia killed an estimated 500,000 which the Imperial Ethiopian Government tried to cover-up. If the government had responded quickly, it perhaps could have avoided the subsequent coup. (See Jack Shepherd, The Politics of Starvation, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, New York, 1975).

40. From private discussions with the author 1980. The International Monetary Fund is now predicting balance of payments deficit for the LDCs of \$70 billion in 1980.
41. See "How to pick winners in the oil-recession lobby," Citibank, Monthly Newsletter, New York, May 1979, p 12-15.
42. OECD is projecting only a 3.3% growth. With lower growth may come an increase in trends towards protectionism which would further restrict LDC trade. See "I.M.P. Report on Trade Assails Protectionist Acts." The New York Times, August 21, 1979, p D-3.

 "O.E.C.D. Study Foresees Oil-Induced Growth Lag," New York Times, September 17, 1979, p D-1 and p D-6.

 "Output Dip Worsening, I.M.F. Says,:" The New York Times, September 17, 1979, p D-1 and p D-6.

 See "Next: A Global Slump?" New York Times, March 16, 1980. "Solomon Pessimistic On World Economy," New York Times, February 29, 1980, p D-3.
 A 1% growth rate for 1980 is now predicted for OECD countries.
 ("O.E.C.D. Predicts Growth" New York Times, June 4, 1980, p D-1.
43. President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines has been quoted as stating that "reports of America falling behind in the arms race made him wonder about its ability to meet the Soviet challenge." Honolulu Advertiser, April 23, 1980, p 1.
44. See James M. McConnell and Bradford Dismukes, "Soviet Diplomacy of Force in the Third World," Problems of Communism, January-February 1979, p 14-27.
45. Human relations problems have not yet been overcome. In August 1979, the Nigerians ordered the Soviets to cut their military advisers from 40 to 5 in part because of the advisers' condescending attitudes. The Soviets have been providing military equipment and assistance to Nigeria since 1967. New York Times, August 22, 1979, p A-3.
46. See Anne M. Kelly, "Port Visits and the 'Internationalist' Mission of the Soviet Navy," in McGwire, Michael, ed. Soviet Naval Influence, Domestic and Foreign Dimensions, New York: Praeger, 1977.

47. The spread of American forces to the Indian Ocean, diminishing 7th Fleet forces in the Pacific has also provided an unplanned opportunity for the Soviets to encroach on Western spheres of influence with a minimum expenditure. See "Soviet Ships Reportedly Destine to Reinforce Indian Ocean Fleet," The New York Times, February 5, 1980, p. A10. "Soviet subs stationed in S. China Sea," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 2, 1980, p. 18. "Foothold in Vietnam expands Soviet capabilities near vital sea-lanes," Baltimore Sun, March 31, 1980, p 2.
48. See "Soviet Economy Grow 0.7% Last Year And '80 Outlook is Dim, Too, CIA, Says," Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1980, p 30; "Soviets Look for Formula to Fuel a Flagging, Vulnerable Economy," Washington Post, June 8, 1980, p 1; "Soviet Production Lags," Washington Post, June 10, 1980, p 1.
49. The New York Times, July 30, 1979, p. D-1. Also Wall Street Journal, January 9, 1978, p 1.
50. The New York Times, January 2, 1980, p D-11. They did not attain their 1979 goal of 11.86 million b/d of crude and condensate production either. A decline in Soviet exports to the West "would endanger U.S.S.R. policy of trying to maintain maximum feasible oil exports to the West to obtain foreign exchange for purchases of advanced technology." (emphasis their's). Oil & Gas Journal, February 11, 1980. For a contrary view, see Marshall I. Goldman, "The Soviet Oil Alarm," The New York Times, April 7, 1980.
51. Dohan, Michael R. "Export Specialization And Import Dependence in the Soviet Economy, 1970-77," in Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, Soviet Economy in a Time of Change, v.2, October 10, 1979, p 349.
52. East Germany recently prohibited other Soviet Bloc visitors from buying gasoline as German prices were half that of other countries. The New York Times, June 2, 1980, p 2. See, also, David A. Andelman, "Energy Trade Issues Confront Soviet Block," The New York Times, February 3, 1980, p 41.
53. See "U.S. Technological Curbs Impose Strain on Soviets," Washington Post, June 11, 1980, p 1.
54. Hughes, Judith E., The Soviet Fishing Industry, A Vital "Stage Interest," unpublished M.A.L.D. thesis, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, MA, 1978.
55. Franssen, Herman T., in Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Soviet Oceans Development, Washington, D.C., 1976, p 623.
56. Hughes, Soviet Fishing, Ibid, pp 50-51.
57. See MccGwire, Michael, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy" in

Soviet Oceans Development, p 127. (Ibid).

58. Hughes, Ibid, p 42.
59. Soviet Economy, Ibid, v. 2, p 626.
60. Ibid, p 628.
61. Ibid, p 630.
62. Ibid, p 631.
63. See Jacob I. Kaplan and Timothy W. Stanley, Dependence And Vulnerability: The United States and Imported raw Materials, International Economic Studies Institute, Washington, D.C., December 1977, also, the International Economic Studies Institute's Raw Materials & Foreign Policy, 1976.
64. See "Capacity Surge Seen For Uranium Mining," The New York Times, June 12, 1980, p D-11, which states that the U.S. uranium industry will be threatened in the 1980's by low-cost foreign mines.
65. See Amos A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarx, Strategic Mineral Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma, Center For Strategic And International Studies, Washington, D.C. c 1979.
66. See Gobind Nankani, Development Problems of Mineral-Exporting Countries, World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 354, IBRD, Washington, D.C., August 1979.
67. See Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, "The USSR, the Third World, and the Global Economy," Problems of Communism, July-August 1979.
68. See, for example, "Kuwait Buying Soviet Missiles," Washington Post, February 10, 1980, p 1.

Chapter Five

Soviet Power Projection

"I hold it as a principal that in Asia the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they will be quiet afterwards. My system is this: to strike hard and keep on hitting until resistance is completely over. Then at once to form ranks, cease slaughter, and be kind and humane..."¹

General Mikhael Dimitrivitch Skobelev, Russian Commander,
Central Asia, 1870's

As far back as the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, in a secret protocol, appeared the statement that "The Soviet Union declares that its territorial aspirations center south of the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the Indian Ocean." In the circumstances that have now arrived with Soviet armed forces on the Pakistani border and a naval buildup of historic dimension in the Indian Ocean, to say that the Soviets 'have no grand, detailed strategy for attaining world mastery' or, for that matter, regional mastery anywhere, as it has been so fashionable to say, may still be true - but would be trivial. For detailed plans would have had little relevance against the contingent and the unforeseen. As Paul Nitze has put it, the Soviets view strategy "as being more flexible and fluid the better to capitalize on new opportunities...as they arise."

Soviet tactics are flexibly adapted to the circumstances of the particular engagement. Their tactical doctrine emphasizes the desirability of overwhelming force, particularly superior fire power, the integration of all forces, the exploitation of surprise and initiative, and the assured durability of command, control, and communication.²

A strategic sense in any case does not require detailed plans; it requires that the Soviets know where, at least in the key third world regions, they wish to go, and this surely is in the area surrounding the Persian Gulf.

This happens in a context where, arguably, the Indian Ocean has come to be the world "heartland," to reverse MacKinder's hypothesis. For power in the nineties will certainly not be a function as such of the control of the European heartland or any other land mass; it will, rather, be in the control of the intricate system of resource provision centering in oil and shipping (and, to a lesser extent, mineral production) originating in the Indian Ocean region. Control of the interior lines in the old European heartland, however, makes domination of the Indian Ocean that much simpler, to be sure.

But it is important to see the systemic nature of Soviet strategy, appearing as it seemingly has in unrelated parts: In Iran, since the Shah began slipping, the world's largest KGB station has pumped out inflammatory propaganda, and presumably assisted revolutionaries (it must be remembered that the Communist Tudeh party is in political control of the oil fields).³ The "Voice of the Free People of Iran," based in Baku, pours out anti-American diatribes in several languages and dialects, increasing the intensity and breadth of these as the crisis deepens.⁴ The development of access rights in Ethiopia, flights of reconnaissance planes over our allies into the Indian Ocean region, development of ship repair facilities at Aden, and virtually open-ended military assistance to Marxist-led guerrillas in Southern Africa at one point or the other are part of the same pattern. This has all come at a time of extreme Western vulnerability, and, with the invasion of Afghanistan, has clearly become an intricate system, no part of which can be understood in a vacuum.

So the Soviet Union clearly has a strategy. Its underpinnings include the attainment of strategic superiority, which on most indices it had already achieved, and for which it prudently waited before its massive interventions began at the decade's end; and the maintenance of conventional superiority in Europe. It then takes advantage - not necessarily according to some overarching, long-laid plan - of Western weaknesses wherever these appear, as they appear, and wherever Western attention has been diverted. Paul Nitze's argument continues:

The Soviet strategy can be expected to include exploitation of fears caused by a realization of Soviet military preponderance in the area, exploitation of political tensions between the Arab states and Israel, and between feudal regimes or narrowly based successor regimes and other groups desiring themselves to monopolize power, and exacerbation of every possibility for dislike of the United States that presents itself.⁵

As we foreshadowed earlier, and as should be clear at this point, the Soviet Union has something of a Schlieffen plan in operation, outflanking Europe by way of Africa and the Middle East - just as the Egyptian/Israeli core of the Middle East was outflanked by Soviet gains in Yemen, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

This Soviet strategy is but a contemporary version of the grand design articulated by Lenin at the Second Congress of the Comintern in July 1920. He urged that the Comintern strike at the imperialist powers from the rear by supporting national revolutionary movements in their colonial empires; in this manner the productive resources and outlets for investment upon which capitalism depended would suffer worsening attrition until the Western economies collapsed:

World imperialism shall fall when the revolutionary onslaught of the exploited and oppressed workers in each country...merges with the revolutionary onslaught of hundreds of millions of people who have hitherto stood beyond the pale of history...⁶

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COMPARATIVE POWER PROJECTIONAL CAPABILITIES: THE SOVIET UNION A--ETC(U)

FEB 81 W S THOMPSON


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By the 1970s the growing dependence of the Western powers on foreign mineral resources gave this strategy greater potential than ever before. Further, the USSR's advancing military capabilities meant that Moscow for the first time could present a double threat to the West's vital lifeline of resources: in addition to backing radical revolutionary movements in key countries, it could conceivably employ its own military power to seize crucial assets in the third world. The invasion of Afghanistan dramatized the latter threat.

A somewhat outworn commonplace holds that the superior mobility of the U.S. armed forces would give the nation strong advantages over the Soviet Union in any military conflict in the third world, whether direct or waged via proxies. The real threat from Soviet power is therefore seen as centering in Europe or in the growing Soviet primacy in strategic nuclear weapons. The problem with this assumption is that a simple one-to-one comparison of overall mobility capabilities is a poor, indeed a misleading, indicator of actual relative capabilities for conventional warfare in specific regions of the world. Simple "bean counts" may have some relevance for evaluating the European balance or the strategic nuclear balance, but they are largely superfluous for comparing the superpowers' capabilities for power projection, where the scenarios of potential conflicts are vastly more numerous and diverse. As far as U.S. policy is concerned, the crucial question is not which power possesses the overall advantage in the quantity and quality of its mobility forces, but this: which side can effectively project superior conventional force into the specific regions of the third world that are of the greatest political concern? Stated in this manner, the problem becomes more complex and the power projection outlook far less favorable from the American point of view.

I

There are four principal reasons why Washington's overall superiority in the technical hardware of power projection does not necessarily translate into political superiority in certain regions of the globe:

1. Geographical asymmetry. There is no question but that the U.S. enjoys a vastly greater capacity to project conventional power into the eastern hemisphere than Moscow has capacity to project it into the western hemisphere. However, the majority of the world's population and nations lie in the eastern hemisphere, and there are situated also the larger part of the mineral resources upon which the U.S. and its allies depend. By virtue of its physical size and position on the globe, the USSR enjoys one critical advantage over the U.S. when it comes to projecting power in the eastern hemisphere: a lesser distance over which it must transport equipment and sustain its logistical efforts. This advantage is particularly salient because of the large number of countries situated within a few thousand kilometers of the Soviet Union among them the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, the most vital seat of Western interests in the third world.

2. The asymmetry in strategic requirements. The geographical asymmetry discussed above is coupled with a sharp asymmetry in American and Soviet strategic requirements for mobility forces. The capability to exert armed power at substantial distances from its borders is vital for the U.S., but largely optional for the USSR. The U.S. must maintain the capability to reinforce its allies in Western Europe and to keep open the sea lanes to Europe, Japan, and the oil-exporting nations. A substantial portion of American strategic airlift, sealift, and naval power is required for these missions. By contrast, the USSR requires a much more

modest airlift and sealift capability for defending its own vital interests, and only in the last two decades has it undertaken procurement of a blue-water surface navy. The Soviet problem is not mobility beyond its borders, but mobility within its borders - a mission it accomplishes largely with tactical airlift and land transportation.

This disparity in U.S. and Soviet strategic requirements means simply that the U.S. can safely earmark only a minority of its transport and naval forces for contingencies in the third world. The USSR, with relatively low risks in terms of weakening its European front, can devote a higher proportion of its mobility forces to a given region in the third world than can the U.S. This factor alone significantly narrows the gap between American and Soviet power projectional capabilities.

3. The Advantage of the Offensive Side. Throughout most of the postwar period, U.S. foreign policy has been reactive and defensive in nature. Washington reacts to moves by the USSR or to revolutionary wars undertaken by Soviet-allied communist regimes and proxies. Only rarely has the USSR been forced to react to American initiatives, and the countries allied with it have never been seriously threatened by U.S.-backed revolutions. This is likely to remain the case for many years to come. Moscow thus enjoys the advantages of foresight and surprise - the Kremlin knew if and when it would resupply the Arabs in the October War, the MPLA in Angola, and Ethiopia in the Ogaden War; it knew that Soviet troops would invade Afghanistan and it knew when. The U.S. in each case was forced to second-guess Soviet intentions and to react to events as they unfolded.

This particular advantage has nothing to do with hardware and military force - it is purely political - yet the advantages of foresight and surprise have had the practical effect of multiplying the USSR's military effectiveness and political influence, while rendering the U.S.

politically divided and indecisive. Rapid deployment, faits accompli, and tactical and diplomatic surprise thus significantly enhance the USSR's capability to project its power into the third world.

4. The Shifting Nuclear Balance. At the strategic level, the USSR has attained a paramountcy which on most indices makes the use of the American power projectional cards unlikely, at least in conflicts that could lead to direct confrontation with Moscow. Given the increasing vulnerability of the land-based American ICBMs and the invulnerability of Moscow's second-strike force, Washington is less and less likely to escalate any confrontation with the Soviets by "sending in the Marines," as it once might have done. It is now the West that has every incentive to keep crises low on the escalatory ladder, which may be a partial explanation for American quiescence with respect to Soviet moves in recent years. Even in situations where escalation is extremely unlikely, the shifting nuclear balance affects each side's perceptions of its strength, bolstering Soviet confidence while weakening American resolve.

These four factors combine to change significantly the picture of American superiority in power projection. At a very minimum they suggest that the USSR may enjoy superiority in those regions near enough to its borders to offset the American advantage in transport volume, particularly if one or more of the following conditions exist: 1) the U.S. is unwilling to risk drawing down stockpiles earmarked for Europe in order to meet a contingency elsewhere; 2) the USSR moves swiftly and unexpectedly, presenting the U.S. with a fait accompli; 3) Washington is unwilling to risk moves upward on the escalatory ladder. In order to evaluate the actual extent to which the Soviet Union can indeed project superior force in regions near its borders, it is necessary to examine Soviet capabilities more closely.

II

The military assets with utility for power projection can be divided into three principal categories: naval power, including amphibious assault forces; sea transport; and air transport, including airborne assault forces. In the case of the Soviet Union, but not the United States, ground forces dependent on land transportation also constitute a significant addition to its capabilities for intervening in any country contiguous to its borders or contiguous to countries where it stations troops - Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran are prime examples. The pattern of investment by the USSR in the three principal categories of power projection during the past two decades strongly indicates that Moscow is undertaking a drive to attain parity in strategic mobility much like its earlier successful drive for parity in strategic nuclear weapons. Soviet advances were plainly intended to enhance the Kremlin's ability to influence the course of distant events, since many of the new forces were not needed for meeting Russia's traditional defensive requirements.

The status of the Soviet effort to increase its strategic mobility may be summarized as follows:

- 1) Naval power and amphibious assault forces: the USSR is clearly inferior to the U.S. in naval combat power, but it has been gaining steadily since the early sixties when its growing fleet first began to venture onto the high seas. From 1961 to 1979 the USSR constructed three new classes of escort ships, five classes of destroyer/ASW vessels, four classes of cruisers, and two classes of small carriers. The total number of new, large warships deployed was over 200. It amounted to the creation of an entire surface fleet in two decades - an event reminiscent of Imperial Germany's naval buildup prior to World War I. Statements by

Admiral Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet fleet, left no doubt that the surface fleet was expanded for the purpose of enhancing Soviet political influence in distant parts of the globe.⁷ Indicative of this goal was the program of extensive port visits to third world nations, inaugurated in 1964.⁸ As the Soviet fleet expanded, it also began to play a significant diplomatic role as a countervailing and deterrent force in several international crises.⁹

As of 1979 the Soviet navy had deployed only two small helicopter carriers (Moskva and Leningrad) and two medium-size attack carriers (Kiev and Minsk). Additional Kiev-class carriers were under construction, but the USSR did not possess any heavy attack carriers, while the American fleet then possessed thirteen. The heavy attack carriers are a principal reason that Washington enjoys superior global naval capabilities over Moscow, but most Western analysts - like their predecessors of the 1960s who doubted that Moscow would attempt to match U.S. missile power - considered it extremely unlikely that the Soviets would ever build heavy carriers because of their great expense and increasing vulnerability.¹⁰ But in August 1979 American intelligence and naval experts revealed that a large-deck, nuclear-powered attack carrier was under construction in the Murmansk area. In December, Admiral Gorshkov confirmed the report to American diplomats.¹¹ The construction of the carrier, apparently in the 75,000-ton class, is a development of great consequence for the future of Soviet capabilities to project power abroad, particularly if it is followed by other ships in its class, as is likely.

The Soviet naval infantry, reactivated in 1964, remains decidedly inferior to the U.S. Marines. Its strength is reported to be around 12-15,000 troops, until 1975 largely dependent for transport upon fourteen Alligator-class landing vessels, the first of which was deployed in 1966.

However, beginning in 1975 the fleet acquired thirteen Ropucha-class landing ships, constructed at Gdansk, Poland; engineered with ro/ro capability and with a higher troop-to-vehicle ratio than the Alligator-class vessels, the Ropuchas were a significant addition to the USSR's overall potential for seaborne assault operations. A much larger number of smaller landing craft, including the world's largest assembly of high-speed naval hovercraft, would permit larger-scale operations, but at a much shorter range. The upward trend in amphibious assault capability continued in 1978, when the 13,000-ton Ivan Rogov was launched, the first of a new class of amphibious craft of highly modern design. The Ivan Rogov, nearly three times the size of the Alligator-class ships, is heavily armed and capable of carrying a battalion of infantry and up to forty tanks. It provides the Soviet armed forces with a long-range, long-endurance assault capacity far surpassing that offered by previous Soviet ships.¹²

In a test of strength that involved actual combat between Soviet and American naval or marine forces, the United States would almost certainly be victorious. The Soviet naval fleet and naval infantry would be of great value, however, if utilized for intervention in the third world or if deployed passively in crises as a means of deterring American action. Furthermore, the Russians are engaged in an intensive shipbuilding program that almost certainly portends a decade of increasing assertiveness and strength on the part of their naval forces. As of 1980 the USSR was constructing four new classes of nuclear-powered cruisers, including a number of 32,000-ton battle cruisers with heavy guns for shore bombardment. Such guns are of little utility against a modern, missile-equipped fleet, but they could have a tremendous impact on local conflicts, even if only passively deployed. The Soviets are also constructing the new

Berezina-class of heavily-armed, 40,000-ton logistics craft designed for replenishing Soviet warships at great distances from the USSR; this will significantly reduce the navy's dependence on foreign bases. The most telling indicator of Moscow's naval ambitions is the large capital investments currently being made in the expansion and refurbishing of shipyards, suggesting that Soviet naval construction will accelerate in the 1980s as the Kremlin bids to close the gap in the most manifest area of its military inferiority.¹³

2) Sea transport: Soviet sealift capabilities are superior to those of the U.S., and they are still gaining. American sealift assets have suffered steady attrition for over three decades, while Moscow has devoted massive resources to expanding its maritime fleet. It grew from 590 ships with a capacity of 3.3 million dead-weight tons in 1959 to an inventory of some 1,600 trading vessels carrying roughly 16 million dwt. in 1975.¹⁴ Administratively controlled by the Navy, the merchant marine by 1976 possessed some 1,650 modern, highly automated ships, nearly 500 of which were ideal for long-range military transport. The entire merchant marine is coordinated from Moscow by an automatic control system with computer centers at major ports on the Black and Baltic Seas in the Far East. "It is believed that most officers of the merchant fleet are naval reservists who regularly provide the Soviet Navy with information (on foreign ports and ships)."¹⁵ During the Vietnamese War millions of tons of equipment were moved by Soviet freighters from Black Sea ports around the Cape of Good Hope to Haiphong, and merchant ships carried the bulk of Soviet supplies in the Arabs in 1973, to Angola in 1975-76, and to Ethiopia in 1977-78. During the latter three wars, the Soviet Union's massive airlifts received far greater attention than did its sealift effort, but the latter really proved the key to sustaining the local clients on the

battlefield. Sealift does not alone enable rapid response to a crisis, but it is imperative for sustaining forces in a conflict of significant length.

3) Air transport: Soviet air transport capabilities still lag behind those of the United States, but great strides have been made in recent years, and construction now underway may narrow the gap yet further as the decade progresses. Because the most critical variable determining air transport effectiveness in any local conflict is distance from home bases, the USSR enjoys advantages over the U.S. in regions near to its borders.

Voennaya Transportnaya Aviatsia (Military Transport Aviation) is the branch of the Soviet Air Force responsible for transporting supplies, weapons, and personnel within the Soviet Union and to foreign regions. VTA relies primarily on three types of aircraft for long-range transport: the Antonov-12, the Antonov-22, and the Ilyushin-76 (see Table). The An-22 and the Il-76 are much better suited for transferring large weapons to a distant client quickly, and they are the principal aircraft on which Moscow has relied in making arms shipments to the Middle East and Africa. VTA's aggregate lift capacity in millions of ton-miles grew from 11.4 in 1965 to 19.4 in 1970 to 26.4 in 1977. Its lift capacity increased over a third between 1970 and 1977 despite a reduction in total planes owing to retirements of An-12s.¹⁶ If additional air transport were critically needed, Aeroflot, the Soviet civilian airline, could increase cargo capacities by about 25% and triple the number of passengers.

Table IV-1. VTA's Principal Long-Range Transport Planes

	Year	Number in VTA <u>Deployed</u>	Service, <u>1979</u>	Power <u>Plant</u>	Max	Range with	
					Cargo <u>(kgs.)</u>	Max Load <u>(kms.)</u>	Troops* <u>Pax Para</u>
An-12	1956	650		Turboprop	20,000	3,600	100 65
An-22	1965	40		Turboprop	80,000	5,000	200 150
Il-76	1971	100		Jet	40,000	5,000	150 120

*Pax = Passengers (infantry); Para = Parachutists

Source: Peter Borgart, "The Soviet Transport Air Force," International Defense Review (6/1979): 945-50.

The relatively short range of the An-12 makes it a key limiting factor on Moscow's ability to respond rapidly and massively to a crisis. If the Kremlin were forced to rely only on VTA's 140 An-22s and Il-76s in responding to a distant crisis in which the U.S. was involved, the odds of success would be heavily against it. But within the effective range of the An-12 (somewhat over 2000 miles), Soviet transport capabilities more than double. The much greater distance which U.S. planes must travel to reach a radius of 2000 miles from Soviet borders also means that Moscow would have significant advantages in time over the U.S. (the more so because it would probably be the first actor, as already suggested).

The inherent advantages enjoyed by the USSR within this 2000-mile radius are enhanced by the existence of seven highly capable airborne

assault divisions. A standard Soviet airborne division consists of over 8,000 troops; it incorporates two parachute regiments, an artillery regiment, and an armored regiment, the latter equipped with 107 light-armored vehicles known as the Boevaia Mashina Desantnais (BMD). Introduced in 1973, the BMD is a nine-ton, highly mobile, fully amphibious tank with considerable firepower for its size; it mounts three machine guns, a 73 mm main gun, and an antitank missile launcher. Carrying six men at speeds of up to 40 mph, it is ideally suited for use by an airborne force, offering sufficient mobility, armor, and firepower to hold its ground against, or even defeat, larger forces. The airborne divisions also carry a substantial quantity of antiaircraft guns, artillery, and antitank weapons.¹⁷

All seven airborne divisions were placed on alert during the October War, and the 105th airborne guards division was the spearhead of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Both events demonstrate that the Kremlin is willing to deploy the forces for interventionary purposes. The swiftness and combat effectiveness of the airborne troops in Afghanistan surprised and impressed Western analysts considerably: roughly 250 sorties of Il-76 and other transport planes airlifted the bulk of the division into Kabul December 24-26; airborne units then seized key points along the highways and tunnels lying between the USSR and the cities of Afghanistan in order to provide a secure route for the ground troops that followed. Even in the unlikely event that the U.S. had wanted to respond militarily, it would have had to roll back what amounted to a fait accompli.

5 The structure and command of the airborne divisions is versatile, enabling them to be configured according to specific missions. They fall

under none of the regular services, but under a special directorate in the Ministry of Defense, which suggests the Politburo's wish to maintain close political control over its most potent quick-strike force. This organizational link to the top command structure also points to their utility for intervention in any crisis near Soviet borders where military and political surprise is desired.

Although nearly 100,000 parachutists were dropped during one airborne exercise in the Soviet Union, they apparently carried only personal equipment. The greatest number that could be dropped with full equipment by existing transport capabilities, according to an estimate made by Peter Borgart, is 30,000.¹⁸ A more detailed estimate by a U.S. Air Force captain concluded that the assault elements of three airborne divisions could be transported by the VTA to a distance of 2000 miles. The author notes: "this power projection would have been accomplished with a single sortie of the existing VTA aircraft, eliminating the need for repetitive ferrying and theoretically enabling the assault force to be substantially landed in in under twelve hours."¹⁹ Smaller forces could be transported to a greater distance; larger forces could be carried up to 2000 miles by undertaking a second round of sorties. Within a 2,000 mile radius of the Soviet Union (or, assuming political cooperation, within 2,000 miles of Warsaw Pact territory and the recently acquired airbases in Afghanistan), Moscow can deploy a superior force in less time than can the United States. Though actual outcomes will be heavily dependent on political events and on the resolve and resourcefulness of each side, the USSR must be considered as possessing superior power projection capabilities within that radius (except in the direction of Western Europe, where NATO forces are in place). The radius encompasses a politically crucial, strategically vital, and highly volatile area of the world: the Persian Gulf, the Ara-

bian peninsula, the Red Sea area, South Asia, and the northeast quadrant of Africa, from Libya to Kenya. Refueling facilities in South Yemen and elsewhere might extend the range, but the Soviet advantages of speed and logistical simplicity would wane rapidly outside 2,000 miles, and the risks of failing would be much greater.

It should also be added that the Soviet Union would have the possibility of using land transportation to move some of its forces abroad in the direction of South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Though railroads and highways are poor in those countries, the invasion of Afghanistan proves that it can be done; Soviet cross-border capabilities have improved by an order of magnitude in some areas of the Iranian and Afghani border. In certain regions the U.S. could conceivably face Soviet forces that were supplied both by air and by land; in such situations the Soviet advantage would multiply dramatically.

Three caveats should be added to this analysis: firstly, the USSR would not necessarily be superior in any clash within the radius in which it relied solely upon arms shipments to a client or proxy, while the U.S. deployed its own troops; secondly, Soviet air transport capability would diminish drastically if Moscow were forced to hold back a substantial reserve for an anticipated contingency in Europe or Asia (though in the first case, American transport capability would also be less flexible); thirdly, in any scenario of superpower conflict or proxy war in the third world, political will and decisiveness will be critical, as will be the support offered by allies and clients in the developing world. The side that enjoys the most trustworthy political support from foreign regimes and that acts with the maximum feasible force and the surest purpose will probably be victorious despite the technical balance.

III

Acquisition of Allies and of Facilities - This is the political arm of military policy, whose consequence can be as critical as the development or proliferation of weapons systems. For over two decades now, the Soviets have assiduously attempted to develop a proto-alliance system in Africa, the Middle East and Indian Ocean region, publicly discounting the military dimensions of their formal agreements (while their allies boasted the precise opposite to their regional rivals).²⁰ More recently, they have begun developing the foundation for a network in the Caribbean.²¹ That it was on the formal pretext of the implementation of the 1979 Soviet-Afghani treaty of friendship that Moscow executed the Afghani president and sent in 80,000 plus troops, suggests that more than just the exchange of ballet teams is involved or at least contemplated in the treaties.

Alliances must not be seen formalistically; there are shades of allies from a functional point of view, especially as the Soviets have played the game. India, Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan are along a continuum of increasing military commitment to Soviet-Indian Ocean strategy, but each has a more or less formally equivalent treaty of friendship with Moscow; military relevance may be in a different order, which is particularly true with respect to India. The fact that a state like Iraq has its own distinct regional ambitions - and large ones at that - and has resisted certain Soviet moves for further cooperation, while reacting against what, in Baghdad, was suspected to be Soviet mischief-making in its own country, does not at all mean Iraq is incapable of coordinating, or even unlikely to coordinate, moves with the Soviet Union for dividing up the Pahlavi spoils or pursuing mutually other inherently valuable goals. Why it has been so fashionable in the West also to discount

the relevance of Socialist-Marxist ideologies (like that of the Ba'aths of Iraq) in defining who are the likely great power partners of important third world states, is not clear either. Suffice it that, as a functionally independent state and as an ally of the Soviet Union, Iraq dramatically extends the potential Soviet reach in the region and greatly pressures American friends, however much Iraq subjectively considers its aims to be its own and in certain spheres acts wholly on its own.²²

Facilities gained through alliances of course extend one's reach. Allies, where contiguous, extend one's interior lines and vastly enlarge the length of the boundary across which one can project power, as is seen so clearly in the current case of Afghanistan. While the U.S. has historically invested heavily in alliances, the experience of Vietnam has led to a peculiarly American wisdom that alliances largely create burdens that may even lead to other 'Vietnams'. Further, it is believed that alliances do not add to the total strategic deterrent. Such dramatically neglects the psychological and power projection dimensions, as well as the level of conventional arms. The intelligent use of alliances adds considerably to one's reach. Soviet access to the key regions - particularly the Persian Gulf - has enormously increased in recent years precisely as Western dependence on them has grown. Whereas, until recently, the Soviets could not move out southward across the northern tier of states allied to the U.S., the position is now much different. Soviet forces fly across Turkish and Iranian airspace at will during crises, while the U.S. has watched its access to Iran cut to nothing even as its alliance with Turkey erodes and that with Pakistan withers. As Albert Wohlstetter has put it:

Since the 1950s the relative position of the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies has been almost reversed. It is now the United States which has major difficulties with airspace and base facilities. The Soviet Union is now some 500 to 1,000 nm from the upper gulf along politically and militarily feasible routes. The United States, on the other hand, at the end of the 1970s would have had to travel nearly 7,000 nm from Fort Riley, Kansas, in order to lift heavy ground forces to Dharan in Saudi Arabia and would have had to make three stops along the way...²³

Surrogates - One of the key reasons for Moscow's difficulties in establishing a functionally permanent presence in the third world in the earlier stages of its involvement there was simply the irascibility of Russian nationals in foreign climes. Moscow's leaders considered third world states ungrateful for what they themselves deemed genuine Soviet sacrifice, which hindered their own learning process. Eventually, they got the point, however. As we saw in Chapter Three, the Soviets simply cut progressively back on economic assistance - (see Table III-1) for it just was not a strong Russian card, no more applied abroad than implemented at home. Such also permitted them to lower their profile abroad. Meantime, however, they increased their military assistance, the one area in which they could compete successfully against the West.

But their use of surrogates was the more pertinent evidence of a steep learning curve - and there is evidence that they intend to continue their use of surrogates on a substantial scale, as we will see. It is important, firstly, to consider how differently the two sides envisage the use of projected influence, particularly with respect to the third world. The U.S. attempts to project its will indirectly - that is, the military component is viewed as a last resort, after diplomatic and economic channels are exhausted. The array of possible responses can be conceptualized as a spectrum, of which military involvement is one end. The Soviets, also maintain an array of possible responses, which may also be thought of as a spectrum, based on the level of Soviet involvement. That

is to say, with the Soviets, only the personae are indirect while the means, from covert action to war, are the same, surrogate or not. The United States sees its influence as primarily a function of its superior economic system, which includes that projected through its economic aid programs.²⁴ By the same token, when the projection of military power has been deemed necessary, it has also usually been indirect, through police-armed force assistance, or through the intimidatory use of sea power - the movement of a carrier, as for example in the Bay of Bengal in 1971. Vietnam is the exception, where after extending indirect aid, the stakes rose and the application of direct power was required.

IV

It is fundamental and axiomatic to Marxist-Leninist doctrine and strategy to take advantage of weaknesses of the adversary, as well as to fall back where necessary whenever the principal enemy is strong. The whole point is to win the war, not the battle. In this regard, it is interesting to collate the evidence of Soviet attitudes toward detente: it has persistently been seen on the one hand as a reflection of Western weakness (in the sense that the West 'consented' to detente on account of growing Soviet Strength),²⁵ and as a great opportunity for lulling the West and thus getting control of Europe by the early 1980s (as Breshnev put it to fellow communists over six years ago at Karlovy Vara).²⁶ As Sir Robert Thompson argues, drawing from Clausewitz, national power is manpower plus applied resources times will.²⁷

Whatever else one may wish to say about them, American defeats and setbacks from Saigon to Tehran have not exactly aided our reputation for reliability or strength of will. Indeed, it was precisely on a calculation

or lack of American will that Moscow launched its rapid 1975 intervention in Angola.²⁸ Similar calculations were subsequently made elsewhere. Moscow, it is frequently argued, may have miscalculated in invading Afghanistan, in underestimating the will to resist; this remains to be seen, but at the moment hardly appears likely. Suffice it that the disposition of the nation to fight for its interests is a critical variable in the correlation of forces as seen from Moscow, as indeed from most capitals. Soviet strategists seem to understand, with Clausewitz, that "the proud spirit's firm will dominate the art of war as an obelisk dominates the town square on which all roads converge."²⁹

V

Soviet power projectional capability has grown incrementally and has been tested incrementally. Failure in the third world marked the first moves away from traditional Soviet areas of interest - as in the Congo in 1960 - but it must be remembered that throughout those years of buildup, the Soviets were testing capabilities they were acquiring in Eastern Europe and in bloc exercises. While the launching of the first Soviet carrier, the Kiev, was widely noticed and done with fanfare, most of the new capabilities were acquired with little notice.

Those analysts who were surprised by Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan had clearly been paying little attention either to this inexorable buildup of capability or to the purposive development of cross-border capabilities, including the construction of roads, bridges, and tunnels, and of course, the sustained and heavy military buildup in Afghanistan throughout the fall of 1979; more often they were unwilling to admit the character of Soviet policy and thus were stopped short by what was a simple

evolution of a long-standing policy.

For all manner of precedent existed - going back easily to 1968 when the Soviet air transport and airborne working in coordination with the KGB made the swift and largely bloodless takeover of Czechoslovakia so successful. In 1975 the Soviets learned large-scale coordination with their Cuban allies-surrogates, successfully moving troops from the Caribbean to Angola, by way of several allied airfields; at that point it should have been obvious that the lessons of the failed Soviet airlift to Peru in 1973 had been learned. In 1978 the Soviets showed they had mastered the swift and massive airlift - that to Ethiopia being one of the largest in Soviet history. Later in that same year, they showed that they could project power on the spot when the murder and execution of the North and South Yemeni presidents took place within a few days, in circumstances that, because of the Soviet-East German involvement at some security levels, indicated Soviet collusion.³⁰

Thus by the time of the Afghani invasion, virtually every component of the operation had been tried out elsewhere; indeed it has been reported in some quarters that the Soviets had test-run the entire invasion in an exercise undertaken in Mongolia.³¹ Small wonder, then, that the invasion should not only have been predictable, but was predicted as well.³²

The political skill required to orchestrate these projections so successfully is worthy of note. The traditional picture of Russians simply using brute force and overwhelming strength to achieve their objective would be at best misleading. Although brute force is a part, and whatever amount of strength needed to succeed has been applied in each case, (for such is the basic requirement of true strategy, as Paul Nitze has observed), sufficient force is the minimum requirement for initial success. In recent years, force has been accompanied by savvy political-

military orchestration. This has included, for example, the reported subterfuge of the entire Kabul officer corps - and their subsequent death.³³ The disingenuousness that went with the Soviet role in the 1973 October war is another example.³⁴ The political-military coordination of the airlift with Algeria, Mali, Congo-Brazzaville and other states in 1975 makes the same point. The Soviet Union has learned the groundwork for its interventions, and then has moved massively to effect a fait accompli as quickly as possible - the very opposite of the American style.

To be sure, it can be argued - and often is - that the Soviets today are still showing considerable caution in their deployment of forces beyond their "traditional" sphere of influence. Thus it remains true that a Kiev-class carrier has yet to be deployed in a third world conflict. As Michael McGwire has pointed out, they have yet to take American forces on in defense of a client state; "we can't assume that they will," he concludes, noting that they have confined their support to logistics, arms supply, transport of client combat elements, and naval protection and support.³⁵

But what constitutes a risk for Soviet forces - and thus what ranks as caution - is an evolving notion, given the expansionary movement of these forces in the past half decade. For that matter, the Soviet "traditional" sphere is itself an elastic concept, as new countries are added to it; we have long since legitimized Soviet strategic control in Eastern Europe as if there were some inherent right involved, and now we have begun to do the same in Afghanistan, precisely by our lack of meaningful contestation of the occupation. But what would have been patently risky behavior for the USSR in the Persian Gulf region five years ago, when five fewer years of attrition to U.S. armed forces had taken place and when five fewer years of Soviet buildup of power projectional forces had occurred, would now hardly

be considered risky at all, except in the very significant sense that it might occasion a miscalculation on the part of the West and lead to central war. But certainly any Soviet conventional move in the Persian Gulf region could succeed on its own terms, without effective counter from the West, if the Soviets used their by-now traditional approach, namely overwhelming strength, suddenly deployed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cited at "The Crisis in the Gulf Region," California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, J.B. Kelly, discussion leader, Jan. 30, 1980. In 1881, Skobelev captured the city at Geok-Tepe in Central Asia, and ordered the massacre of the entire population and the rounding up and killing of anyone who fled.
2. Paul Nitze, "Strategy for the 80's." Remarks before the Civilian-Military Institute, Denver, Colorado, May 5, 1980. Available from the Committee on the Present Danger, Washington, D.C.
3. See "The Spirit of Detente", The Wall Street Journal, (November 16, 1979) p. 22 for extracts of Persian-language broadcasts into Iran by Radio Moscow.
4. See Sharran Chubin, "Repercussions of the Crisis in Iran." Survival (May/June 1979).
5. Paul Nitze, op.cit.
6. V.I. Lenin, "Report on the International Situation and the Fundamental Tasks of the Communist International," in Collected Works vol. 31 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966), p 232.
7. Sergei Gorshkov, "Navies as Peacetime Instruments of the Aggressive Policy of Imperialist States," Morskoi Sbornik (December 1972), and "Guarding the Conquests of the Great October Revolution," Morskoi Sbornik (October 1967).
8. Prior to 1964 the Russian combat fleet had visited only three developing countries. From 1964 to 1972 Soviet warships visited at least 38 additional third world nations; the total number of visits exceeded 300. The program continued to expand throughout the seventies.
9. See Bradford Dismukes and James M. McConnell, Soviet Naval Diplomacy (London: Pergamon Press, 1979).
10. Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Strategy: Fifty Years of Theory and Practice (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1968), pp 153-55, even declared that the fact the Soviets had not built aircraft carriers was proof that they did not have expansionist designs.
11. New York Times, August 21, and December 17, 1979.
12. Strategic Survey, 1979, p 45; Defense Daily, March 21, 1980 p 118; Jane's Fighting Ships 1979-80 (New York: Franklin Watts, 1979) pp 548-50.
13. New York Times, December 10 and 17, 1979.
14. Richard T. Ackley, "The Merchant Fleet," in Michael McGwire and John McDonnell, eds. Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions (New York: Praeger, 1977), p 208.

15. Donald C. Daniel, "Merchant Marine," in David Jones, ed., Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual 1977 (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International, 1977), p 53.
16. Robert P. Berman, Soviet Air Power in Transition (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), p 36.
17. Kenneth Allard, "A clear and Present Danger: Soviet Airborne Intervention," unpublished seminar paper, Harvard University.
18. Peter Borgart, "The Soviet Transport Air Force," International Defense Review (6/1979): p. 948-50.
19. Allard, op.cit.,
20. As an Iranian diplomat recently put it, "Whatever the Russians say about their treaty with Iraq, the fact is that when the Iraqis talk to us, they stress the increments of military strength which the treaty brings to them"
21. See infra. chapter three, and Roger Fontaine, "The Regional Projection of Military Power - The Caribbean" prepared for Conference on Projection of Power, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Medford, MA, April 23, 1980.
22. See Albert Wohlstetter, "Half Wars and Half Policies in the Persian Gulf," in W.Scott Thompson, ed. From Weakness to Strength, (San Francisco: The Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980): p 154.
23. Ibid. p 142.
24. As then Ambassador Andrew Young put it in 1978, "All the Soviet Union has is guns. We've got what all the third world countries want - superior technology, free markets, and all that. You can't do anything with guns which is why everyone is turning to us."
25. As a recent New Times editorial put it: "Sober voices can be heard also in the U.S. itself. True, at present, they are drowned out in the vociferous chorus of those who would talk to the Soviet Union from positions of strength...", New Times (Moscow: June 1980) p 6.
27. See Richard Nixon, The Real War (New York: Warner Books, 1980: chapter 1.
28. W. Scott Thompson, Power Projection' A Net Assessment of US and Soviet Capabilities (New York: National Strategic Information Center, 1978) p 17.
29. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976) p 119.
30. See Nimrod Novik, On the Shores of Bab Al-Mandab: Soviet Diplomacy and Regional Dynamics (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute Monograph No. 100, 1980).

31. According to reports openly circulating in the national security community.
32. See, for example, W.Scott Thompson, "The First Tier, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey: the Projection of Soviet Power," in Report of the California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy (July 25, 1979).
33. The Soviet deceptions of the Afghan military prior to the December coup was both complex and well-planned. For example, Russian advisers informed Afghan tank commanders that their tanks needed to be "winterized", and removed the batteries from 200 tanks in the Kabul area. On the eve of the coup, officers of the Kabul garrison were invited to a Russian reception, served beer and vodka, and were subsequently locked in the reception room until the coups was over. See "The 'New' Afghanistan", (Newsweek, January 21, 1980) p 34.
34. See Michael Handel, "Deception, Deception and Surprise," Occasional Paper No. 19. (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1976).
35. Presentation at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, April 1, 1980.

Chapter 6

U.S. Policy and the Projection of Power:

Allies, Gimmicks, and National Strategy

Short of unforeseeable technological breakthroughs in weapons development - in themselves notoriously difficult to emplace in the battlefield quickly - it is difficult to imagine what sort of quick fix is immediately available to counter the Soviet strategy outlined in the previous chapter, given shortfalls in our weapons inventory and widening gaps between U.S. and Soviet capabilities in both strategic and conventional arenas.¹ This study does not directly address itself to specific weapons, options, or mixes. It rather looks, in this chapter, at the classes of remedies available for the short and medium term - without some varieties of which there will hardly be a long-term prospect worth planning for.

The only way in which the United States can meet the Soviet threat, given the impossibility of undoing over night the decade-long "mortgaging of our future,"² as Leonard Sullivan has put it, is through imaginative work with friends and allies in the third world and Europe, so as to make our projection of power feasible and effective; and through a simultaneous reconsideration of strategy, that is by orchestrating our unilateral actions and those with allies and friends effectively so as to maximize the chance of reaching a given goal. Out of this analysis will emerge some clear sense of where our marginal dollars must go if an optimal short and mid-term strategy is to work.

I

The Western System - The United States was the first world power with a genuine world system, composed of allies, working relationships

with friends, and an infrastructure of bases that gave us the logistic capability to protect sea lanes, resources, indeed the whole network. This system, in both its formal and informal dimensions, has become grievously weaker in recent years.

Firstly, looking at the third world, one is struck by how widespread the American system was. Although American alliance systems have generally been more formalistic and explicit especially with respect to military responsibilities in the third world, the U.S. in effect had a functional alliance system whose utility far exceeded its apparent import and structure on paper - in some respects not unlike that of the Soviets under construction today. Ranging from states like the Philippines with several of the world's largest bases on its soil to formally unallied state like Tunisia, which coordinated policy with Washington until recently on problems of North Africa, the components of this network were in every region of the globe.

Nowhere did the U.S. have a more effective and functioning de facto alliance system than in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia provided oil and reinforced many Western purposes (even in Taiwan and South Vietnam at various points); Israel stood as the most pertinent block to Soviet military ambitions throughout the Western Middle East; Iran, under the Shah, endowed the West with depth, air space, and critical borders. With the collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty, this particular Western system qua system has fallen apart; hitherto, those disparate (and by no means harmonious) silent partners had worked synergistically, if unconsciously, to preserve this functional Western-led system, at least from Washington's perspective. Now Turkey is increasingly alienated from the West, Israel is isolated to the East, the Saudis have lost much confidence in the U.S., and

in Iran, radical terrorists backed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, defying three millenia of the development of international law, incarcerated our diplomats.

The dust has still not settled on the harm done to the system by the Shah's fall. Western power had extended up to the Soviet border to the Caspian, along Afghani and Iraqi boundaries, in effect bisecting central Asia on a north-south axis and barring Soviet expansion on an east-west axis. What had been a well-crafted (if ad hoc) strategy, based not on natural advantages but on a carefully cultivated arrangement of interests, collapsed in January 1979. The U.S. is now left to its natural geographic disadvantages in the region. Its remaining allies, like Turkey and, residually, Pakistan, provide diminishing defensive depth as Soviet power moves further southward. And the situation could worsen dramatically well before the fruits of current (post-hostage and post-invasion) efforts are grown. A senior Israeli intelligence officer of great reputation recently, for example, predicted that the Saudi regime would fall much earlier than the five years' grace with which many observers have endowed it.

As we see elsewhere in this study, the threat to our interests elsewhere is tangible - for example the Philippines, which is the hub of an admittedly diminished, but still vital network, and without which the remaining links - with Thailand and Singapore - would undoubtedly be lost at the military level, not to mention the political effect on the entire region.³ Less remarked upon is the withering of the "Rio system" in Latin America, alliances between the U.S. and major South American countries having become for all intents and purposes dead letters because of Washington's political disdain for the regimes in power during the late 1970's.⁴

The principal short-term need, as is increasingly well understood, is base access in the Indian Ocean region, to make possible the protection of oil lanes. The amount of firepower needed, however, to deter a Soviet or Iraqi threat to the Saudi oil fields is vastly greater than can be mustered at present - the equivalent of four carrier task forces deployed in the Persian Gulf, as is demonstrated in a study by two of the present authors.⁵ That number of ships being unavailable at the moment for such deployment, the only solution to the problem is by dramatically expanding our base access and by eliciting greater cooperation from allies.

The principal constraint on the expansion of our basing options has hitherto been thought to be the unwillingness of potential hosts to receive American forces. Such thought largely misses the point. Expanding the American basing system would have been easy at the time of the British withdrawal in the early 1970s. Until 1977, the U.S. was, in fact, expanding its available infrastructure in the region in a different sense; the rapid expansion of the Iranian and Saudi armed forces through foreign military sales under American direction was itself presumed to be of help to the West. It furthermore emplaced in the region substantial numbers of American technicians and advisers highly pertinent to the projection of American power. The 1977-78 Soviet intervention in Ethiopia, the presumed Soviet participation in the two June 1978 Yemeni coups and, most devastatingly, the perceived unwillingness of the U.S. to buttress its royal Iranian ally, all caused the spread of the perception that the U.S. no longer aspired to (and increasingly was incapable of providing) regional leadership.

From late 1977 until the rearming of North Yemen in mid-1979, re-

gional states became increasingly reluctant to cooperate with the United States. More recently, the disposition to work with Washington has improved, but rests more on residual feelings of goodwill than on genuine confidence in American fortitude. Regional leaders are increasingly pessimistic as to the prospects for their states. Receiving foreign forces is a risk, based on an assessment of which side has staying power and will prevail. It would be highly unlikely that even well-disposed powers, whose interests were coincident with ours - as are those of the royal states of the Saudi peninsula - would welcome the public reception of U.S. forces prior to a shift in the regional perceptions. For it usually takes as long to correct an impression as it took to make it in the first instance, in which case even the deployment of American power in the region would hardly be fully credible before a few years of stepped-up naval operations in the area.

But, as regional states accustom themselves to the continuous presence of at least one carrier group, frequent naval and air exercises with allied powers, the development of new facilities, and most of all the concurrent American willingness to take risks, their willingness pari passu first to welcome increased port visits, then repair facilities, and finally, additional basing rights, should progress apace. This is, therefore, a case where horse and cart come simultaneously.

It is important also to recall that the accumulation of land basing rights for air power in no way negates the continued utility of the deployed naval power in the theatre. As we have previously argued, land and sea-based power must be seen as directly complementary: sea-based power, our most flexible military tool, acts as a magnet for attracting land rights and thus binds threatened states closer to us. Such naval power will be needed to sustain the land bases and to reassure our friends

that our commitment holds during the dangerous period ahead. Our friends are unlikely to stick their necks out on their own territory if the U.S., purportedly the foremost naval power, is unwilling to stick its out at sea.

In the Indian Ocean region, ironically, the state which can aid us the most, and whose needs may well take priority with us before any others, is an ally - a full-blown NATO ally at that. It is useful to consider Turkey in the third world/Persian Gulf context precisely because of its pertinence to the 'oil theatre' and despite Turkish sensibilities to being considered as anything other than in a NATO context. As the Islamic revival progressed in the 1970s, eliciting increasing attention from the eastern portions of Turkey especially, and as the Soviet strategic buildup progressed just to Turkey's north accompanied by enormous Soviet development aid to Turkey,⁶ it was inevitable that a weakening of ties with the West should occur, given the self-defeating arms embargo of 1974 imposed by the U.S. Congress.

All of the possible bases from which we could reach the Gulf pose difficulties. Most problems arise from restraints imposed by potential hosts out of fear that our use of their facilities might expose them to greater risks than those we might help alleviate. However, Turkish bases have a clear priority which should not be obscured by domestic political issues.

Moreover Turkey is the only country relatively near the head of the Gulf with which we have treaty arrangements committing us to its defense. It differs from Pakistan in this respect whose relation to the U.S. is covered only by an Executive Agreement, which was successively eroded during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India, prior to its attempted resurrection in 1980. Pakistan is not only embittered but in an extremely pre-

carious state internally, with its integrity and independence very much in doubt and hardly to be sustained only by a transfer of arms without additional commitment. The other Arab states have even fewer formal arrangements, however much they welcome a strong American presence in the region. Egypt may have a succession problem and a problem of dealing with other Arab states, conservative as well as radical, which makes its future alignment less than certain. Israel has obvious problems in serving the immediate defense of the Gulf states.

Nonetheless, though billions of American dollars have gone in help to other states and the offer of 400 million dollars was termed "peanuts" by the Pakistanis, so far all that has been managed for the Turks is \$50 million. Even that was transformed from grant aid to a loan.

But Turkey presents sensitive problems. One of these Turkey shares with other European members of NATO; it is reluctant to commit the use of its NATO facilities for operations by the U.S. outside of the NATO treaty area. A second problem is a heritage of the erosion we permitted even in a NATO treaty commitment: the 1964 letter of President Johnson to President Inonu, which raised doubts about our coming to the defense of Turkey in the event of a Russian attack, following on the trouble in Cyprus, began a steep downward slide in U.S.-Turkish relations. Our embargo on arms to Turkey, a NATO ally in 1974, brought relations to a new low.

The damage of the embargo, following the legal Turkish occupation of part of Cyprus, was considerably greater than has generally been realized. As one of the most senior Turkish officers puts it, even in a crisis in which there were Turkish interests at risk, it "would be difficult for Turkey to receive American forces," so great is the resentment,

especially among younger officers.⁷ The armed forces are in desperate need of modernization across the board, a process of particular relevance given their size and proximity to the Soviet Union.

Another dimension of the American-Turkish alliance to which little attention has been given is its potential role in counteracting any Iraqi aggression Saudi Arabia (or against any power for that matter). With its long common frontier and capable army, Turkey could readily open hostilities that would decidedly complicate Iraqi moves. The greatest import of this, perhaps, is what Riyadh might do for Turkey now. Turkey needs money and oil, Saudi Arabia has both and needs protection from a great army like Ankara's. Saudi diplomacy, however, has a pronounced ideological/theological Islamic character. As a secular state, Turkey is not an obvious partner of Saudi Arabia - much to the contrary, as the Saudis would prefer to strengthen reactionary forces within the Turkish context. Yet, the problem is not insurmountable. The basis for a remarkably effective trade is present, if Turkey can attain the clarity of vision which the removal of some of its present resentments would bestow, and if Saudi Arabia can see how great the danger is and how unlikely of fulfillment is its fundamentalist Islamic goal.

A coherent strategy has yet to be fitted together in the Indian Ocean region, let alone for the third world as a whole. The requirements of sensitivity, subtlety, and often silence, for working with frightened third world friends are not everywhere understood; it is difficult to understand why, for example, a White House spokesman found it necessary to point out to the world press that if Oman's willingness to help us were made public, Oman would be forced to deny it.

What we have had thus far is an erratic attempt to capitalize on

what is considered good news - through Soviet reverses - in developments in the third world of which two current illustrative cases, Zimbabwe and Iraq, make the point. The reasonably peaceful election of Robert Mugabe to the premiership of what has become Zimbabwe has for example been hailed by Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,⁸ as the "greatest reverse the Russians have suffered in Africa in years." Mugabe won despite the considerable Soviet support of his rival Joshua Nkomo, and at the independence ceremonies, he reportedly snubbed the Soviet delegation. All this is taken to point to a tremendous turn for the better in what had been considered a region where one of the most potentially serious crises for the West could develop during the 1980s. Even if Mugabe's steps have been taken in good faith, as a change of heart, this hardly constitutes a strategy for the U.S. At best our celebration is premature, and rests on the fact that Mugabe's well-advertised Marxist-Leninist convictions have been laid aside for the moment as he struggles to get his country off to a good start by keeping the settlers that are necessary to run the economy smoothly. But only for the moment: as within weeks of independence powerful calls were being made to get rid of the supposedly unchangeable guarantees to the Whites - namely for a 20-seat bloc in the Parliament.⁹ Soon thereafter, the press lost much of its freedom. And Zimbabwe's abstention on the second 1980 UN roll-call vote on Afghanistan hardly augured well for Western standing in Salisbury.

There are very deep problems built in, all of which were absent in the previous Muzorewa government, with its close ties to and faith in the West, which also incidentally won a landslide victory, when power and momentum appeared to be on the side of its backers. It remains to be seen whether Mugabe can control his armed forces; he couldn't during the

guerrilla war. And some military leaders are more radical than he.¹⁰ His cabinet included hot heads with deep and bitter grudges against the West. His ties to Moscow are not nonexistent; his forces received increasing amounts of Soviet aid after Mozambique, their host country between 1975 and 1979, switched from Peking to Moscow for its communist inspiration. And the situation has built-in tensions in the nature of things. For whatever else is said, Mugabe and his key followers remain Marxist-Leninists, and as their power takes hold, there can be little doubt that they will wish to consolidate ties with Angola and Mozambique, both Soviet allies, in order if nothing else, to better sustain a confrontational policy in the long run with South Africa.

To be sure, the Zimbabwe outcome has bought time for the West, and for South Africa, which is trying quite systematically to dismantle the framework of apartheid without however destroying the foundations of its security. Prudence suggests that judgment be suspended until the character of Mugabe's foreign policy and domestic politics is clearer. Until then it would be prudent to assume that the election of an avowed Marxist-Leninist in so vital an area of the world is hardly good news for the West.

In Iraq, the fact that strains between the Ba'athist regime and Moscow have surfaced publicly, and that Iraq voted with the majority to condemn the Soviet Afghani invasion at the UN, have been widely claimed to herald better times for America in the Persian Gulf region. Moreover, President Saddam Husain has publicly warned of subversive Soviet designs in the region, as well he might, given Iraqi familiarity with Moscow's moves in Ethiopia, Aden, Iran and now Afghanistan. It can be deduced, moreover, that the Soviet 'treaty of friendship' partner was caught red-

handed in an attempt to overthrow his regime, for which a number of local communists were executed.¹¹

Nonetheless, a close reading of Saddam Husain's foreign policy leads less to the conclusion that he wants the Soviets out of the region since in any case they are already there - than that he wants all Western involvement in the region to end. A lengthy recent speech, while mentioning and criticizing the Soviet Union briefly, went on at vastly greater length about the perfidies of Western (and Israeli) imperialism.¹² And Iraqi diplomacy has attempted to prevent Sultan Qaboos in Oman from granting base rights to the U.S., has reportedly used the oil weapon to try to dissuade Turkey from extending American base privileges, and elsewhere in and even outside the region has attempted to use its new predominance as the most powerful Gulf state and as a major oil exporter to prevent the U.S. from implanting even a minimal presence for protection of the oil lanes.¹³ With the great Soviet bases in Baku so close by, Iraq is hardly being even-handed. To be sure, it will be a worthwhile effort to try to ameliorate Iraqi foreign policy through a cultivation of closer ties with Baghdad. But that is all by way of damage limitation, not the construction of strategy.

The problem in the formal alliances is that the West is not reacting adaptively to the threats to its interests: economic, political, or military; the Western powers have lost, it seems the art, so laboriously perfected in the post-war years, of pulling together in crisis. Thus in 1979, as Walter Levy has argued, the West suffered the selfinflicted wound of almost a tripling of oil prices, thanks to the panic buying that characterized the western reaction to the diminution of Iranian oil production after the fall of the Shah.¹⁴ In 1980 much the same happened in

the political sphere in the reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The inner sense of timing which governs a successful alliance was lost on all sides as the principal alliance bulwarks pulled, for the most part, in different directions.

To be sure, the real situation is different today from years earlier, when American predominance was greater within the alliance, and when allied dependence, as perceived on both sides, was sufficient to make deference to American leadership a given -- the degree of hierarchy being a key variable of alliance success. But in fact the other variable affecting whether alliances function effectively, namely the size and intensity of the threat motivating and sustaining the alliance, cuts the other way: the threat has become far greater, even as it is rationalized away so much more easily.

What has happened, as we have suggested, is that the Soviet Union has skillfully played on the "contradictions" between America and her allies - disparities in oil dependence, and critical differences in geographic variables. For example, Germany's greater dependence on Gulf oil, and its greater psychological dependence on detente for sustaining contacts with its fellow Germans in the East, make it far more of a hostage to detente - a fact on which Soviet diplomacy has played with great skill.

The U.S. is not militarily or economically in a position to undertake a revitalized strategy in the Indian Ocean alone. The best short-term "quick fix" available is, in fact, to maximize the role of our existing allies and friends to help shore up the Indian Ocean position and its supply lines, in short, conservation.

A problem immediately emerges. Our allies in Europe, along with Japan, have appeared pusillanimous in their help in the recent past; in

fact such is most often a result of Soviet pressures and indeed coercion designed to split the alliances. Moscow has even obtained military assistance, in effect, from our ally Turkey by overflying her territory in war time (1973) and defying Turkey to do anything about it.¹⁵ Yet these allies are more dependent on Western oil than we are. Should it yet again be American policy to proffer help to those spurning it? To ask the question is to misunderstand the process by which our position has been eroded and by which it can be restored.

With respect to our European allies, it must firstly be noted that their dependence on America for their security has continued for so long that they have lost what, in the case of several, was an historically well-honed strategic sense. This has been compounded by the dramatic buildup of Soviet forces in proximate regions, which has the predictable consequence of intimidating some, and giving incentives to others to take out insurance against still greater Soviet strength. Thus can Herr Wehner, the most influential member of the ruling West German party after only Chancellor Schmidt, call Soviet European policy "defensive."¹⁶ The anti-military trends that in America are associated with the Vietnamese war are perhaps even stronger in Western Europe among the young, suggesting that the real cause is endemic to the nature of the prosperous open society and must, therefore, be continually compensated for. Finally, greater allied dependence on Persian Gulf oil, as already foreshadowed, substantially enhances their sensitivity to Arab demands and Soviet pressure.

A more recent trend is discrete: in the past several years, Allied reluctance to take a leadership role is a function simply of what in Europe is termed a failure of leadership in Washington. In this regard

one only need mention the so-called neutron bomb affair, in which the German chancellor had, in fact, paid a political cost against the forces mentioned above to support deployment of this effective weapon, only to have it "postponed" from Washington once his own decision had been publicized.¹⁷ But each of the Allies has its own favorite issue, whether it be the withdrawal of troops from Korea (for Japan) or the failure to recognize the seriousness of Cuban-Soviet moves in Central Africa (for France). The net effect was a serious erosion of confidence in America, as against a greater cohesion at the NATO level that had been evolving throughout the 1970s. The point is that the former process is not determined.

For all that, our allies could have done, and could be doing, better. Romanticism about the third world began on the left bank of the Seine; the notion that defense beggared welfare began in Scandinavia and in England; the wishful thinking about the lack of threat to the Western oil supply if Britain withdrew from the Gulf (and if no Western presence replaced it) began in London; and the notion that detente is a necessity is most pertinently underlined in Germany, whose interests are country-specific. In short, the failure was powerfully one of intellect firstly, then of will -- though the two became hitched in wishful thinking. Moreover, when evidence of the failure of analysis was becoming abundant, European leaders aligned themselves with American factions unwilling to face the hard facts; they ran down their defenses and allowed their demoralized elites, in effect, to size their forces against a threat in which they had lost conviction. The guards were almost wholly dropped on the transfer of technology, and Japan, an admittedly highly vulnerable ally, bought Iranian oil on the spot in the aftermath of the seizure of

American hostages. Nor have our allies, fearful of offending Moscow too openly, followed our lead as freely and enthusiastically as hoped in applying sanctions on the Soviet Union for its Afghanistan invasion. It is thus time that our allies be told that their economic prosperity enables them to assume a fair share of their own defense, if they will permit themselves to be defended. Their sense of responsibility compels them to assist more fully. If not, they will, in any event, face a severe alternative.

The question is whether the Allies, if they saw a clear direction in, and got a firm signal from Washington, would respond with the considerable additional assistance which will be required to fill the strategic gap in the Indian Ocean that is now plainly visible. Our assumption is that they would, if Washington moves forward with more than merely economic steps against Moscow - that is, by rapidly building up our forces. We assume that the more vigorous the American lead, the more ample the willingness to help. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the simple fact is that the Allies are more immediately and directly threatened by Soviet moves in the Indian Ocean - not just in the Persian Gulf itself, but also in the southern African region abutting the Indian Ocean, which is of far greater importance economically as a trading partner for European states than for America, and at least as important for strategic metals.

Secondly, there has been a decided move to the right in Europe in the past two years - with the election of the Thatcher government in the U.K., the reelection of a conservative majority in France, the elevation of Franz-Josef Strauss to the leadership of the opposition in Germany, and the election of conservatives in several of the smaller states. Throughout Europe the tocsin of the Soviet threat is beginning to be sounded.

Thirdly, there is the synergism of working actively together at a heightened pace. Soviet threats against the modernization of the theatre deterrent, combined with the Afghani affair, have galvanized European elites as little else has in recent years. It is only a little risky to project the same trend forward, finding Europeans readily assisting Western purposes, using their naval and other assets in the general interest. The high point of Allied coherence (1961-62) was achieved at a time of overwhelming Western military superiority; it is ironic that, as the trends have moved negatively, coherence has declined while faith in "interdependence" and other shibboleths has increased. It is difficult to believe that the alliance cannot return to the invigorating earlier spirit, once the full measure of the threat has been taken, on a firm lead from the President of the U.S. and given a sufficient American military program.

More specifically, the first and most obvious option to our ranking allies is, in effect, to broaden the geographic limits of NATO to encompass the range of the threat. NATO's boundaries of 30 years ago have little pertinence today except in tradition, and the new realities of the threat to the Gulf oil supplies are widely enough perceived to spark some action. This would most likely be in the form of an understanding, that any undertaking by a hostile power which directly threatened NATO states could elicit a NATO response, whatever its locus of origin. Although there has been resistance to the widening of NATO's purview within its councils, the immediacy of the threat today and its direct tie to the survival of NATO countries, as independent entities, should make it possible for the U.S. to work with key countries where pertinent to reduce the threat within the cadre of NATO defense. There is some risk in opening this subject anew,

given the moderate success which NATO has achieved in maintaining consensus on European defense issues; yet the future of NATO is hardly a happy one if, in fact, alliance help in the Indian Ocean is not forthcoming. The alternative to taking the risk is to try an even riskier option - maintaining the status quo.

With these broader responsibilities in hand, NATO members could undertake a variety of tasks hitherto performed solely or largely by American forces, as these are redeployed to the Indian Ocean. Such will succeed only to the extent that American policy psychologically accepts both gains and losses from burden-sharing with the Europeans. Thus the good intentions of all parties must be accepted, something with particular relevance for the French, who have chafed under their (usually correct) perception that their role has been under-appreciated in Washington.

It is worth noting how extensive the French role could be, not just in the Mediterranean, where the French navy could assume numerous tasks which now fall to the U.S., but in the Indian Ocean, where they arguably have the most substantial base facilities of any foreign power and sometimes the largest surface fleet. The potential infrastructure and power afforded by their Djibouti facilities (with its 4500 French soldiers) and such islands as Reunion, together with their three carriers, 145 carrier aircraft and 23 submarines, some increased portion of which could be deployed to the Indian Ocean, should not be underestimated. In fact cooperation is on the increase, with frequent communication and coordination between U.S. and French naval commands in the Indian Ocean, if at a relatively low, nonpolitical level.

Throughout the 1960s and part of the 1970s, the French were in many ways the least helpful member of the alliance - whatever the reasons.

A heritage of resentment lingers along with a reluctance to take at face value French protestations of their interest in the Western Allied defense position. Nations' perceptions of their interests change over time; the possibility that the French mean it when they say (as they do now) that their suspicions of American intent are a thing of the past, might well be accepted. In Shaba I, even while U.S. officials scoffed at their role, the French demonstrated their ability to intervene effectively at great distances. In Shaba II, they showed (with American help) that they could coordinate such action effectively with other powers. It is the French who are credited by the Saudi royal family with virtually saving their dynasty, for the enormously critical role French forces played in ending the crisis in Mecca in the autumn of 1979. Their ability to intervene in all but a major conflict in the Persian Gulf region would appear to be evident.

Enhanced cooperation that might bring much further tangible help could not possibly come cheaply. French naval forces have been configured to strengthen the French position in Africa, though they can easily assume more roles, especially as the perceived Western position in the Indian Ocean basin is strengthened. But the cost to the U.S. for the French to join with us more often than for the occasional naval exercise, or as in the present division of labor, would be, to a small extent generally, in a certain subordination of American perceptions and priorities to those of the French, and to a much greater extent with respect to African policy. In other words, accepting the French view of and French lead to things - to the extent that (and in the proportions that) France was throwing its military and economic weight into the common effort. This would not come easily to Americans who, while accustomed to dealing openly and easily with the British, have never put aside their suspicions of the Gallic character, though the cause of such has surely receded in recent years.

Consider the record of recent years. Alone of major Western allies has France taken any initiative in repelling communist advances in the third world. Largely alone of major Western allies has France officially refused to be deceived by wishful thinking on detente in the recent past. France has made strides in freeing its statist economy and has shown the resilience and adaptivity to cope with the energy crisis despite its dearth of resources. In short, its national performance, its writ large, its powers of national adaptation, is probably the most impressive in the West. While Germany is bound into an increasingly sullen attempt to sort out its destiny between East and West, while England tries to arrest its downward catapult, while Italy copes with terrorism and inflation, France has had a forward foreign and domestic policy, appreciated in Paris, but little elsewhere.

The most important reason for playing the French card is the culmination of all of these reason - namely French legitimacy in the Third World.¹⁸ Even while defying U.S. embargos to arm South Africa, while testing nuclear weapons in Africa, while sustaining what was widely termed a neo-colonial empire in West and Central Africa, French prestige was higher than that of any other major power, industrial or otherwise, in the Third World, particularly in the Middle East. While some of that Gaullist heritage may have fallen off in recent years (witness the hostile demonstrations in Tanzania against the French foreign minister), enough remains for the U.S. to increase its standing, access, and legitimacy in the third world if it coordinates policy more substantively with France. But the scope of assistance needed helps to explain why French cooperation in the depth needed will be expensive with respect to our attitude.

British capabilities are much smaller, as is their ability to

pay for increased defense expenditures. Nevertheless, there is an important British component of a new Western strategy in the Indian Ocean. Britain could be asked to double the amount of training it undertakes at present to Persian Gulf ex-dependencies and to double its diplomatic and military advisory presence in those countries. The reputation of British ingenuity in this region persists and should be cultivated. Beyond that, in an actual contingency, Britain could commit field forces to Iran, and could cooperate with Egypt by providing sealift (using Ro-Ros, for example) in the movement of Egyptian forces to the Persian Gulf area. It could increase the scope of its annual naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, coordinating them more closely with American exercises.

Other allies could make contributions. Australia could provide naval escorts, join in naval exercises, and perhaps more importantly, permit home porting at Cockburn Sound, a large port facility on its northwest coast. New Zealand's contribution would necessarily be more modest. But a significant point here is that the "Soviets count," as one Sovietologist has put it. Contributions, however small, will not escape their notice, and the efforts by smaller power will have more than their physical weight in the balance as a result.

Public consciousness in Japan of the growing security threat to it has grown dramatically in recent years, aided by the Soviet military buildup in the Kuriles, the former Japanese islands occupied by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, violation of Japanese air space, the flight of bombers to Cam Ranh Bay, and truculent language (as in Gromyko's 1978 UN speech threatening military consequences to the China-Japan treaty of friendship). The Japanese economy is wholly dependent on imported oil, and the time is thus propitious for the Japanese government to be asked to

make a substantially larger contribution to its own (and, hence, Western) security, given the proximity of Afghanistan to the source of Japanese oil supplies. Japan could substantially lengthen its maritime patrols southward thus releasing U.S. naval power of the Seventh Fleet for duty in the Indian Ocean. Japan could also make a monetary contribution to the general effort, given its substantial reserves and the small effort it makes at present in defense (one-fifth that of the U.S.).

II

Historically, the comparative advantage of the United States in world politics has been its abundance of resources, its geographic isolation, and as Edward Luttwak adds, its problem-solving ability.³⁰ None of these is a compelling advantage today; indeed the United States is, at least temporarily, in straightened circumstances and must for the remainder of the decade operate from a position of relative weakness. It may at least be a partial reassurance to learn, as Paul Nitze has put it, that, historically, "no country has emerged as a great country that has not lived through periods of great weakness and has shown it can conduct strategy from weakness and recover." Nitze goes on to argue that Soviet strategy has always known how to conduct policy from weakness - and it did so successfully in the 1950s and 1960s.

If the correlation of forces is against them, they must throw dust in the enemy's eyes while they establish the preconditions for reversing the trends. The correlation of forces must again become favorable before forceful action can prudently be taken. By analogy, we should recognize that the correlation of forces now is negative for us, that it is going to be negative for the next five years at least, and that the object of policy should be to throw dust in the enemy's eyes while getting on with reversing the trends and making them positive.¹⁹

The problem is that a country must have a strategy - as Luttwak puts it, connecting "the diverse issues into a systematic pattern of things" and then crafting plans, often of long range "for dealing with the whole." Strategy is simply not an American long suit, nor are our political institutions and social traditions conducive to it, with our four-year electoral cycles and our rapid changes in political fashion.

Thus when grave crises are finally and lately recognized, as is happening at the present to some extent with respect to inadequacies in our non-com forces, our shipbuilding program, and our land-based missile survivability, our temptation is to produce gimmicks, as short term quick fixes or substitutes for solutions. The 'new look' was a gimmick in the 1950s for reconciling divergent budgetary and military needs; the strategic perception was changed to accord with the higher priority desire to balance the budget. Intermittently we have introduced gimmicks as a substitute for strategy, and they have brought us to our present dilemma.

Even today, the Rapid Deployment Force, a useful and helpful part of the solution to the vulnerability of the oil lines of communication and security of the Persian Gulf, is being touted as a substitute for a real solution, which will involve at least an order of magnitude more funds and effort. The real solution will include the buildup of our ship construction program, resolving the manpower crisis at least in part and finding solid and serious bases in the Indian Ocean region not only on which we can rely but which are within a range to help solve the problem.

Looking at the base structure problem strategically requires that we innovate where necessary and relate our every move to the dictates of overall strategy. Thus access to strategically useful facilities in the third world must be pursued by an old-fashioned, discreet diplomacy that is

not congenial to America's open style. Indeed it is precisely at the level of American advantage - its economic, social and political superiority over the Soviet Union - that access may be obtained, provided it be done in a quiet way. For we have been too dependent on the highly visible infrastructure created in the aftermath of, and out of the basing system for, World War II. The Soviets, as is noted elsewhere,²⁰ have been much more subtle, depending on agreements by which they can exercise rights periodically without creating objects of hostility in permanent facilities. The U.S. must learn from them and would do far better at this game, given the strong predisposition that still exists in so much of the third world in favor of the West. At the least, self-inflicted wounds can certainly be avoided.

The U.S. could and should begin renegotiating the use even of Thai bases, which would stretch our reach for projecting power into the Indian Ocean, while reassuring the Royal Thai government; agreements could be made with the ruling military leaders, bypassing the more ticklish negotiations which might ensue with the Foreign Ministry, if Americans in any number were to be brought in. Depending on the country and the nature of its internal political system, agreements of a partial and implicit nature could be made in which the door would be opened a crack to our forces either through our cooperation in the first instance with a ruling elite or with its military, if these are different. Access can begin as reassurance, as port visits to Pakistan are today, even in the absence of negotiations. Use of Dakar could be stepped up. The naval intelligence link might quietly be reopened with South Africa - with the conditions being imposed in reverse in this instance, namely that they not reveal this critical step.

Access could be gained on every major littoral of the third world if it is tied to our aid programs, if it provides reassurance to third world friends, in short if it is made intrinsic to an overall strategy.

The United States has entered the 1980s in the most precarious position militarily and strategically in its history, with an adversary possessing on most indices considered relevant, superior useful military power. And as Charles Burton Marshall has put it

The states are not marginal concerns to be bargained over in a mood of give and take, but are basic to the characters of the two societies concerned. The problem for the United States is not how to avoid war - for war is ever avoidable by merely giving in - but how to avoid being defeated case by case (though) having been deprived, in a situation of visible strategic inferiority, of ability in extremity to define preferences cogently as vital interests.²¹

The foregoing five chapters have tried to shed some light on precisely that part of ongoing Soviet strategy in which the "game" is being played, namely the unstable third world, as well as some light on the nature of that medium, the third world itself. It is therein that the United States has recently faced defeats "case by case," and presumably could face worse prospects in the near future, as is envisaged in the ensuing chapters, in the absence of corrective measures.

In the final analysis, however, it is the totality that must be considered - the totality of the Soviet threat, at its various levels. And it is the totality that is missing in response, in the sense that the whole of strategy, greater than the sum of the individual parts, has been missing. To the notion of a Soviet thrust on the world stage, we have responded with the gimmick of building up the central front, where the threat is least likely to be activated, precisely because we have not considered the strategic whole. The burden of these first five chapters is to provide the

wherewithal for constructing national strategy, with respect to that material which is least considered, and least understood: the important portion of the world balance of forces determined by the projection of power in the third world - precisely where the Soviets have shrewdly chosen to gain new ground.

FOOTNOTES

1. On 'quick fixes,' see William van Cleave and W. Scott Thompson eds, Strategic Options for the Early 1980s: What can be done in a Thousand Days, New York, NSIC, 1978. Note that the options discussed therein have largely expired with the passage of the thousand days - and with no substitutes in the meantime.

2. Leonard Sullivan, private paper on "Defense Budgeting", Committee of the Present Danger, 1980, Washington, D.C.

3. See W. Scott Thompson, Unequal Partners; Philippines and Thai Relations with the U.S., 1975, D.C. Heath Co, Lexington, MA.

Few students of the present day Philippine system expect the Marcos regime to last more than a few more years, and few predict a peaceful transition to a successor regime.

4. The Reagan administration's sharp and pointed shift of policy toward the Latin America right from the first moment of power may mean that attempts will be made to resurrect the system.

5. See Worth Bagley and W. Scott Thompson "Options and Strategy: Redistributing The Risks", prepared for Pan Heuristics, Marina Del Ray, 1979.

6. In 1975 Turkey was the recipient of the largest amount of Soviet economic aid rendered to any country other than Cuba.

7. Interviews, Turkey, July 1979.

8. See The Boston Globe, 14 May 1980.

9. See W. Scott Thompson, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa in the 1980s", unpublished, January 1981.

10. Soviet military aid continues to go to Joshua Nkomo's opposition ZIBRA forces according to several sources: if not enough to determine the outcome, sufficient to keep the political situation heated.

11. See Frank Fukuyama, "The New Soviet Strategy", Commentary, December, 1979.

12. Speech 6 January 1980, cited in Wohlstetter, "Half Wars and Half Policies," in W. Scott Thompson, From Weakness to Strength: National Securities in the 1980s, San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980, p. 159.

13. See Claudia Wright, "Iraq, New Power in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs, Winter 1978-79, Vol. 58, No. 2, p. 261.

14. Walter J. Levy, "Oil and the Decline of the West", Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1980

15. See W. Scott Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of U.S. and Soviet Capabilities (New York: NSIC, 1978) p. 39.

16. Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Will Germany Go East?" Policy Review, No. 11, Winter, 1979.

17. Richard Burt, "Aides Report Carter Bans Neutron Bomb; Some Seek Reversals", The New York Times, (April 4, 1979).

18. See Kenneth L. Adelman "Seminar in African Diplomacy", Harpers, September 1978.

19. Policy and Strategy from Weakness" by Paul H. Nitze, in From Weakness to Strength: National Security in the 1980's, ed. by W. Scott Thompson, San Francisco, Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1980. p. 452.

20. See W. Scott Thompson, Power Projection: A Net Assessment of US and Soviet Capabilities (New York: NSIC, 1978), Chapter 2.

21. W. Scott Thompson, "Strategy: The Emerging Dangers" in From Weakness to Strength p. 439.

Chapter Seven

Four possible and wholly realistic models of the international system in the 1980s can be derived from current trends. Model I, an optimistic model, assumes that current negative trends in the world power balance, namely the widening of the military gap in favor of the Soviet Union, secondly the deterioration of the Western economic position, and thirdly the turbulence in the third world, are temporary and predictable, aberrations the transition from which will make the West stronger.

Models II and III straightline current trends for five years. In Model II, an optimistic straight lining, we assume a continuation of the three present trends, as named above, but see no qualitative shifts in the character of the international system as a result of another five years of these. Model III, a pessimistic straight-lining also foresees a continuation of the present trends, but in adding these up over the next five years, and aggregating them with those that have occurred since the fall of Vietnam in 1975, it sees a qualitative change in the international system leading to Soviet preeminence, with consequent effects on American economic, political and, of course, military interests and capacities.

The fourth model, a fully pessimistic one, assumes not only that Soviet military advantages accumulated will be translated into political ones, but also assumes that a world war, either a nonnuclear one of horizontal escalation or a central thermonuclear one, could well take place, with the Soviet Union emerging in precisely the terms that most war-fighting scenarios currently show to be possible, given the relative military capabilities obtaining.¹ In this study, the highest probability

is attached to Model III, and it is suggested that the probabilities are sufficiently strong to drive defense planning accordingly.

Model I - In this model, superpower military trends are accepted as negative. However, there is a broad range of interpretation. At one end are those who believe that America was hitherto more powerful than was either necessary or in American interests.² In the middle, George McBundy epitomizes a school of thought, firstly, by arguing (as he did in 1979) that "Our strategic deterrent is currently healthy" but that even if the ratios appear disadvantageous, we must remember that the "basic nature" of deterrence is not thereby changed, as he quotes Carl Kaysen. "I am a believer in what Michael Howard has called 'Healey's Theorem', on the deterrent power of even an uncertain threat: 'if there is one chance in a hundred of nuclear weapons being used, the odds would be enough to deter an aggressor even if they were not enough to reassure an ally'"³ At the end are those who at a minimum believe that the current vulnerability of, for example, the land-based missiles (which they concede) must not be confused with the vulnerability of the United States (to paraphrase the Secretary of Defense).

This school of thought would furthermore emphasize the very real difficulties the Soviet Union has in overcoming geographic obstacles to the furtherance of its purported political-military ambitions (its absence of warm-water ports, Western control over egresses from the Black Sea, the North Sea, and the Sea of Okhotsk, etc.), as well as to overcoming political obstacles to its imperium - from recalcitrant allies eager to expel it from third world climes⁴ to restive East European allies uneager to assist it in expanding its alliance network worldwide.

With respect to current economic troubles of the West, this

school would emphasize both their transitional and inevitable character as adjustments to a new era of energy scarcity. As in any transition, there are costs - and losers. The United States has lived on cheap energy and developed its economy on that basis. It is already becoming apparent that enormous real savings in energy consumption can be made without sacrificing economic growth as such in the long run.⁵ In the past decade and a half, the United States for its part has gone through a veritable revolution in which long-needed sociological adjustments were made by our society, bringing long-suppressed minorities into the political and economic culture, which adds to long-term strength even while (temporarily) reinforcing the present instabilities.

With respect to the instability in the third world, on which the Soviet Union is at the present time able to feed, the optimistic school would stress the fortuitous and transitional character of this phase. Of course there was bound to be considerable strife during the transition from imperial rule to a world of sovereign and equal states. It is not just a question of the struggle for independence itself - though that has been the issue in such states as Zimbabwe, which have just now achieved true majority rule, it would be argued. It is a question of finding a new equilibrium within the new states once the successor, and often colonially-appointed, leaders have died off or otherwise been disposed of. Eighteen of these still rule in Africa, and one can anticipate instability in those states as the independence leaders are replaced. But now that independence has come to most of the third world, a new stability, a genuine and deeply rooted one, can be established.⁶ In the Middle East we find a special situation, which relates to American politics as much as

to anything. Much of the terrorism in the world derives from PLO-related efforts to establish a homeland. Many spokesmen of Model I would argue that uncritical American support for Israel anachronistically perpetuates a state of affairs in which peace will be impossible in the Middle East.

Finally, in the most hotly-contested region of the third world, namely Southeast Asia, five years have passed since the indispensable condition was obtained for long-term stability, namely the fulfillment of Vietnam's nationalist destiny. To be sure, boat people, genocide in Cambodia, and the Vietnamese invasion of the Khmer Republic, provide some inconvenience for this argument, though in most cases not enough to alter belief.⁷ Thus Model I accords with the historic idea of progress which is intrinsic to American liberal democracy and to most models of economic development.⁸ It is a model which found more support a few years ago than today, but it nonetheless stands as a *paradigm*, an 'ideal type' against which reality must be measured. People, history shows, change their paradigms slowly, and thus this model must be taken seriously.

Model IV, in contrast, assumes the worst. In it would be the argument that there already are more than enough developments to explain, ex post facto, the outbreak (in the next few years) and conclusion of, at worst, a world war won by the Soviet Union; or at best a political conflict resolved by a massive strategic retreat, in effect a surrender, of the West.⁹

The argument cannot be discarded simply because it assumes the worst; indeed many hypothetical ranges of developments in recent eras have erred on the side of optimism. Who in the mid-1960s would have predicted that, within a decade and a half, developments as unpleasant as those of today would obtain - e.g., the fall of the Shah and its consequent

tragedies, the fall of Vietnam, the Cambodian genocide, the dramatic growth in Soviet power projectional capability and forward position in Afghanistan and Ethiopia, the dramatic weakening of Western economies and so forth? In the 1960s a confident West talked of building bridges to Eastern Europe as a means of prying it loose from the Soviet grasp, while today we worry about Finlandization - in the opposite direction. We talked then of how the Soviets would not attempt to equal our strategic capability, while today the Soviets on most axes have outstripped us.¹⁰

The point of greatest import is that wars, or collapses of civilizations and cultures occur after these lose their confidence and after they lose their momentum, as adversaries acquire the taste and habit of victory. And one would be hard put to deny that the West has had a bad string of losses. Worse, its own unity is badly frayed and continuing to deteriorate, something which does not happen entirely accidentally, given the very explicit Soviet campaign to split the allies from America over oil differentials and related issues.¹¹

The pessimistic argument raises the question of precisely why the Soviets have continued their massive strategic buildup, beyond all possible defensive needs, why they continue their conventional and theatre nuclear buildup in Europe (to the point of holding a 25 to one megatonnage advantage) if they do not anticipate war or an early confrontation in which they emerge victorious, or at the least intimidatory action designed to preclude or deter Western responses. Why, it goes on, would the Soviets not be planning, however loosely, to take advantage of Western disarray and military weakness while they can; who knows, after all, what quick fixes or technological breakthroughs might issue forth from an alarmed West in the next few years? One would add the further point, as Henry Kissinger has been doing in the past year, that it is unprecedented in history for a great

power to amass a vast military lead without attempting to translate it into political gains.¹² And indeed, by all Soviet accounts, this is precisely what the Soviet Union is attempting to do at this time.¹³

So at the least, in Model IV, there will be a very rapid accumulation of Soviet gains, and in a few years, a forced acknowledgement by the West that Moscow does indeed provide the central direction of world politics as Foreign Minister Gromyko said was its objective a few years ago.¹⁴

The implications of Model IV are very grave indeed, even in its most optimistic no-war garb. For lack of any alternative, their policy prescription would resemble Model I's namely further defense cuts, particularly in such areas as the Navy, since any further policing, peacekeeping, or power projection would be futile. At best the triad of the strategic deterrent could be retired as its components become vulnerable one by one. Follow-on systems would either be vetoed, something for which there is already sufficient precedent (as with the B-1 bomber), or cancelled by way of stretchouts that could be done piecemeal without eliciting undue public comment, for which precedent exists in the 1977 MX decision, among others.

In practice our real choice for the future is between the two straight-lined positions - Model II (optimistic) and Model III (pessimistic).

Model II (optimistic) realistically accepts the deterioration in America's strategic posture as given, and as serious. It represents the position of many of those who had historically subscribed to Model I. The introductory comments in the 1980 and 1981 Defense Report¹⁵ are close to those of Model II (o), in describing, graphically and accurately, the

disturbing elements in the international system, but arguing against over-reaction, and arguing that there has been no qualitative change in the international system flowing from events like those of the past five years.

Moreover, the tendency in this school is to minimize, though not to deny, the political consequences of changes in the balance of military forces. While in Model I this relationship is denied and deemed conceptually impossible because of the nature of nuclear war, in Model II (a), it is, rather, denied that so large an imbalance exists in fact (or is foreseeable) that the theoretically feasible political shift would be possible.

Economic shifts are largely seen in Model II as similar to those of Model I, the consequence of one-time shifts in the factors of production in the Western economies. Adverse developments to American capital in the third world are seen as a natural consequence of nationalistic past posture of Western multinational firms to nationalist aspirations.

Changes in the third world are also seen in similar light to Model I. The likelihood of further Vietnams for America are minimal, it would be argued, not only because America has learned its lesson, but because there are not any "Vietnams" being fought by our side; it is the Soviet Union that is fighting or aiding rear-guard actions around the world, corresponding in some measure to our Vietnamese struggle. In the Middle East the progress brought by the Camp David process is counterposed to the gains the Soviets have made in the Horn, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. It is assumed that the Camp David process can be indefinitely expanded until the entire Middle East is at peace.

Model III (pessimistic) is what we would consider the more realistic assessment of current world trends. It "straightlines" current

trends for the next five years, but assumes there is no particular reason why the trend is not cumulative; thus it does not see Vietnam as a one-time disaster, unconnected to the larger realities of world politics, but as an event with large consequences in and of itself, and for what it did to perceptions of the United States and to the American ability to act in the world. Vietnam is thus seen as leading to more Vietnams, because radical forces in the third world were encouraged by Hanoi's victory, because Hanoi is able to aid some of these forces, particularly in Southeast Asia, and because despite some recovery in America, there still exists a strong revulsion to large-scale engagement abroad.

By the same token, the fact that most of the third world is now independent of colonial power (save the Soviet colonies in Central Asia),¹⁶ does not mean that there no longer are conflicts, incipient or actual, in the developing world in which Soviet and American interests are engaged. For a whole second wave of revolutions is engulfing the third world - from Islamic revolutions stretching across the 'arc of crisis'¹⁷ to Marxist-Leninist revolutions challenging the rule of independent regimes everywhere from the Philippines to central America. And the outcomes of these struggles in part hinge on the world balance of forces.¹⁸

It is also assumed in this model that the attempts in recent years to accommodate American interests to those of third world revolutionaries is that 'the appetite comes with the eating' i.e. that further demands are sought once initial concessions are made. The broad strokes of the ensuing analysis are thus not painterly inventions, they are extrapolations of trends already in place in 1980. True, many great events could easily 'go either way'; such was even true of the Russian Revolution for that matter, from which so much of the following flows - it was a coup

a' etat which might after all have failed. But if luck is usually a factor, so too are the large trends of world politics: would Lenin have felt so emboldened had the world war been progressing differently? King Hassan of Morocco, whose regime collapses in 1984 in the following analysis, is ultimately defeated by the refusal of Saudi Arabia to underwrite his regime any longer, which was dictated by its policy of tight adaptation to that region's realities, namely growing Soviet power. The monarchy in Riyadh hardly wished the collapse of a brotherly throne, but the terms of its saving its own was the abandonment of such help.¹⁹ Interdependence, in short, is a double edged sword, working more against than for world stability.

Thus the events envisaged here depend in the large on the great trends that cut across continents. In an era of mass communications and satellites linking the countries of the world, it takes little time for modern revolutionaries to send their messages, and little more for the target audience to get them - and to see which way the wind is blowing. We argue then that nothing herein is new. Most of the coups that succeed in the scenario were previously tried and had failed in that form, but could be tried again in new form; and the wars of 'liberation' were long underway. Although it is true that, historically, most guerrilla wars and rebellions have failed (as Professor Boyer Bell argues)²⁰ such obscures the trend in any particular period driven by particular forces. Modern rebellions, beginning with the anticolonial drives of the 1930s and 1950s, against a Western system which was put in place over centuries, have tended almost everywhere to succeed. The explicit anticolonial struggle was completely over by 1980 everywhere, that is, except in the Russian empire. The 'second revolutions' against regimes and systems allied to the West, or created by the West in part in its own image, and taking the form of the Islamic revolution of the late 1970s or the Marxist-Leninist drives in the

third world from the late 1950s, had not all succeeded by 1985. A sense of inevitability attached to them, however. The West had hastened this end by endowing them with legitimacy, especially in the United States in the late 1970's.

It is also true that the West in 1980 had no policy or strategy for dealing with the trends extrapolated in this analysis. Counsel was everywhere divided, with the French alone willing to buck the trend of accommodation to revolutionaries,²¹ and they only where their own interests were involved. The American policy of 'getting on the side of history,' and accommodating itself to the broad third world trends, a policy which prevailed from 1977 to 1980, made it impossible to develop a realistic strategy once it had become clear that the old policy was based on unsound premises. The old policy simply had too many adherents with a stake in its execution.

It is important to note that the key events of the ensuing prognosis occurred or were set in motion prior to 1980. Indeed, conflict scenarios designed by recognized authorities in strategic matters as early as 1975²² envisaged the fall of the Shah, and a collapse of order in Iran, as the key step into international anarchy, world war, or more likely, the drift of the rest of Eurasian land-mass into Soviet control. It had now happened, but the results, aside from the capture of the US Embassy in Tehran which itself diverted attention from the more important strategic decline,²³ occurred incrementally and were thus seldom considered in toto.

In the Gulf region itself, once the Shah had fallen, the U.S. no longer had air access to Iran, while the Soviet Union now assumed routine use of it; the air barrier that the 'first tier' posed to Soviet expansionism in the 1950s and 1960s is well recalled in this connection.

Electronic surveillance of Soviet testing was gone, and Iran was no longer training and preparing to police the Gulf; more important, Iran no longer sat as a forward projection of American power on the Soviet border, thus vastly weakening the will and ability to resist in Pakistan and Turkey.

As Edward Luttwak wrote in his masterly study of the Roman empire

Partly because of the very nature of the threats faced by Rome, the value of the client states in the security system as a whole far exceeded their actual military effort, because their contribution was not merely additive to Roman military power, but complementary. Efficient client states could provide for their own internal security and for their own perimeter defense against low-intensity threats, absolving the empire from that responsibility.²⁴

Iran had also supplied Israel and South Africa with oil; both of these 'pariah states' would continue to obtain it, but with increased difficulty. Not all Americans would choose to see South Africa aided, but most might be grateful that an ally of ours like Iran made a strategically located country like South Africa able to help in the event of world or theatre war.

In East and Southeast Asia, the fundamental forces in 1985 are the growing neutralism of Japan and its link with China, along with the continued expansion of Vietnam. Indonesia has fallen and the Philippines and Thailand are contested.

China by 1985 is halfway to her own goal of avoiding a war with the Soviet Union during the perilous decade, which in itself will be a positive factor. But Beijing no longer attempts to convince Western states of the common danger; she simply plays on Soviet fears to deter a Soviet preemptive strike. In part China has survived these five years because of Soviet concentration on Europe and Southwest Asia. China is

also unable any longer to aid allies: she is not able to retaliate against Vietnam again for incursions into Cambodia and Thailand, for example.

Japan, however, has sensed that the United States can no longer protect her in case of world conflict - something eminent naval experts had said as early as 1979.²⁵ Although she has continued her rapid increase in defense spending and easily has the third largest defense budget in the world, Japan has moved perceptibly away from the United States, and has lost her reluctance to alienate Washington on such matters as long-term oil contracts with Iran, Saudi Arabia, or other states hostile to the U.S. Her closest ally is China, with whose interests she considers hers to be truly engaged at a fundamental and structural level.

The Republic of Korea, like China, has reached a vital point unscathed. Although her economy has slowed down, her real growth has enabled her to add steadily to her defense arsenal, albeit increasingly from non-American suppliers. The relative position of the South vis-a-vis the North has improved, if viewed in isolation. But the relative position of the patrons of the two make Seoul increasingly worried about the ensuing half-decade.²⁶

A coup d'etat in Indonesia occurred in 1982. Organized by an army colonel, outraged by the worsening of corruption, it was in turn aggravated by roaring inflation and political stagnation.²⁷ The new government pronounced itself nationalistic, but Marxist-Leninist in inspiration. By 1985 it has signed a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union.

The Philippines and Thailand have become contested territory. The embattled President Marcos having played every card to sustain and legitimize his regime, was finally running simply on negatives - "standing

up to" the United States, for example, and demanding renegotiated terms for use of the bases. In the meantime, he had virtually closed them down. The 13th Air Force was grounded and Subic Bay was closed to all but the most routine maintenance. The New Peoples Army, increasingly well armed by Hanoi, controls the northern half of Luzon island (including road access to Subic Bay), almost as much as the Huks had in 1950, but with greater depth of control. Demonstrating mobs in Manila demand Marcos' resignation and the termination of the base agreements.²⁸

In the wake of Vietnam's 1980 incursion, Thailand by 1985 has essentially evolved into a Bangkok city-state, attempting to avoid affronting Hanoi, whose Soviet-supplied insurgents occupied half the kingdom - the northeast along the Cambodian border and even part of the north, where Chinese-influenced communist activists had traditionally been the principal troublemakers.

Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand had reinforced their links and were even eliciting cooperative signals from Burma, but these states can no longer draw on the ebullience of ASEAN to create the image of a dynamic security system. Theirs is a policy of hope.

In Africa the main events of the half-decade were the fall of Hassan and Mobutu. Other events essentially reinforced the trends that these represented (for example the Liberian coup in early 1980, which led to that American friend becoming another Soviet 'Treaty of Friendship' state).

In Southern Africa, the independence of Zimbabwe and accession to power of Robert Mugabe made an escalation of radicalism inevitable in the region, despite Mugabe's own successful efforts in the beginning to assuage local and Western fears. The hook-up between his preexisting

forces and intelligence networks with those of regional allies like Mozambique and Angola, sustained increasingly in recent years by Soviet efforts, simply won out over the forces of moderation, despite the continued strength of the Republic of South Africa. Zimbabwe's independence was the single most important factor in the final radicalization of Zambia, from which the third and successful push for Shaba was launched. Mobutu's downfall, at the hands of a dissident army faction apparently aided from outside, led to the de facto independence of Shaba, and by 1985, wide-scale Western fears that its vital minerals would soon be denied to Western industry. This was an as yet unrealized fear, however.

South Africa itself, aided by its soaring gold exports and increased defense cooperation with Israel, South Korea and Taiwan, is still a going concern, but its security is increasingly compromised by raids on and instability in the northern sector of the country, which diverted much of its effort. This trend, reported as early as 1978,²⁹ led by 1983 to a laager mentality wherein farmers in the northern sector were selling out and moving to the suburbs of Pretoria and Johannesburg, abandoning the area to the terrorist-challengers. The cost to the West is simply that South Africa's preoccupation with its own internal security made it impossible for it to concentrate on the naval threat around the Cape route. And to prevent a UN-imposed (and Soviet-enforced) blockade of the country, South Africa bargains quietly with moderate third world countries and has committed itself not to aiding Western navies in their ASW and other surveillance missions. The self-imposed Western stipulation against use of South African port facilities, including the great Simonstown base, had thus turned into one imposed by South Africa itself.

In West Africa, events have been dominated by the return of Nigeria to

its 1975-78 radical stance, as it stoked the fires of revolution in southern Africa as a diversion to its growing trouble at home. The failure, once again, of a civilian government to come to terms with the seemingly intractable ethnic problems of governance, did not surprise regional experts, but added another baleful element to the African political mix.

If the domestic organization of Nigerian politics stayed much as before, the same was not true elsewhere in West Africa. Liberia's five-year old revolutionary government, aided by Sekou Toure's 27-year Marxist-Leninist experiment and by the Benin Republic's decade old government bound to Moscow by treaty, reinforced the radical new successor government in Senegal after Leopold Senghor died. The French, seeing their African base eroding, withdrew their forces from Senegal gracefully, the better to reinforce where it counted, in Ivory Coast, the last bastion of a pro-Western sentiment in the region.

In East Africa, very little changed in five years. Colonel Mengistu continued to tighten his grip on Ethiopia, and his increased East German, Cuban and Soviet aid eventually wore down Eritrean rebels and held off Somali guerrillas. Only his overwhelming military advantages sustained the status quo against the less-armed, but vastly better supported, popular forces in the Ogaden and Eritrea. Somalia is betwixt and between, getting too little aid from the West to strengthen herself, too much to make reconciliation with former Eastern allies possible. The situation simply stumbles along. Kenya continues to be a relatively bright spot of economic growth and cooperation with the United States though geography has not changed and thus Kenya's distance from the Gulf inhibited any substantial use of its bases. Tanzania continues its long-term trend away

from Chinese arms toward Soviet supplies having signed a treaty of friendship in 1983, something Nyerere had predicted in 1978 he would ultimately have to do to save himself and his regime.³⁰ Uganda remained a state in name only, never having recovered from the disasters of the 1970s; Tanzanian soldiers thus returned in the early 1980s to govern it and Soviet planes use its air space and fields for projecting power into central Africa, as they had in 1976-78.

In North Africa, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has become more purposeful in his use of weapons around the third world, and Libya's role as a materiel prepositioning center for Moscow, which began in earnest in the mid-1970s, has become more important.³¹ Thus when the new "revolutionary" government of Morocco requested aid urgently, primarily to forestall the possibility of French aid to the embattled King in his southern redoubt, the Soviets were able to bring MiG 23s, 25s, artillery and tanks in from Libya swiftly and apply the coup de grace to the King. The collapse of King Hassan in 1984 was thus the biggest news of that year. Although Hassan had struggled mightily against the insurgents from his army and from the PLO and Algeria, his end was only a matter of time once the Saudi government discontinued its subventions of his rule and military purchases, a step into which they were forced by local pressures a year before Hassan's collapse and execution.

Tunisia, under the successor government, continued its 'adaptive course' begun in 1977 when Soviet ships were first granted access to Tunisian ports. Nothing on the surface changed, but pressed as it was on both sides the new government discontinued its generation of cooperation with America. Algeria continues as before, depending on Soviet arms and

voting with the East in key security questions at the UN, while oil and gas exports to the West keep the state functioning as the economy and polity stagnate.

The Middle East also has witnessed no major change, just the continuation of well-embedded trends of the 1970s. In what had always been the central sector, Egypt and Israel continued to abide by the 1979 peace treaty. Anwar Sadat's fatal heart attack in 1983 did not as predicted lead to instability in Egypt, but his epigonic successors lacked his legitimacy and aura and could not project or even sustain his policies. It was thus possible for Syria and Iraq, now vastly more powerful than they had been in the 1970's, to bring Egypt 'back into the Arab fold', but the vehicle for doing this was of course military cooperation with Moscow. The return of the Labor government in Israel took some sting out of Israeli West Bank policy, and this has stretched out the Israeli occupation longer than it might otherwise have done given the regional trend. Israeli policy is now purely defensive. For the first time its neighbors are stronger in real terms, a trend which began with the 1980 Syrian-Soviet arms deal. Israel, like Syria in the late 1970's, is trying to avoid a war - while the Arabs are spoiling for a fight.

But Middle East action is now centered around the Persian Gulf; all else is subsystemic. The Dhofar rebellion was reactivated in 1981 and led to the assassination in 1982 of Sultan Qaboos in Oman and his replacement by a pliant radical under a regime responsive to Yemeni-Soviet control from Aden. The other rulers in the Gulf got the message and got into line, cutting off Western access to their ports - most pertinently in Bahrain where the MIDEASTFOR was de facto based.

(In Iran the biggest Soviet move of the half decade took place, though its historic scope must be balanced by the fact that it was the fourth military move by Moscow into Iran in the twentieth century. But the move of the Soviet divisions along the Western Afghani border, and of the airborne divisions in from the Transcaucus, on the appeal of the successor government to the Islamic regime of Khomeini and Bani-Sadr in late 1980, could hardly have surprised anyone, given the strategic advantages Moscow had assumed with its occupation of Afghanistan a year earlier.³²

Order at least was restored in Iran, and oil was soon being pumped at the 1978 level. It is often forgotten that the Tudeh party, which called the shots in the Soviet 'protective reaction,' has its base in the oil-producing region and at the pumps, which goes far to explain events from 1978 onward.³³ Iraq's countermove of proclaiming a 'protectorate' over Kuwait was soon neutralized by a Soviet refusal to resupply weaponry and spare parts unless Iraq withdrew its threats.

(Saudi Arabia remains a fiefdom of the Saudi family, but in name and privilege only.³⁴ It no longer has reach, influence, or power. In late 1978 it had first exchanged messages with Moscow, as it began to see the writing on the wall in Iran. By 1980 it had permitted Soviet overflights of its territory and in 1981 exchanged embassies. As the new order in Iran was felt, Saudi Arabia adapted pari passu. Its subventions to the PLO multiplied, as did its aid to Syria, and to its deserving Arabian neighbors. No longer did it aid Somalia or Morocco, let alone conservative powers further afield. One by one senior princes departed the kingdom as the "anti-corruption drive," the codeword for the kingdom's adaptation to the new realities, was implemented. The form into which the kingdom would

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evolve was not clear by 1985, but as Soviet ships cruised the Gulf and the Arabian Sea, it was abundantly clear that the kingdom's oil would go only where Moscow wished.

Events in the subcontinent followed logically from events in the previous half decade, once Sanjay Gandhi was no longer alive to push the causes of free enterprise and Western friendship. India reaped the benefits of Mrs. Gandhi's warm ties with Moscow as the Soviets moved closer and closer; India has simply been allowed to fester, with famine, riots, and other problems centrifugally driving apart the union, eliciting ever stronger rule by Mrs. Gandhi. She finally permitted the Soviets full military access to Indian ports after years of refusing, on the advice of her armed forces. Compliant admirals and generals were found to implement her policy - a pattern hardly exclusive to India.

Pakistan was the second domino after Afghanistan, as it were. With Soviet power on both northern and eastern borders, and increased aid to Baluchi dissidents in the very area between Afghanistan, Iran and the Indian Ocean, Pakistan had little choice but to permit the Soviets a free hand in the 'development' of Baluchistan; the alternative being a Soviet military move on the country as a whole, which would presumably have been reinforced from India. The practical effect of the "Baluchi free zone," as it came to be called, was to permit the Soviets free passage between Afghanistan and Gwadar, the natural port on the Indian Ocean, which Moscow was developing as its warm water outlet. For all intents and purposes Pakistani governmental control was nonexistent, by 1984, in the eastern half of the country. It was better to leave it this way, unstated, than to challenge the position. Ample precedent (for example in Laos and Cambodia at various stages) existed for such an arrangement.

In the Caribbean, the Soviets developed their first genuine inter-state system since the creation of the Eastern European block after World War II.³⁵ With Cuba a long-time founding member, and with solid infrastructures in Jamaica, Guyana and several islands where Cuban police and counterintelligence aid had long been welcome, expansion was simple once American quiescence and acquiescence was assumed. In 1979 Granada became, for all intents and purposes, a bloc member. Nicaragua maintained distinctions until 1981 as to its loyalties, though its votes at the UN tipped its hand in part (as for example the January 1980 vote on Afghanistan, where it sided with Moscow). The addition of El Salvador in 1980 and Guatemala in 1981, followed by Jamaica in 1982, gave the Soviet Union sufficient choice of venue for bases in duplicate or as needed and made her position largely impregnable to American pressure, especially as Mexico's foreign policy line hardened in a radical direction.

Only South America progressed through this half-decade relatively unscathed, though its leaderships were living off of the political capital accumulated in the 1970s, following the downfall of Allende, when hard-line governments became increasingly uncompromising on issues of internal order and communist penetration.

Europe was the object of the most intense Soviet political pressures in the early 1980s, as Moscow used every avenue to compel Germany in particular, but the other states as well, not to impose sanctions on Iran, to boycott the 1980 Olympics, or to permit the modernization of their theatre missiles. Luckily, NATO, during the last half of the 1970s, had become far more cohesive than theretofore, which gave it some capability to ride through the period during which America's position weakened so precipitously. But by 1985 the Soviet determination to translate military

advantage into political influence had borne fruit. In Italy the PCI had entered the ruling coalition and was supplying the political muscle for national survival. Although it hardly welcomed Soviet domination of Western Europe, its own position on virtually every international question for the past decade save Afghanistan had been identical to the Soviet position, and it certainly sought American withdrawal from Europe.³⁶ Thus it was never likely to have used its influence to prevent the alteration of Europe's balance that occurred between 1980 and 1985.

In Germany the left wing of the SPD came into still greater prominence, following the SPD's landslide of 1980. Herr Wehner's role as party leader became highly pertinent. His long-stated view that Soviet positions in Eastern Europe were "purely defensive"³⁷ thus became, for all intents and purposes, operational German policy. It became virtually impossible for NATO to agree on steps outside the treaty area to assure the region's defense, and NATO by 1985 has become virtually a relic of an earlier era, if one still standing with all its institutional framework, military units, and litany intact. NATO had long existed with vastly inferior forces to those opposing it; it thus could slip from a position where it was positioned to fight hard and to count on both defensive advantages and American resupply to compensate for Russian superiority, to a position where there was no such expectation, where no one wished to test the new reality, but no one had a need to, either.

Only France and England maintained a semblance of historical independence - France to preserve some residual influence in Africa, England as a conservative island braving all elements, as if on a different planet, for all its ability to alter the wind's direction. But the continued independence of France and England gave to gatherings of Western prime

ministers and presidents the semblance of meaningfulness as they attended to economic issues and the matter of arranging for the flow of refugees from newly-occupied areas (something that had haunted the world from 1975 onward). But they did not discuss politics, leaving those hard chores to the Soviets and their hardy allies.

This then is the world of 1985 - as a logical evolution from the events of 1975-80. In the ensuing chapter some of the military consequences of these shifts are considered.

FOOTNOTES

1. T.K. Jones and W. Scott Thompson, "Central War and Civil Defense" (Orbis, Vol. 22, No. 3, Fall 1978) p 681.
2. See for example the view expressed by Victor Utgoff, of the National Security Council Staff, to wit that if the U.S. possessed strategic superiority as it had it would use it occasionally "as a way of throwing our weight around in some very risky ways... It is in the US interest to allow the few remaining areas of strategic advantage to fade away." Cited in "The Great SALT Debate," Washington Quarterly, (Winter 1979), p 39.
3. McGeorge Bundy, "The Future of Strategic Deterrence," Survival, Vol XXI, No. 6, (Nov-Dec 1979,) pp 271-72.
4. See for example "Russians and Cubans in Africa", Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Wall Street Journal, (May 2, 1978) and see W. Scott Thompson, "Africa for the Africans?", Commentary, (September, 1978), for a comment on Schlesinger's views.
5. See World Energy Outlook, (Exxon Backround Paper, December, 1979).
6. This was the reported view, in part, of the authors of PRM-10. Also see Thomas Hughes "Liberals, Populists, and Foreign Policy", Foreign Policy, (Fall 1975).
7. See Carl Gershman "The Mysterious Origins of the Boat People," American Spectator, (September, 1979) p 7.
8. See Robert Packenham, "Liberal America and The Third World; Political Development Ideas In Foreign Aid And Social Science", (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1973).
9. Few writers of repute advocate this position openly, though many are known to consider it nearest the mark. For the notion of "strategic surrender," Sir Robert Thompson, Revolutionary War in World Strategy, (New York: Taplinger 1970).
10. See "Measures and Trends, US and USSR: Strategic Force Effectiveness", draft interim report, Defense Nuclear Agency, February, 1978. Also see Richard Burt, "Soviet Nuclear Edge in Mid-80's Is Envisioned by US Intelligence", The New York Times, May 12, 1980, p 8.
11. See The New York Times, (April 19, 1980) p 27. See also the extraordinary interview with the head of the KGB station in Washington, Boris D. Medvedev, in "Soviet Diplomat in Washington Interviewed on Kabul Crisis", FBIS-SOV (January 15, 1980).
12. See The New York Times, (August 1, 1979) p 6.

13. See W. Scott Thompson, "The Phony War," American Spectator, (May 1980).
14. U.S. House of Representatives, 1979, "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for US Diplomacy." House Documents, No. 96-236, 96th Congress, First Session. P. 431-34, cited in Charles Burton Marshall, "Strategy: The Emerging Dangers" in W. Scott Thompson, ed., From Weakness to Strength, (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980).
15. See Harold Brown, Report of the Secretary of Defense - FY80, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1979).
16. For the position of the central Asian territories in a third world context, see Daniel Pipes, "The Third World Peoples of Soviet Central Asia", The Third World, Premises of U.S. Policy, ed. by W. Scott Thompson, (San Francisco: Institute For Strategic Studies, 1978).
17. See Daniel Pipes, "This World is Political!! The Islamic Revival of the Seventies", Orbis, (Spring 1980) p 9.
18. See W. Scott Thompson, "The Projection of Soviet Power", in James R. Schlesinger, et al; Defending America, (New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1977), p 22.
19. There is ample precedent for such Saudi moves. Its distancing itself from American policy in 1979-80 was perhaps natural in the circumstances, but was forced in pace by Iraq in particular as the Saudis sought to keep up with developments. The Saudis had long supplemented Arab budgets, including those of the PLO, less out of inclination than out of a realization that such was the price for remaining in power unchallenged.
20. J. Boyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice, (New York: Knopf, 1971).
21. Note the French-organized resistance to the Katanganese gendarmes who invaded Shaba in 1977 and 1978; and note continued French willingness to reorganize military expeditions, as in the coup d'etat carried out by French forces in the Central African "Empire" in 1979.
22. Scenarios involving the fall of the Shah and thence dislocations in American and Western security were an important feature in lectures given by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, USN ret., between 1974 and 1978, (as also those of W. Scott Thompson).
23. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which by mid-1980 was considered a fait accompli, was seldom in the news, while the question of the 53 American hostages dominated the news.

24. The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire, Edward N. Luttwak, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) p 24.
25. The Zumwalt-Bagley Report. "Congress Should Beware of Those Friendly Summer Seas", The Los Angeles Times, (August 13, 1978).
26. See W. Scott Thompson, "Regional Instability and The World Power Balance," Conflict, Vol 1 No. 4, 1979.
27. The Indonesian scenario is based on work done by Dr. Guy Pauker, Rand Corporation, from 1976 onward, on deteriorating Indonesian conditions.
28. See Richard J. Kessler, "The Philippines: The Next Iran?", Asian Affairs, (February 1980).
29. See Robert S. Jaster, "South Africa's Narrowing Options", (IISS Adelphi Paper No. 159, Spring 1980). also see W. Scott Thompson "Africa for the African", Commentary, (September 1978).
30. "Terrorist Threat Grows Along the Limpopo", To The Point International, (Sandton, South Africa on November 10, 1978), p 60.
31. See Avigdor Haselkorn, "The Soviet Collective Security System, 1965-1975", (New York: National Strategic Information Center, 1978), p 72.
32. A point made by Paul H. Nitze, in "The President's 1980 State of the Union Address: A response by Paul H. Nitze", Committee on the Present Danger, 1980.
33. See Shahram Chubin, "Repercussions of the Crisis in Iran", Survival, (May-June 1979) p 98.
34. See Adzed Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia's Search for Security", (IISS Adelphi Paper No. 158, Winter 1979).
35. See Roger W. Fontaine, "The Regional Projection of Military Power The Caribbean", paper presented at Conference on Projection of Power, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 23, 1980.
Also, see James D. Theberge, "Soviet Naval Presence in the Caribbean Sea Area" in James L. George, ed. Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-first Century, (Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1978).
36. See for background to the PCI's attitude toward international questions, W. Scott Thompson, "The PCI, NATO, and the United States", Naval War College Review, (Spring 1977).
37. Cited in Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Will Germany Go East?", Policy Review, No. 11 (Winter 1979).

Chapter Eight

Introduction

In projecting current world trends into the 1980s, the military implications are made clearer by assessing how armed power fared in the preceding period. For Model III (pessimistic), the last half of the 1970's set the pattern of events expected to continue in the next decade. A first consideration is the strategic (geopolitical) environment within which military forces gain their purpose. As strategic changes are noted, one can then judge whether the suitability of military forces for national security remained constant, were adapted or not adapted to new strategic conditions, and how opposing military strength affected U.S. arms capabilities.

Setting the Stage 1975-1979

The preceding period opened with North Vietnam's forces overrunning the South. American forces withdrew over the shoreline in the modern fashioning of Dunkirk. While the effects of important change no longer can be confined within a single region, the events in Southeast Asia gave early prominence to the Pacific area.

Since the fall of Saigon, Southeast Asia counts differently in American strategic calculations. Laos and Cambodia are under Hanoi's control, supported by the Soviet Union. China, pressing to regain political influence in Cambodia, has used arms once against northern Vietnam as a signal of its interest. Hanoi, believing a direct Soviet presence might deter further Chinese attacks, opened the Cam Ranh Bay base to Soviet air and naval forces. Along Thailand's eastern and northern

borders, unrest and subversion, growing refugee movements, and now armed attacks, are reducing security.

Though the US withdrew US military forces placed in Thailand during the Vietnam war, the Carter administration has reemphasized U.S. responsibility for future Thai security, a declaration that enforces or otherwise ambiguous Manila Pact. But fulfilling that commitment must now take into account hostile Vietnamese air and ground forces in Laos and Cambodia, an uneasy and faulted security situation in the parts of Thailand contiguous to Laos and Cambodia, and a proximate threat of Soviet involvement by their force presence in the South China Sea.

As these changes occurred, America's strategic position in the Far East has evolved in two different directions. There is continuity in geopolitical concepts based on historic precedent while emerging signs of political change suggest the beginning of a transition.

Our military forces have access to Clark Field, Subic Bay, and supporting facilities in the Philippines though base rights are somewhat eroded in the latest bilateral defense agreement, and the Philippine political-economic situation has been deteriorating.

The 1972 diplomatic opening with China, offering hope for a Chinese role in encouraging political military stability in East Asia, has progressed. Washington is making agreements for transfer of defense technology and defensive arms to China, while not preventing our allies from providing other sorts of military assistance. Peking, perhaps hedging against declining US naval power in the Western Pacific, is pressing Japan (as is the US) to rearm. Common US-China strategic objectives, involving barriers to Soviet and Soviet proxy aggression and

political influence, are being more explicitly recognized though the means for achieving those objectives are in dispute. Peking prefers a tit-for-tat arms and diplomatic policy, while Washington is more cautious in part because US armed strength has declined. The US continues to perceive different strategic risks from China, but the recognition is growing that US security increasingly depends on China's geographic position and power (both regional and on the Soviet border) and the two countries' actions for similar strategic objectives may begin to converge.

Washington has nurtured relations with the ASEAN countries, but no formal defense arrangements have emerged, either among themselves or with the US. In contrast to the examples of continuity in geopolitical concepts, in other ways the American strategic position has changed. Forces and facilities no longer exist in Taiwan, reducing the line of defense bases, surveillance and logistical points connecting American power off the Asian shore. One effect is to increase the operational demands on deployed military forces and to reduce the flexibility of employing available forces along the length of the Western Pacific. During the period, also, other policies and interests tended strategically to disperse American power along the periphery of East Asia, potentially requiring more force flexibility.

A reduction in US ground forces in South Korea (offset in part by combat aircraft augmentations) increased the importance of crisis reinforcement, particularly in the face of the concurrent strengthening of North Korean forces. Continued US naval ship homeporting in Japan - to get more from declining force levels - was strategically consistent with support for South Korea's security, but not with the demands on a smaller American Navy for US naval forces in the Indian Ocean which emerged

urgently in 1979.

Use of the carrier and destroyers based in Japan for presence in the Indian Ocean presented strategic problems. The distance to the Arabian Sea is 1500 miles greater than from the Philippine area, extending the period in which NE Asia naval power is absent. Initial Japanese political acceptance of the US deployment of homeported forces from Japan to the Persian Gulf area can not be expected at all times in the future. The passage of naval forces along the length of the Western Pacific into the Indian Ocean places a higher priority on secure sea lines of communications than normally exist in peacetime. Both the loss of Taiwan, and the Soviet naval presence in North Vietnam, lessened the strategic confidence that the US could assure sea control.

US naval forces operating in and out of the Philippines are similarly subject to conflicting strategic influences. Because of the unstable security situation in Southeast Asia, we need a force presence in the China Sea, and are then less able to fill a force gap off NE Asia when US naval forces there are deployed into the Indian Ocean. But, when US sea power around the Philippines moves, in its turn, to the Indian Ocean, security for South China Sea transit lanes (for logistics ships and for reinforcements if needed) is lacking. Naval strength in Japan has deterrence and readiness tasks oriented to Northeast Asia, filling the role previously vacated while deployed in the Arabian Sea. And, with the loss of bases in Thailand (given up as our Vietnam-related military forces were withdrawn), we lost a key land base alternative for use of airborne logistics.

This mismatch between security commitments and forces, in the two strategically separate areas of the Western Pacific (NE Asia; South

China Sea), exists unless more US naval forces are deployed; or other naval forces assume the Indian Ocean task; or, in partial substitution of capabilities, US landbased air is drawn from other commitments and placed in Japan or the Philippines for combat contingency and sea control operations; or allied (i.e. Japanese) forces are deployed for tasks left uncovered by the US. Allied Force substitutions, however, inevitably draw armed power from other peacetime and wartime assignments until, or unless, allied military strength is built up.

Accordingly, as a consequence of these strategic circumstances, the US military position in the Pacific Ocean region is deficient. Instability or hostile force changes in Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula require ready counter-force deployments. Chinese influence for regional stability works on the generally common strategic objective of keeping Soviet influence out, but the risk perspectives for implementing political and defense policies differ and Chinese military strength is limited by size and dispersal for covering very long defensive frontiers. Since the US needs to depend strategically on China, but lacks and may not want formal arrangements with Peking, that reliance presents potential risks until US military forces are stronger and more self-sufficient (a matter of more than 5-10 years once decided). The US relies on an offshore sea power strategy. US interests are involved in threats to South Korea and Thailand at a time when limited forces require greater efficiency and the paucity of connecting land positions reduce efficiency. On top of that, external demands, most particularly, the Indian Ocean, create explicit commitments for a force presence outside the Western Pacific and, to protect force and supply routes into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific, for sea control inside the region.

In the Persian Gulf area, the latter half of the 1970s saw a

creeping evolution of geopolitical and military events affecting the Persian Gulf area, stimulated by Soviet and Third World decisions.

Acting to achieve strategic objectives with minimum risk of confrontation with the US, Moscow formulated a latter-day "Wars of Liberation" concept - the more direct "Proxy War on Proxy Presence." Starting with Cuban forces in Angola in 1975, the Soviet Union actively expanded to East Africa, the Horn of Africa, and through South Yemen into the Arabian peninsula. With it came potential access to foreign bases in east and west Africa and an actual force presence in Guinea, South Yemen and Ethiopia. Soviet forces also became associated with armed forces in other countries dependent on Soviet arms aid, particularly in Mozambique, Iraq, Syria, and Libya.

During this period, American access to foreign bases became less certain and the future possibilities were ambiguous. Naval ships transiting from the Atlantic to the Arabian Sea were unable to find sufficient fueling bases, placing unexpected demands on mobile naval logistics forces whose current strength depends on short-leg access to land supply. Homeporting of the Middle East forces flagship at Bahrein was terminated and US ship access limited to a specific number of "ship-days". NATO-oriented bases in Greece and Turkey were alternately useable and not useable, varying with political and strategic perspectives. Tests of land-based combat aircraft transits from the US to the Gulf met restraints of overflight and fuel staging rights in the Mediterranean region, requiring large, inefficient airborne logistical support from resources already over-extended in NATO and the US. After the Camp David accords, both Egypt and Israel were discussed publicly as possible contingency bases for American forces, but political concerns have (and probably will) limit significant use. Only at Diego Garcia, some 2600 miles from the Gulf, is

a base assured. But, at the end of the period, base access talks were started with Oman, Kenya and Somalia. Early reactions suggest bases in Oman and Kenya may be available but only as peacetime support facilities, with some politically-dependent, limited (but subject to time-consuming construction) use for staging military forces in time of crisis. Further afield, Australia may be willing to receive US naval units, but distances to the Gulf are approximately 6000 miles.

An inadequate base infrastructure in the Gulf region and its distant approaches was hitherto acceptable to Washington because of the presence of a seemingly stable, strong ally in Iran. But, in 1979, the Shah fell and Iran turned away from the US. Cento, the symbol and potential political instrument for security against Soviet intrusions in the Gulf, dissolved. A power vacuum developed much as it had a decade before when Britain withdrew from east of Suez.

For deterrence and combat defense in the Gulf, the US faced serious strategic disabilities. Deployment of forces from the US was disadvantaged by long distances and unreliable overflight and logistics rights. Diego Garcia lacked the capacity for large forces that might be required; and sea transits to the Gulf require five days. The most recent reaccommodation with Ankara on use of Turkish bases specifically excludes use by US forces for Gulf contingencies in the absence of a NATO obligation. Under these circumstances, a US combat force deployed in the Gulf requires significant combat and logistical support to reach the region, be

able to fight there. Deterrence, therefore, will call for a

force posture, one large enough for initial

response to aggression may be

elements needed

against US forces available, structured for one and one-half wars (or less), the proposition of presence and reinforcement is not feasible without increasing risks in NATO and the Western Pacific. Even as, and if, access to regional bases near the Suez can be gained - and force efficiencies enhanced - the asymmetry between US forces designed for one and one-half wars and the new demands for Gulf defense is unresolvable. Since that inadequacy is observable, weaker countries are reluctant to provide base access, as seen in Chapter 5, accepting the current risks of Soviet or Soviet proxy aggression rather than provoking aggression by the presence of US armed power that is not credible.

In a modern world where regional strategies merge and interact with arms and strategies in other regions, the US posture vis-a-vis the Gulf touches on the Mediterranean. That sea provides routes to the Middle East, positions for outflanking would-be Gulf aggressors, as well as the anchor of NATO's southern flank.

Beyond the strategic uncertainties posed by political ups and downs with Greece and Turkey, the US suffered other limits on extended military positions in the Mediterranean. Communication stations were closed in Morocco and Spain, in part but not totally offset by satellites, themselves increasingly vulnerable, thus reducing the redundancy of communications links. A renegotiated base treaty with Spain removed the Poseidon SSBN presence and put new limits on US land-based aircraft presence. North Africa became a potentially hostile complex in US Middle East and Gulf strategy, creating new sea control and air space protection tasks for reinforcements en route from the Atlantic over the Mediterranean to the Middle East and Gulf. Moreover, the strength of our forces in the Mediterranean was designed for NATO's southern flank. Employment in other regions, even for power projection from a distance, present vulner-

abilities for defense of Greece and Turkey. Our experience in supplying Israel in 1973 showed our allies could be uncooperative on giving base access if our political aims are not harmonized and if the consequences of our operations might degrade security for the NATO countries. Since our respective views toward the Middle East still diverge, we cannot count on strategic or force cooperation from NATO or other Mediterranean allies in Middle East contingencies.

Within NATO, however, the US strategic position in the North Atlantic is intact, at least at the military level. The significant change in the late 1970s is the new US strategic commitment to the Gulf, an evolution that promises to continue to draw US forces from NATO. The political implication for our allies is the necessity of building their own armed forces, offsetting the stress on US arms, but exceeding plans for NATO-related force improvements that are not yet underway. Current trends suggest allied determination to rationalize Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, the key event that ended the 1970's, in hopes of mobilizing Third World political sanctions as a substitute for Western rearmament. One presumed motivation for what may be Allied appeasement is the degraded US geostrategic position as described above. But, other elements are at work widening the gap between strategic challenge and available armed strength for the US and the West:

-The US lost, in the late 1970s, the nuclear strategic advantage relative to the Soviet Union. Without it, conflict rests on conventional arms in which the Soviets have built a general superiority.

-International efforts to avoid nuclear proliferation are failing, with serious future implications for stability in any crisis or

conflict situation.

-Aligned with Cuba, the Soviets are supporting an expanding subversion and revolt in Central America, raising the prospects that US military forces will be further distracted from other regions.

-An increasing reliance of the industrial powers on scarce resources in Third World territories is narrowing the time interval between when the West might resort to the use of arms to gain access to embargoed resources and the slowing of the industrial machines denied those resources. For more and more industrial nations, political accommodation appears preferable to resorting to arms if their national economic health is to be maintained. This tendency to downgrade the utility of military power is reinforced as the Soviets act strategically to expand their influence and presence in resource-rich Third World countries.

At the close of the 1970s, therefore, the US looks out on only a few strategically reliable strongholds. As a hard assessment, they might be classed in three categories:

1. Politically strong (positive trends of internal political control; foreign and security policies dependent on or sympathetic with US; democratic in outlook):

Norway - Portugal - Israel - UK - Australia
New Zealand.

2. Politically vulnerable (trends in internal politics either to left or to loss of control; foreign and security policies may offer acceptable alternatives to US protective umbrella; perceptions on utility of military force emphasizing nonmilitary alternatives):

Italy - Germany - Japan - Thailand - Egypt
Iceland - South Korea - Philippines.

3. Politically neutral (exercising independent political and security options, but by philosophy or tradition will retain the option of a security association with the US):

South America - France

Thus, as US strategic impoverishment grew in the 1970s, with new interests to protect (Persian Gulf) and older, once secure interests unravelling (NATO; East Asia), America needed more military forces. The reason was finite - the simple links among geography, presence, and distance - and, relative - as Soviet military strength grew and its use was facilitated with improved strategic positions. But, real US defense expenditures decreased significantly from the mid-1960s to 1977. From 1977 to 1979, overall defense outlays were at no-growth or a slight gain in some categories. But, consistently, the Soviets were willing to expend more real funds, use a higher proportion of GNP, and create power projection capabilities as well as expand basic armed strength. Both the Soviet strategic situation and its forces improved just as the US was incurring or accepting degradations on both counts.

The Main Event - 1980-85

As this analysis begins its projection of the international system from the 1970s into the first half of the next decade, American power has accumulated serious deficiencies:

- A lack of strategic position for military presence, projection, or mobility in new regions of interest (Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf) and a growing loss of reliability in strategic positions in Europe and the Pacific on which we had previously counted as a matter of common interest.

- A growing inability to match forces with new threats to our interests extending from historical lines in Western Europe and geographic

extremes in the Western Pacific, to the Middle East, Persian Gulf, Caribbean, and Africa.

-A loss of strategic nuclear force advantage, a trend that has not yet been reversed, while the conventional arms balance has worsened.

From the current program evidence, correcting these deficiencies by 1985 will be limited:

-A rapid deployment force, combining afloat equipment for 11,000-15,000 combat troops with air hook-up of manpower at points of crisis. Implicitly, the force design anticipates an administrative landing and join-up, the required ports and airfields available by political agreement and not threatened by a hostile force. Reaction time will approach 10-14 days; afloat supply ships will require dedicated naval resources for protection; and, air transport will be used at the penalty of shortfalls elsewhere.

-Strategic positions may be established in Oman and Kenya, and less likely, in Somalia. Force deployment capacities will be expanded at Diego Garcia. Naval access to Australian ports may materialize for contingency purposes. On the continuity side of the strategic situation, the US faces renegotiations of base rights with Spain and possible defense or base pact reviews with Japan, Iceland, Greece and Turkey.

-The number of army divisions with pre-positioned equipment (POMCUS) in NATO Europe will be held at six rather than the planned nine, increasing the number of divisions deployable outside Europe. The three divisions retaining their equipment in the US will be more readily available for crisis contingency deployment elsewhere though additional lift will not be provided in 1980-85.

An unfortunate aspect of the limited prospects of planned improvements (though alternative actions for earlier improvements in nuclear and non-nuclear force and strategic position exist) is its effect on other countries' policies. Allied force build-ups (for regional strength compatible with improved Soviet or proxy capabilities, and to fill gaps created by US deployments to the Gulf); the offering of overseas strategic positions for US or allied forces; and the acceptance of US military assistance and defense protection, are all less likely as long as US military strength is perceived to be insufficient and inadequate programs for force strengthening are not proceeding.

The international system changes foreseen in 1980-85 must be assumed to occur in part because of the force deficiencies the US brings into the 1980s. What occurs in those systemic changes add to the US disadvantages inherited from the 1970s:

Pacific

The move of Japan away from a common strategic purpose with the US could first reduce bases now used by US forces (without negating the Defense Treaty) and then deny storage facilities for arms on which US defense in NE Asia (S. Korea, Japan) depends. Denial of access in Okinawa might follow. The potential effects are:

Our military forces would lose some or all the Japanese bases from which they receive logistical support; repairs; storage of parts, materiel, and ordnance; as well as the operational infrastructure that includes homeport; port or airfield operating base; communications, intelligence, command and control; training areas; and recreational facilities.

If the US is to cope with the consequences, some or all of the following options would have to be pursued:

(1) Increase force levels. For the same strategic purposes, more combat forces would be required in the forward area, placed at land bases still accessible to the US within quick-reaction strike or support range of objectives, or at sea, or in an attainable land and sea combination. Force rotation intervals would be shortened as forward logistical and maintenance resources diminished, requiring a larger combat force in the US to maintain the desired forward-deployed combat power. Area surveillance, degraded by loss of land bases, could lower the efficiency of force employment and, similarly, require an incremental combat force increase.

(2) Reassert employment efficiencies. To regain some part of the force employment efficiency derived from forward bases, a costly expansion of facilities at Guam could be undertaken. This action would take a year or two, but considerably less than the 5-15 years required for force expansion.

(3) Increase naval and commercial sea-lift. Sea lift for logistics, replacing lost storage ashore, would be required and, as the forward combat force relied increasingly on sea power, a greatly augmented naval mobile logistics ship complement in the region would be necessary. As local sources of fuel and provisions were denied, the mobile logistics force would be supported by a train of supply ships transmitting from the US to Guam and to the Western Pacific.

(4) Revise NE Asia strategy. As the Japanese support and operational infrastructure is degraded, there will be a strategic choice between increased US military force presence in South Korea or a

less credible combined defense of that country.

(5) Develop strategic hedge to dependence on China. The combination of a disaffected and rearming Japan (and a passive NATO) presents the probability of Tokyo influencing China to weaken or terminate its strategic association with the US. If the US, in 1980-85, depended on a security relationship with China without developing policies that include secure geographic positions and larger forces, a rupture in US/China relations would create an immediate demand for US and allied military forces that would not exist in NATO and in the Western Pacific. NATO would have to assume some subsequent change in China's links with the USSR and China's interests in Asian stability no longer would be the same as those of the US.

As a consequence of a change in the power relationship between the US and Japan, political differences will grow between the two countries and affect US diplomacy in the rest of Asia (and with the other Western industrial countries) in one way or another (e.g. a fundamental status quo is altered).

As foreseen in this analysis, the expanding revolt in the Philippines and the denial or restrictions on US use of Clark Field, Subic Bay, and related facilities would occur as Japan separates itself from US strategic policies, as Thai rulers lose legitimate control over much of the country's territory, and as the Indonesian government is overthrown in favor of a Marxist leaning leadership. The potential effects are:

Our military forces would lose some or all of the bases in the Philippines that provide support in the South China Sea and Southeast Asia similar to the role served by Japanese bases in the northern Pacific and Northeast Asia. In addition, the logistical anchor and air/sea routes for

projecting forces into the Indian Ocean are compromised as the Philippine base complex is lost, the potential of Thai air bases as an en route way-station is reduced, and the security of the Malacca Straits and the Indonesian Archipelago with its Sunda and Lombok Straits is placed in question.

Coping with these consequences requires consideration of some or all of these options:

(1) Increase force levels. Additional combat forces, to regain the employment efficiencies previously afforded by local bases, following the same logic occasioned by Japan's growing neutrality. But, since our forces near Northeast Asia and near Southeast Asia have their own strategic purposes, the force increment in the South China Sea would generally be additive to that required in the north.

(2) Reassert employment efficiencies. A build-up of Guam base facilities to serve a Southeast Asia/South China Sea/Indian Ocean combat force as well as forces near Northeast Asia. As political deterioration proceeds within the ASEAN group of states, the US may find political receptivity in Singapore (and perhaps Malaysia) for increased base accommodations.

(3) Increase naval and commercial sea lift. Mobile naval logistics ships (backed by a train of ships from the US in Guam) in numbers consistent with supplying a naval force whose access to local base complexes in the South China Sea has diminished. If Guam is expanded, this sea lift can converge on that island and then serve the outer regions (NE Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean) with some greater efficiency.

(4) Combat initiatives. A commitment of US forces, either directly or in combat support roles, assisting the Philippine and Thai governments against rebels or in safeguarding key political and defense sites vital to continued or resumed US force use of bases in those countries. Arguments against this alternative must consider possibly alienating Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand, concerned with threats to their own security, at a time their cooperation with US forces may be essential.

(5) Revise SE Asia/Indian Ocean strategy. A change in strategic concept that takes into account, and hedges against, the potential disruption by hostile littoral forces of lines of communications through and over the South China Sea and Philippine Sea into the Indian Ocean. One possibility is base arrangements in Australia, incurring a number of possible penalties: creating a new force requirement for the Indian Ocean, independent of the employment and reaction flexibility previously available with the Western Pacific and Seventh Fleet, compared with the Philippines; incurring a transit range increase of 1500-2000 miles from forward base to the Persian Gulf for contingency response and for logistics support, increasing the base missions at Hawaii and Guam to provide overseas support to three rather than two regions of forward-deployed force. A consideration in creating a base complex in Australia is whether it would suggest the US plans to cede the South China Sea to hostile forces (particularly if other actions are not taken to assist Thailand and the Philippines and offer force presence to Singapore), at the expense of a final rupture with Japan who might still depend on the US for secure oiler routes from the Persian Gulf into the South China Sea to Japan.

(6) Alliance with Taiwan. Rejoining and strengthening defense links with and US force presence in Taiwan, would

improve power projection capabilities into the East China Sea (in the absence of Japanese bases and in the face of a change in the form of strategic association with China) and replace regional surveillance capabilities lost or reduced in the Japanese and Philippine areas. Taiwan's central position between Northeast and Southeast Asia would offer flexibility in employing US combat power either to the north or to the south and would reintroduce some force employment efficiencies degraded by the 1980-85 strategic changes.

(7) US/China combat initiatives. Should China sustain its political, economic, and security links with a Japan distancing itself from the US, while persuaded by Vietnam and Soviet-instigated subversion/aggression in Southeast Asia and Indonesia to retain its (Peking's) strategic association with the US (and with NATO in China's drawing off Soviet forces), the US would have a choice. Washington could concert a regional campaign with Peking: the US assisting Thailand from offshore and the Philippines on land and perhaps blockading Indonesian oil exports, while China launched an invasion of Vietnam. The Soviets' great distance from these events would limit their willingness to intervene, and Cam Ranh Bay would be irrelevant for a Soviet regional response to China's large land forces. The explicit Chinese determination to resist Soviet proxy aggression and Soviet subversion in Asia could be exploited by the US to restir NATO will and to convince Japan the US will protect common interests. The key elements of decision for the US on this alternative are: force availability and the effect of force commitments on security elsewhere; the political and military feasibility of suppressing subversion and revolt; the oil embargo sanctions which might be undertaken by

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other OPEC nations (either independently or under Soviet pressure) in sympathy for Indonesia's plight; and, the feasibility of logistically supporting far-flung combat operations at a time traditional regional base complexes are limited or unavailable.

Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf/Approaches

As the analysis foresees, the Soviet access to India's bases, the outflanking and reduction of Pakistan's territory, the Soviet presence and control in Iran, the radical takeover in Oman, Egypt's unstable and anti-US regime, and the regional states' rejection of US presence in the Persian Gulf gives Soviet strategic and political control of regional oil resources. In combination with South Africa's rejection of western presence, and events in Africa, Indian Ocean approaches to the region are under the cover of Soviet armed power and the single US/UK base at Diego Garcia is hostage to Soviet attack. The potential effects are:

For protecting US and Allied interests in the Persian Gulf region, the strategic changes foreseen place narrow limits on what could act as, and be perceived as, credible military force. Soviet armed power is perched on the Gulf, in Iran, capable of heavy concentration and projection with little or no warning, and is situated astride the Gulf's projection approaches in Baluchistan and Oman. From India, the Horn of Africa and southern Africa, bases available to the Soviets give control over the Indian Ocean promising early detection and repetitive attacks against US contingency deployments and reinforcements. Under the close and threatening hand of Soviet power, regional countries are unable or unwilling to grant base access to US military forces. With a few exceptions, political changes and trends in central and western Africa offer few options for logistical staging points for air-transported forces originating in crisis from the US. The exercise of US defensive force near

the Gulf, aimed at deterring further regional political and territorial degradation or deterring a Soviet-influenced oil embargo, revolves on a strong, dependable force presence, capable of reacting within hours to a local or Soviet armed action, and capable of securing a regional position for entry of reinforcements.

For the US (and willing allies) to cope with these circumstances, a number of alternatives will have to be considered:

(1) Fix regional strategy. Fashioning concretely a strategic concept that sets the Persian Gulf in the pattern of a larger regional entity, reaching to the Mediterranean and south to Kenya, US forces would rely first on long range non-nuclear weapons as a way to clear out hostile forces that control the Indian Ocean and, second, on ground and air forces based in Israel to threaten the territory that is otherwise subservient to the presence of Soviet power. Non-nuclear cruise missiles could be deployed continuously at sea in many ships (naval and merchant hulls) and submarines and on-land in aircraft and shore sites located in Kenya. The combination and distribution of launchers strains Soviet capabilities for location and attack and because the threat endures, both deters deployment of land-attack forces from the USSR and raises doubts about the security the Soviets can assure for countries granting Soviet bases. Working thus to reduce the possibilities of isolation from the east and south, US and allied forces could join with Israel in presenting a regional ground and air force that is capable of projection across borders by air and overland and acts as a counter to Soviet power employable in the region. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean (with carrier and cruise missiles) could support the Israeli position. Cruise missile launchers could be placed in Israel, as well. In addition, the concept should include declaratory willingness for measures

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of political and arms escalation against Soviet forces elsewhere, in response to adverse Soviet-inspired activities in the Gulf.

(2) Revise rings of strategic position centered on Gulf. A series of diplomatic arrangements, sealed with economic and security guarantees, that give mobility and thus feasibility to the optional strategic concepts. These might pursue several aims:

a. Transit routes for reinforcements.

Pacts with countries in western and central Africa.

b. Regional presence. Mutual defense accords with Israel, Kenya, Australia, and France, oriented to the region.

c. External escalation. Bilateral arrangements with Norway, UK, South Korea, and China (sparked by Japanese influence and self-interest).

(3) Expand controlled bases. Expansion of capacities, force presence, and defenses of US-controlled bases relevant projecting power in the Indian Ocean and on Soviet territory: Diego Garcia, Alaska/Aleutian Islands.

(4) Combat initiative. An invasion (or an inspired counter-revolution) of Oman, designed to secure a US position on the Gulf and resist isolation from the region resulting from the proximity of Soviet power.

(5) Counter-subversion. A policy aimed at undercutting Soviet or radical authority in the region. Targets might include Baluchistan; Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Egypt, and the Seychelles. With Chinese cooperation, in SW Asia, this campaign might be extended to the southern USSR.

Mediterranean

Changes in Tunisia and Morocco create a hostile line along the whole North African littoral and trends in NATO present unreliable

conditions on a secure northern rim of the Med. Though the implications of these events for NATO defense are ambiguous, US use of the Mediterranean to project power in the Middle East calls for a high sense of self-reliance. The potential effects are:

Our military forces would be vulnerable. To operate in the eastern Mediterranean, US arms would have to be stronger for survival and would require a large mobile logistical tail for sustained operations. Even if NATO declined to react to the development of a hostile north African littoral, and ready power on NATO's southern flank became less relevant under that land threat, the US would want to keep armed power in the Mediterranean for any viable security concept for the Middle East and Gulf.

A number of options would have to be examined:

(1) Ties with France. A bilateral treaty with France, oriented to security in the Mediterranean to meet common objectives towards North Africa and in the Indian Ocean for stability in the Gulf and Horn of Africa areas.

(2) Ties with Greece. Increased US use of NATO-oriented bases in Greece to test Athens' bilateral willingness to accede to US unilateral requirements, exploiting a possible trade-off between general Alliance passiveness, on one hand, and a desire by Greece to keep the American connection and flank presence, on the other.

(3) Distributing striking power. A proliferation of American non-nuclear cruise missile strike power in the Mediterranean, distributed among naval and merchant hulls and submarines, to decrease possibilities of Soviet preempting US striking power.

(4) Force increases. Combat force and logistical force strengthening, oriented to sea power, requiring some 5-15 years to achieve but hedged in the interim by cruise missiles and other

shorter term combat equivalencies (i.e., strategic position; regional allied force cooperation; merships for logistics; land-based air support for our sea power).

(5) Combat initiative. An invasion, or inspired revolt, in Libya (as the main Soviet arms base) designed to gain a friendly position on the North African littoral that hazards the security of other littoral states if they maintain security ties with the USSR.

Caribbean

The Soviet/Cuban supported interstate system (Guyana, Jamaica, Granada, and others), and the accommodation available for Soviet bases in the region shifts US defense perspectives to continental defense. The potential effects are:

A distraction of military forces from other areas to safeguard the US southern coasts and borders and to monitor the form and location of hostile nuclear and non-nuclear power in the Caribbean and Central America. Naval forces would be required in strength to display (in peacetime) and guard (in crisis) sea lines of communications between the US and Latin America, spanning the Caribbean and reaching into the South Atlantic.

Coping with this situation requires pursuing relevant combinations of the following

(1) Force increases. A strengthened land-based and sea-based conventional military force, generated from forces assigned elsewhere or from procurement.

(2) Surveillance. An early-warning network to detect nuclear or non-nuclear attacks from the South and defenses against such attacks (interceptors, AAA, and possibly ABM).

(3) Nuclear force survivability improvements. Measures to achieve increased survivalulity for the US nuclear offensive

force (extra MMIII ICBM holes, SSBN pens, more widely based strategic bombers with improved defenses, expanded continental defense force).

(4) Combat initiatives. Plans for preemptive strikes, invasions, or other forms of isolation against hostile forces as a way to limit continuous US military presence in the Caribbean region - the forces for which are not available without increased risk elsewhere.

(5) New contingency plans. Plans for blockading Mexican oil exports as a sanction against Mexican policies opposed to US interests.

(6) Revised strategy. A security and economic alliance with South American countries, designed for control of the South Atlantic and to avoid South America's isolation from the US through a Soviet Caribbean barrier.

(7) Accommodation on areas of primary threat. An accommodation with the Soviet Union, spelling out areas of dominant interest close to each country's territories, aimed at Soviet withdrawal from the Caribbean in return for American withdrawal from the Arabian Sea and Gulf region. While the US might be able to sustain such an accord economically by achieving independence from Gulf oil by 1990, it would still depend on non-Gulf members of OPEC in the 1990's, and in Europe the consequence may be further dissolution of NATO as those countries accepted Soviet control over the Gulf.

NATO

As foreseen in the analysis, the progressive disrepair of the military alliance's effectiveness implies a growing isolation for the US. The potential effects are:

Our military forces in the NATO Center barely cling to relevance since the will for defense has waned. The Alliance area is outflanked by

Soviet political and territorial acquisitions in other regions and few deny Soviet armed power in Europe outguns NATO. US military presence in Europe retains the image of a nuclear guarantee, but the nuclear strike credibility wasted away as US and allied conventional forces remained steadfast in the European front as much of the rest of the world fell to Soviet power and politics. American forces on the NATO Center, less useable elsewhere as allied defense force credibility decreases politically, are hostage to Soviet decisions on whether to wage war in Europe. Though the US strategic concert with China offered ways to strengthen one front with the Soviets, while using forces on the other front elsewhere, the US preferred standing transfixed in Europe as a protective encouragement to its allies to build up their own conventional forces. The allies did not seize the American lure, strategic losses proceeded in the Gulf, Pacific, and elsewhere, but American force remains on NATO Europe soil. With that force, a host of US combat support resources are tied to NATO.

Dealing with this large military commitment that is increasingly irrelevant where it is, and highly relevant - though decayed by time - elsewhere, will require that America examine combinations of several alternative policies.

(1) Alliance with China. Stretching the form of the strategic association with China by plumbing the common risks and vulnerabilities that each share. China has turned more to Japan for security on its Pacific frontiers and coasts while giving first priority to strengthening its own land-based arms. But Beijing has found it difficult to develop military forces sufficient to cope with strategic changes that involved a decreasing American ability to project power, increasing Soviet

action beyond Russian borders, and a NATO that had become comatose. In this situation, the US could propose a coordinated defense plan with China:

- The US would withdraw its conventional forces from NATO Europe except for one division and two tactical air wings, leaving its logistics and supply infrastructure adequate for a subsequent 60-day mobilization.

- Sea power would be redeployed in two ways: first, to create a line of power projection in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, centered on non-nuclear and nuclear cruise missiles fitted in naval ships, merchant hulls, and submarines. This power could reach over the NATO fronts, into East Europe, and into the Western Soviet Union. Second, our sea power would deploy into the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, supporting counter operations in Thailand and the Philippines and prepared to isolate Indonesia, as well as extending a ring of long-range cruise missiles targetable around the Soviet periphery and on countries outside the USSR.

- American industry would be mobilized to increase American and Chinese arms.

- China would invade Vietnam (Hanoi's forces already dispersed southward into Southeast Asia) under the seaward protection of American sea power near the region and distributed to present risks to the Soviets of attacks in other areas.

- China would strengthen its land forces along its northern borders with the USSR.

(2) Disperse US ground forces. Redeploy selected American army divisions from NATO Europe to Puerto Rico, the southern US, to American bases accessible in the Philippines and to South Korea.

(3) Strategic oil reserve. Undertake a crash program to develop independence from Persian Gulf oil supplies, giving first priority to building the oil strategic reserve to a 12-month supply.

The Strategic/Military Synopsis

If the US is to survive beyond 1985, with the events this analysis foresees, basic policy directions stand-out in the foregoing regional and interregional assessment. They are summarized below.

a. Build-up force staging capacities at US-controlled overseas bases: Guam, Diego Garcia, Hawaii, Alaska, and Puerto Rico.

b. Greatly expand naval mobile logistics forces, and obtain/earmark sufficient non-naval sea lift for transport of supplies from the US over three oceans to forward-deployed combat forces lacking overseas bases.

c. Undertake negotiations for base use at Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand for logistical complexes, operating bases for strike and sea control forces, and for surveillance and other support facilities that combine nearness and remoteness to regions in crisis.

d. Undertake negotiations to trade off US commitments for defense, on one hand, for the placing of long-range (1500) non-nuclear cruise missiles, on the other, in Kenya - covering the Red Sea, Arabian peninsula and adjacent areas.

e. Negotiate with Israel for contingency US use of bases (combat aircraft, troop staging) and location of sites for contingency placement of non-nuclear cruise missiles.

f. Develop bilateral defense pacts (as a substitute for Alliance weaknesses) with selected NATO countries (e.g., Norway and Greece) crucial to US strategic interests and concepts related to peripheral pressures on the USSR and with France for security goals in the Mediterranean and Arabian Sea.

g. Maintain the capacities of bases on Taiwan and

systems for surveillance and C³, for possible US use.

h. Seek bilateral accords (possibly by economic concessions) with African countries for US military aircraft staging, refuelling, and overflight rights, designed to assure fast reinforcement routes to the Middle East/Gulf.

i. Develop security pacts with willing countries in Central and South America and in the Caribbean, designed for US security in the face of inadequate US force levels for the new threat.

j. Expand the strategic association with China, including lifting limits on arms and transfers, and making compromises on how strategies are implemented, but take actions that hedge the adverse evolvement of that relationship later on.

k. Redeploy some US forces from Western Europe to other regions where strategic interests are at risk.

l. Create an active subversion and counter-subversion apparatus.

m. Build-up US military forces, emphasizing sea and air power.

n. Match an increased defense R&D effort to the strategic deficiencies and the impulse of a need for new concepts. For example: logistical innovations (e.g., concrete floating barges, air-deliverable modular parts) that substitute for forward bases; non-nuclear cruise missiles for long-range engagement, countering the Soviets long weapon reach afforded by strategic positions outside their own borders and presenting a threat to targets inside the USSR; fast supply/troops ships that offset loss of forward bases; towed sonar arrays to substitute for lost land-based means for surveillance.

o. Expand the American industrial capability to produce arms.

p. Use the American military for diplomatic purposes in countries where the leadership is military or is greatly influenced by their own military (e.g., Pakistan, Turkey, South America, Africa).

These actions, or alternatives, all present their own problems, whether economic or political, representative of the in extramis situation for American security. The effect of future strategic changes yielded by analysis underlines why these distasteful and emergency measures have to be considered and pursued.

a. The loss of overseas bases sharply limits the efficient employment and sustaining power of military forces. Forces must be rotated more frequently to keep ready arms on station, and those arms primarily are naval. Reaction to crises requires transit of landbased forces from long distances and landing them at politically inappropriate or hostile points. The past notions of closing military force on or close to an objective may no longer be suitable. We will need a capability of projecting strikes from a long distance, both to act in time and to avoid movements that either are geographically or logistically not feasible or are highly vulnerable to hostile interdiction.

b. Soviet external positions provide a shield around critical areas that previously did not exist. For our military forces that means Soviet power can reach out great distances and attack, interdict, and preempt our military power before it can engage at the objective.

c. Our allies are no longer dependable and countries who retained the option of accepting the US security umbrella now discard that option because the image and visibility of Soviet armed power is more

credible than the counter capabilities possessed by the US. In this context, the US has no choice other than creating forces and strategies that assume inadequate allied force concert and little pre-hostilities or initial conflict cooperation from otherwise sympathetic nations under assault. The feasibility of strategic arrangements with selected countries, emphasizing bilateral accords joining security and economic interests, will depend first on firm signs that US is proceeding with defense rearming.

d. As Soviet armed power has moved out of Russian territory to extended positions, and American military forces concurrently lost forward bases, new military problems are presented to the US. If a US force presence is to be maintained overseas, which implies additional forces for more frequent rotation in the absence of bases, that force also must be stronger because of the increased Soviet capability for preemption. Further, Soviet proximity places a higher premium on the mission of US presence forces to defend and isolate an area for secure introduction of reinforcements. If that traditional concept is not now feasible, then new strategies must be examined. US forces may be given a long-range strike capability so their presence position is outside or at the extremes of the Soviet preemption capability. A Soviet-stimulated crisis in one area may be declared as automatically triggering a US strike elsewhere, thus dispersing Soviet forces for defense and changing the calculus of risks for Moscow. US naval presence forces fitted for long range strikes may be structured for enhanced survival. Strike weapons may be distributed among many platforms, requiring the Soviets to surveil above, on, or under the seas. Each US ship, aircraft, or submarine contributes to the survival of platforms operating in different oceanic mediums. The demand on Soviet

surveillance and attack resources to counter this distributed US naval presence can be further aggravated by US cover and deception, avoiding distinctions that differentiate high value striking units from those with lesser capabilities.

In sum, these implications for strategy and force changes are far-reaching. American military force may have alternative means of coping with the combat deficiencies, in isolation, but the crucial element will be reasserting some strategic leverage and flexibility. Armed power can contribute to policies for that purpose, but the first call will be on American will, diplomacy, and domestic and international risk-taking. The post-1985 period will see an America under Soviet pressure on all sides and a beginning of reversing that situation will be a forceful American policy to reattract the cooperation of discouraged and passive allies. Whether there will be time to build and adapt our military forces to the new strategic environment, or to erode Soviet strategic gains, is uncertain.

PGM's and the Maritime Environments of the 1980's

PGM's operate most easily against an uncluttered background. For that reason, they perform best in the air (particularly in air-to-air missions but also in air-to-ground and ground-to-air modes) and are the most difficult to operate on the ground-to-ground mode. The operation of PGM's in various modes at sea falls somewhere in between the air and ground types of operation, perhaps somewhat closer to the air mode of operation.

PGM's in the maritime environment can involve different types of operation: sea-to-sea, sea-to-air, sea-to-shore or vice-versa, air-to-sea and shore-to-sea. For the naval strategist, the most interesting PGM's are perhaps the sea-to-sea (or ship-to-ship) missiles, but all other types of PGM's are no less relevant depending on the area of operation (i.e. close to shore or on the high seas) and on the weapons available to the opponent.

For most purposes, the use of medium and large caliber naval guns has become virtually obsolete against a sophisticated enemy. (Radar guided anti-aircraft rapid-firing guns are still of great value and larger caliber guns are still of some value for sea-to-shore bombardments or against unsophisticated simple targets.)¹ This trend is dictated by the much longer range and greater accuracy of ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore missiles (i.e. PGM's) which clearly out perform naval guns of all types.

The first to appreciate this trend were the Russians who, in the 1950s, were searching for a solution to the U.S. carrier threat and U.S. naval superiority in general. They found such a solution in the development of small, fast torpedo-type boats carrying sea-to-sea missiles that could accurately hit U.S. ships while remaining out of the target's range. These were the Komar and Osa boats carrying the Styx missiles. By

the 1960s, this trend was also independently recognized by the Israelis (developing the Saar and Reshef fast missile boats carrying the Gabriel Mk. I and Mk. II sea-to-sea missiles), the French (with the Excoet missiles), the British, the Italians, the Germans, the Norwegians, and others. Those countries decided to build a new type of fast, small boat designed around the new sea-to-sea missiles. These small ships are difficult to detect and intercept, highly maneuverable, and have an amazing amount of firepower considering their small size. Historically, the most dramatic demonstration of their potential occurred on October 21, 1967, with the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Eilath. This signalled the dawn of a new era of naval warfare - but the first actually extensive use of sea-to-sea missiles which clearly demonstrated the new strategy and tactics of naval warfare was during the Yom Kippur War of 1973.² Engagements took place at very long ranges, involved the use of sophisticated electronic warfare, electronic countermeasures and counter countermeasures.

Usually in the forefront of military technology, the United States lagged behind.³ It focused most of its energy on the development of nuclear submarines, anti-submarine warfare, aircraft carriers and the like, but showed little or no interest in the design of short and medium range ship-to-ship missiles, nor has it so far developed a special ship to carry such missiles on the high seas. By the 1970s the United States designed a relatively long-range sea-to-sea missile (the Harpoon) but has not yet designed any special long-range missile boat and closer range sea-to-sea missiles. The Americans are still lagging behind in this particular area of naval warfare - but this also presents the opportunity to develop new and advanced types of missile-carrying boats while incorporating and learning from the experience of other states.

PGM's have radically changed if not revolutionized naval warfare. Their impact can in modern times only be compared to the rise of air power and its impact on naval warfare. What are some of the new directions resulting from this change?

Large ships such as aircraft carriers have become much more vulnerable to the attack of fast, small missile boats and to shore-to-sea long range missiles. It will thus become difficult (if not impossible) to deploy such ships in close to shore areas or in closed seas like the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf. Sea-to-sea or shore-to-sea missiles such as the U.S. Harpoon (exported for example to Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia) or the Italian Otomat (exported to Lybia, Egypt), the French Exocet (exported to Equador, Oman and fifteen other nations), and the Soviet Styx (deployed by Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Algeria), to mention but a few of the countries deploying such missiles, will make the environment highly unfavorable to the deployment of large aircraft carriers for intervention in any of these areas. If we add to these the ship-to-ship and shore-to-ship PGM's, the proliferation of air-to-sea stand-off missiles and bombs (such as the Maverick sold to Egypt, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia in large quantities, or the German Kormoran) the large aircraft carrier and the task forces around it become highly vulnerable.⁴

In other words, many small states have acquired an extremely effective defensive capability against major U.S. ships. If we add to these PGM weapons the extensive use of mines for example, the small state's hand is further strengthened. The defense of a weak or small state against a superpower has, for the first time, become a possible option. If we compare the price of a fully equipped fast missile boat which is in the range of 20 to 30 million dollars to that of an aircraft carrier - a huge

and difficult target to defend - which is in the order of 5 billion dollars plus - it seems as if the U.S. will now be very careful if not reluctant to deploy its carriers in areas and operations in which they encountered only very few risks as late as the mid-1960s.

PGM's in naval engagements seem to offer more benefits to the defense over the offense, and neutralize to a certain extent the intervention capabilities of the great powers.

What are some of the lessons or implications of these trends for the U.S. in the 1980s?

(1) The U.S. must develop its own fast missile boats to defend and serve as a screen for its larger ships. The United States Navy must also learn to think small.

(2) Most of the ship-to-ship and shore-to-ship type of PGM's that will be massively deployed all over the world by the 1980s are relatively slow flying missiles (Mach 0.7 - 0.9). They can therefore be intercepted (though this is not easy). Countermeasures must include electronic countermeasures (ECM) and electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) including chaff and other decoys as well as anti-missile missiles (such as the British Sea Wolf and the American Seasparrow),⁵ rapid-firing radar-guided anti-aircraft guns and machine guns, and perhaps even the more esoteric anti-missile (anti-PGM) weapons such as laser beam guns. At this stage the ship-to-ship and shore-to-ship missiles seem to be ahead of the countermeasure developed against them; moreover, if appropriate countermeasures are not rapidly developed, they will be obsolete by the time they are to be deployed since new generations of PGM's will have been developed by then.

(3) The U.S. Navy will have to vastly improve its intelligence and knowledge about a large number of small states. It should have complete information on the types, performance, and countermeasures needed for all PGM's in the hands of many small states, on their deployment, on their level of maintenance, on intentions to use them, and the sophistication of their operators (which presumably would often be low). This is by no means an easy task given the proliferation of such weapons, their mobility, and the possibility of easy and rapid transfer from one country to another.

(4) New naval tactics must be developed. For example, in case of a need for intervention by a naval task force, the carriers will have to be kept further away than before, be screened by a higher number of missile boats, anti-aircraft frigates and the like. Troops will have to come in from longer ranges in order to first put the opponent's shore-to-sea and ship-to-ship missiles out of action. Such operations will require excellent intelligence and heavy reliance on a surprise attack. In a sense, land and commando operations will have to clear the way for naval task forces to get closer to shore. Even then, it may be safer to keep the larger ships farther out from the shore. The success of some naval operations may therefore depend on the preliminary success of land operations. (Similarly, for example, the Israeli air force depended on the ground units to clear away some of the SAM batteries in order to regain its maneuverability). The implication of this situation is that, at least in intervention operations or operations in closed seas or close to the shore, naval and land operations become more closely linked than ever before. This may require the navy to develop special commando units to take care of enemy missile batteries and air bases on the shore - as a prerequisite for any successful operation.

NOTES

For some general literature see:

Power at Sea: Adelphi Papers, Nos. 122, 123, 124; London
IISS, 1976.

World Armament and Disarmament 1979 (London: Taylor and
Francis, 1979), Chapter 6, The Expansion of Naval Forces,
pp. 329-389.

General:

U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

Marine Rundschau (German)

Jane's Fighting Ships; Jane's Weapons Systems

International Defense Review

Aviation Week and Space Technology

1. The development of naval Cannon-Launched Guided Projectiles could revive the role of heavier naval guns in close support roles, ship-to-shore bombardments and the like.

2. For an interesting analysis of the naval experience in the Yom Kippur War, see Rear Admiral Benyamin Telem, "Naval Lessons of the Yom Kippur War" in Military Aspects of the Israeli-Arab Conflict (Tel Aviv: University Publishing Projects, 1975), pp. 228-238.

3. The Russians, unlike the United States, have developed and deployed a large variety of sea-to-sea missiles:

SSC-1 Shaddock (coastal defense); SSC-2B Samlet (coastal defense); SS-N-1 Scrubber (ship-launched); SS-N-2A and 2B Styx (ship-to-ship); SS-N-3A Shaddock (sea-launched version); SS-N-7; SS-N-9; SS-N-10; SS-N-11; SS-NX-12; SS-N-14.

4. The U.S. Navy (and other modern navies) have developed sophisticated and relatively effective defensive systems against attacking aircraft. These systems are, however, ineffective against aircraft using long range stand-off missiles or against sea-to-sea missiles. Both the stand-off and sea-to-sea missiles present very small targets which are extremely difficult to detect and intercept.

5. See "Seawolf/GWS25, the Royal Navy's anti-missile missile system" in International Defense Review, May 1976; also "Seasparrow to get anti-missile capability" in International Defense Review, June 1979.

The Geopolitics of Energy

Prior to the outbreak of major political violence in Iran in October 1978, many oil analysts continued to talk about the glut of oil in the international market. The events that transpired in Iran from October to the departure of the Shah in January 1979, however, showed how quickly the stability of the global energy environment could be altered. Before October, Iran had been the world's fourth largest oil producer, averaging six million barrels per day (MMBD) in 1978, and had provided about fifteen percent of non-communist import requirements. Within three months, however, Iranian oil exports plummeted to zero as political disruptions in Iran's oil fields made it impossible for Iran to produce even enough oil (about one MMBD) to meet the country's domestic requirements.

The impact of the Iranian oil crisis would have been much more pronounced in the industrialized world in the early months of 1979 had not two events helped alleviate the short-term effects of the oil shortfall. First, global oil stocks (commercial inventories mainly) were at a record level. In addition to the seasonal buildup that occurs in the fourth quarter of the year, the international oil companies had made additional purchases in anticipation of another price rise being levied at the December 1978 OPEC meeting in Abu Dhabi.

Second, as the magnitude of the crisis became apparent, Saudi Arabia allowed the ARAMCO consortium to raise production to 10.5 MMBD. This was two MMBD above Saudi Arabia's self-imposed average annual production ceiling of 8.5 MMBD, and three MMBD above actual Saudi

production levels prevailing before the curtailment of Iranian production. Saudi efforts to balance global oil supply/demand were aided by Kuwait, Venezuela, and Nigeria, all of which together raised production an additional 900,000-1,000,000 barrels per day. This was the situation that prevailed in the international petroleum market in January 1979.

By late 1978, the international petroleum market was very different from what it had been prior to the 1973-74 OPEC oil embargo. Until the eve of the embargo, United States oil import dependence had been held at reasonable levels, implying that the U.S. would not be a major claimant on world oil in the event of a supply emergency, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. After 1973-74, however, skyrocketing demand in the U.S. and the continued decline of domestic U.S. production raised U.S. oil-import dependence from twenty-three percent in 1973 to almost fifty percent by the end of 1978. During this period, seventy percent of European oil requirements were met by imports; whereas imports accounted for a staggering ninety-nine percent of Japan's oil needs.

Another startling development that had occurred by 1978 was that European and Japanese dependence on crude oil supplies from the Persian Gulf and North Africa had risen to fourteen MMBD, accounting for over eighty percent of their oil imports. In contrast, the U.S. received only thirty percent (three MMBD) of its oil imports from the region. In the European and Japanese view, therefore, both in percent of origin and in volume, their greater dependence on Middle Eastern oil mandated that the U.S. not adopt politico-military policies in the region inimical to Europe's and Japan's vital interests.

By late 1978, medium- (1985-90) to long-term (1999-95) forecasts of global energy supplies, conducted by reputable analysts, varied so

widely that policymakers and the oil consuming public were left confused, frustrated, and suspicious. Nevertheless, most of the differences could be accounted for by the following factors: (1) varying projections of world GNP growth rates; (2) different assumptions about energy demand inelasticities; (3) conflicting forecasts of total oil and gas reserves available, and differences over the future rate of discovery of new reserve additions; (4) a lack of understanding of differences in oil-flow rates (reserve/production ratios) in many oil-producing countries; (5) varying assumptions about the impact of governmental and environmental policies on the timing of energy resource development, and (6) differences over the rapidity of technological innovation leading to enhanced oil recovery.¹

In addition to the differences among forecasters on these economic, regulatory, and technical assessments, by late 1978 there were profound discrepancies in other areas. Some analysts argued that new oil production from Mexico, China, and Indonesia and the exploitation of the heavy and unconventional crudes of Canada and Venezuela could both diminish the power of the OPEC cartel and solve the global energy crisis.

Other differences centered on whether, over time, new claimants might emerge for some share of the oil in world trade. In this regard, several controversial Central Intelligence Agency reports on the Soviet energy sector² raised the specter that Soviet bloc oil exports (one MMBD) to Western Europe might cease and, by 1985, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe might have to purchase as much as 3.5-4.5 MMBD on the international market. Although the CIA assessment was questioned by many, clearly the possibility of the Soviet Union entering the Middle Eastern petroleum market raised profound new geopolitical and economic issues.

There was also a lack of consensus both on whether China, rather than being a major net oil exporter, might not have to begin to import oil,

and what effect Third World oil supply/demand might have on the global energy environment in 1985, 1990, and later.

Finally, and perhaps most important, many assessments revealed a critical lack of understanding of the differences among OPEC 'installed' oil production capacity, 'sustainable' production capacity, and 'current OPEC production levels'. Thus, while installed OPEC productive capacity in October 1978 was around 40.2 MMBD³, maximum sustainable capacity was probably around thirty-six to thirty-eight MMBD and October production was thirty-two MMBD. In October, Iranian production averaged 5.5 MMBD.

Those analysts who saw great excess productive capacity in the system (six to eight MMBD) not only made the cardinal error of believing that a shortfall in one place in the system would necessarily be made up elsewhere, but failed to address the political motivations affecting the production decisions of the major producers, especially Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian Crisis:

The Geopolitical Environment

The Iranian political crisis generated shock waves not only in the industrialized world, which remained vitally dependent on Middle Eastern crude, but also in the countries surrounding the Arabian Gulf.

The Iranian crisis occurred against a background of serious strains in relations between Europe, Japan, and the United States. The litany of contentious issues, arising in the aftermath of the 1973-74 OPEC embargo, is well known:

(1) The refusal of NATO members (except Portugal and briefly Germany) to allow the U.S. to use their territories to resupply Israel during the Arab-Israeli War out of fear of retaliatory cutoffs of oil supplies;

(2) The opposition of some nations, especially France, to follow the U.S. lead to present a united oil-consumer negotiating position in the wake of the OPEC price rises;

(3) The rush by some nations, notably France, Japan, and the European Community, to seek bilateral deals with the Arab oil producers insuring access to oil supplies - possibly to the detriment of other consuming states;

(4) The commencement in June 1975 of a Euro-Arab dialogue without the participation of Japan and the U.S.:

(5) Differences over the best policies to be pursued in the 1975-77 Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris to insure access to oil supplies at reasonable prices;

(6) Suspicions in Europe and Japan over U.S. motivations in seeking a "special relationship" with Saudi Arabia at the exact time that the U.S. was seeking greater cohesion among the industrialized countries in forming the International Energy Agency;

(7) Ongoing differences between Europe and Japan on the one hand and the U.S. on the other over international nuclear policy, and incredulity in Japan and Europe when the U.S. suspended shipments of enriched uranium supplies in June 1974, utilized the offer of nuclear technology as a diplomatic tool in the Egyptian Israeli dispute, indefinitely deferred commercial reprocessing in October 1976, and in April 1977 launched a vigorous campaign against the sale and/or development of sensitive nuclear facilities.

(8) Continuing differences over the proper political politics to be pursued in the Arab-Israeli dispute; and

(9) The failure of the U.S. to adopt an effective energy policy.

While the strain on intra-alliance relations generated by each

of the above varies greatly, in toto they gave the United States' major industrial allies little reason to be sanguine about either the direction of U.S. policy or the degree to which the political and economic interests of Europe and Japan might conflict with President Carter's policies in the strategic, energy, and nonproliferation policy arenas. The United States, on its part, is equally unhappy with policies pursued by its European allies and Japan, and particularly with those of France.

Of all the areas of contention, continued U.S. diplomatic support of Israel and the unwillingness of the United States government to pressure the Begin government on the Palestinian and status of Jerusalem questions cause the greatest concern to the Europeans and Japanese. In their view, the imbalance of oil import dependence between themselves and the United States, U.S. support of Israel and the special relationship between Riyadh and Washington mandate not only that they act to protect their interests but also lead to the possibility that their interests often diverge from those of the United States.

Although many analysts in the United States project that sensational rises in oil production from Mexico and China may equal that of Saudi Arabia, European and Japanese analysts dispute this view and argue that for the remainder of the century the Middle East will remain the critical source of world oil.

By early 1979, the idea of the Middle East continuing as the world's major oil-producing region led to heightened concern about the direction of the Carter Administration's Middle East policy. Alarm was also widespread in Japan, Europe, and Riyadh, over whether the implied U.S. defense commitment to protect Saudi Arabia's vital interests would be honored.

The failure of the U.S. and Egypt to consult Saudi Arabia prior to President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in December 1977; the refusal of

the United States, despite repeated requests by Riyadh, to transfer Saudi-financed arms to Somalia in the wake of the Soviet-Cuban military buildup in Ethiopia in late 1977 and early 1978; the anti-Saudi and pro-Israeli tone of the U.S. Congressional debate on the sale of F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia; the failure of the United States to oppose the April 1978, communist-backed coup in Afghanistan; the lack of any U.S. response to the assassinations of the presidents of North and South Yemen in June 1978, and the attendant drift of the new South Yemeni regime of Abdul Fattah Ismail into the Soviet orbit; and, finally, the burgeoning crisis in Iran, dismayed not only the other industrialized nations but, more importantly, conveyed the impression to the Arab world of a fundamental erosion of U.S. influence in the region. This perception continues to affect profoundly the geopolitics of energy.

As noted, the Iranian political crisis generated alarm, not only in the industrialized world, but also in the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf. Whereas in early 1978, when major disturbances first commenced against the Shah, Riyadh had been thought to be somewhat pleased that troubles at home might impede the buildup of the Shah's vast military arsenal, as the rioting intensified and the degree of opposition to the Shah became apparent, the Saudis became seriously alarmed. This concern was shared by Kuwait and Bahrain.

The United Arab Emirates and Iraq were particularly disturbed by the Ayatollah Khomeini's power over the Shi'ite masses of Iran. Since both countries had sizeable Shi'ite minority populations, even veiled threats of a pan-Shi'ite 'jihad' (holy war) sent shudders through the ruling elites of both countries. Despite the varied concerns of each Gulf state, it was Khomeini's attack on the modernization process itself, and the corruption of fundamental Islamic values arising therein, that generated the un-

easiness throughout the Middle East.

The social and political situations on the Arab side of the Gulf made an exact repetition of the Iranian crisis unlikely. By 1979, however, every nation in the area realized that even vast infusions of petrodollar revenues would not transform their societies over a short period of time. As the Iranian political crisis intensified, every leader in the region began to question whether rapid economic modernization (and hence implied high oil production) was worth the attendant risk of provoking a socio-political explosion.

The Iranian crisis placed the Saudi regime in an extremely delicate position. Already dismayed by American Middle Eastern policies, Riyadh suddenly found itself challenged as the spiritual leader of the fight against Zionism. The visit of Yasir Arafat to Teheran, and the overtly pro-Palestinian policies of the Khomeini regime, made it impossible for Riyadh, in the absence of a solution to the Palestinian and status of Jerusalem problems, to adopt a public policy on the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord favorable to U.S. interests. To have done so would have risked isolation from the Arab world as well as the possible overthrow of the House of Saud by elements in the Saudi royal family who are opposed to the pro-American policies of Prince Fahd.

Nevertheless, despite these problems Saudi Arabia continued to work behind the scenes to defuse the influence of the more radical Arab states. In November 1978, Riyadh used a great deal of political capital in Baghdad to avert a serious breach in relations between Egypt and the rest of the Arab world. In addition, Saudi Arabia, at the Abu Dhabi OPEC meeting in December 1978, the OPEC meetings in March and December 1979 and in May 1980 worked quietly to prevent a move away from the dollar by the OPEC oil producers, as well as attempting to restore some stability to the price of

oil in world trade.

The removal in early 1979 of five MMBD of Iranian oil exports from the international market generated shock waves in the industrialized world. Almost overnight, the estimated three MMBD of world surplus production capacity was eliminated, and worldwide oil reserves began to be drawn down at the rate of two MMBD. Although a tenuous equilibrium was restored by mid-1980, as consumers of oil cut their consumption in response to ever rising oil prices, the geopolitics of energy remain precarious.

While the international petroleum market was under assault, the fall of the Shah of Iran had a profound impact on the Saudi ruling elite. Increasingly, the Saudis wondered if the United States would come to the defense of the Shah, whom only one year earlier President Carter had toasted as representing "an island of stability" in a sea of chaos, and whether the U.S. could be counted on to protect Saudi security.⁴ The dispatching of unarmed jet aircraft (F-15's) to Saudi Arabia, Secretary Brown's request for a U.S. military base in Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.-sponsored role of Egypt as a substitute for Iran left the Saudis bewildered as to the level of U.S. understanding of Middle Eastern political realities.

In the Saudi view, the curtailment of oil production to 9.5 MMBD did not represent a hostile act, but an effort to help the industrialized world meet the oil shortfall from Iran. The Saudi government had been appalled that, after initially raising its production, a policy which may have been opposed by a significant element of the royal family, President Carter made no public effort to acknowledge its decision. Instead, the Saudis found that the President's personal intervention in the Egyptian-Israeli peace impasse placed them in an isolated position. The fact that

they were not informed prior to the initiative intensified Riyadh's disillusionment with the United States.

The geopolitical situation affecting access to oil became more desperate during the summer and fall of 1979. The deteriorating political situation in Iran, the November seizure of the American embassy in Teheran and the December Soviet intervention in Afghanistan led to an ever greater escalation in the price of oil. By the end of 1979 most OPEC crude prices were near \$25-\$30/barrel; six months later much of the oil in world trade hovered closer to \$33-\$35/barrel with further price rises likely.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan added a volatile new element into the geopolitics of the Middle East in that it once again raised the specter of whether the invasion was a prelude to a Soviet move to seize the Persian Gulf oil fields to shore-up its deteriorating energy situation.

The subject of the energy vulnerability of the CMEA countries is extremely controversial and is difficult to treat in a cursory manner. However, several facts should be noted: (1) No European analysts accepts the worst case analysis of CIA, (2) Few European analysts see Soviet oil production falling before 1985, (3) No European observer accepts the original CIA forecast of a net CMEA oil import dependency of 3.5-4.5 MMBD in 1985. Most European observers see a net import dependency of between .5-1 MMBD by that time. This view is predicated on the belief that conservation, interfuel substitution, rising internal energy prices and the development of new energy sources will help offset the rate of decline in the oil reserve base.

However, by 1985, this situation will change dramatically. By

that time, the USSR will no longer be able to export beyond the CMEA countries. The decline in oil exports to Western Europe will cause the Soviets to lose between one-third and one-half of their hard currency earnings with which they have historically financed imports of western technology and grain. While rising oil, gas and gold prices could help alleviate the situation, the Soviets could confront a disastrous situation.

If the Soviets cannot maintain oil production in the 1985-90 period the choice will be between reducing deliveries to Eastern Europe with all the attendant political and economic problems and accepting draconian constraints on their internal oil consumption. If exports to Eastern Europe were curtailed, these countries might need 2.5-3 MMBD by 1980. Lacking hard currency, the CMEA countries probably will not be able to afford them and hence will go into economic stagnation. In such a scenario, the Soviets could experience massive social and political unrest in the satellite countries. It is this future deteriorating position which enhances concern about a Soviet strike against the Gulf oil fields.

Coming at the same time as the Afghani invasion, the November takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, the riots among the Shiite workers in the eastern Aramco oil fields of Saudi Arabia, growing Israeli intransigence on the settlements issue and the deterioration of Iraqi/Iranian political relations threatened to set the Middle East ablaze.

At the same time these momentous events were transpiring in the political arena, events occurring in the commercial energy market also were transforming the terms and conditions government access to oil. As the price of oil skyrocketed during 1979-80, the international oil companies began to see the further erosion of their guaranteed access to crude oil supplies.

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Whereas in 1969, the seven sisters had a near stranglehold on the international oil business, by 1979, these same companies extracted only about 45 percent of OPEC crude, or only about 50% as much in the late 1960s. At the same time, the seven sisters had lost their access to most equity crude and had been reduced almost to the status of mere service contracts. During 1979-80, the big multinational oil companies saw their overwhelming control of the market pass to national oil corporations and large independents. Increasingly more and more oil was diverted to the higher priced spot market. As the medium of exchange increasingly (albeit slowly) became state-to-state sales, the question began to arise as to whether the industry advisory board in the International Energy Agency would have sufficient flexibility to allocate crude oil supplies in the event of a major supply emergency and the activation of the IEA oil-sharing mechanism. The seriousness of the situation was demonstrated by the fact that by late February 1980, it was estimated that over 42 percent of oil in international trade was sold in direct sales, a change of over 3 million barrels per day in one year. Likewise, as the position of the seven sisters was further eroded in the early months of 1980, the major companies further reduced third party sales to protect their own affiliates, thus placing some independent refiners in a desperate financial position.

Despite the perilous situation reigning in the international petroleum market and the geopolitical environment, by early 1980 a "mini glut" of oil reemerged as a result of a softening of demand in the industrialized world in response to high oil prices and the deepening economic recession. Although some noted analysts predicted that the glut would continue there remains great debate over not only the extent of the shortfall that currently exists but also over whether upward pressure on price or nonavailability of crude in sufficient volumes represents the greater threat to the industrialized world.

Recent assessments by Exxon, Royal Dutch Shell, and British Petroleum demonstrate that to date the shortfall in global petroleum supplies has been between two to three MMBD. To the extent that the balance between global oil supply/demand is not redressed by increased production or by continually reduced demand, there will be a continued heavy drawdown of stocks which could cause prices to increase dramatically (\$4-5/barrel) by the fourth quarter of 1980.

The situation confronting the industrialized world is indeed perilous. It is possible that a major crisis can be avoided with the continued goodwill of the surplus oil producers, the implementation of tough conservation measures, and accelerated development of energy resources in the industrialized nations. Nevertheless, there is little reason to be optimistic that prudence will prevail in any sector.

Although Saudi Arabia launched a major initiative to restore price stability in the international petroleum market in late May 1980, its failure demonstrates that there is little reason to be sanguine

The industrialized world especially the United States, can no longer afford to disregard the vital interests of the major oil producers. In this regard, the U.S. special memorandum of agreement with Israel, accompanying the Egyptian-Israeli peace accord and the American failure to press Mr. Begin on the settlements issue during the Prime Minister's spring 1980 visit to Washington, will have important policy repercussions. This latter failure, coming in concert with a little noted U.S. decision not to sell Saudi Arabia additional military equipment requested by the Kingdom makes it more difficult for our friends in the Arab World to protect their and our vital interests. These actions occurring in tandem with renewed U.S. concern about the stability of the Gulf in the wake of the ongoing

crises in Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, give conflicting signals to our friends in the area and convey the impression of a government at best in disarray. Moreover, to the extent that the United States continues to act in a manner seen to be contrary to the vital energy interests of Europe and Japan, our industrial allies will have little choice but to separate themselves from our policies.

In this regard, it is interesting to question whether the early 1980 visit of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing to the Gulf and the recognition of the PLO by the United Kingdom do not haringer a major renewal of the Euro-Arab dialogues. Already the European Economic Community has proposed the establishment of a new institutional mechanism to address issues of common concern.

Likewise, Japanese efforts to link Middle Eastern downstream processing developments with Japanese domestic market demand demonstrate a different approach than that of the United States. The question needs to begin to be addressed as to whether these European and Japanese efforts will be independent or exclusive of the United States.

In the wake of the Iranian crisis, Iraq's role will assume growing importance, not only in OPEC councils, but also in the politico-military evolution of the region. Although Iraq has held down oil production for conservation reasons, it is generally agreed that Iraq has the near-term capability to raise productive capacity to five to six MMBS.

Against the backdrop of the analysis and the events in Iran, how will the Middle Eastern nations best accommodate themselves to social, economic, and political change while meeting the oil needs of the rest of the world? In this regard, the volatility of events in the region, as well as the different perceptions and interests of the oil-producing nations, leaves much room for political miscalculation.

Finally, the prospective energy needs of the Soviet Union loom as one of the most critical unanswered questions about the future. To the extent that the Soviet Union becomes another claimant for Middle Eastern oil during the late 1980s or early 1990s, the geopolitics of energy and the region will be profoundly altered.

FOOTNOTES

1. United States Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Energy: An Uncertain Future, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, December 1978), pp 5-15.
2. Central Intelligence Agency, "Prospects for Soviet Oil Production,"
April 1977.
3. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, (March 12, 1979).
4. Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. 22, No. 21 (March 12, 1979), p 6.
5. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, (February 18, 1980).
6. Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, (February 25, 1980).

LDCS In Trouble: Future Arenas For Conflict

The fact that LDCs are in a period of instability is hardly new. Historically, they have been highly unstable as Table 17, Chapter 4 previously illustrated. What is different about the current period is their increasing capability and willingness to act as a counterweight to any involvement by the West in any arena of the Third World. This increasingly sophisticated capability coincides with an era of economic weakness and diminished military capability in the West. At the same time, the problems of the Third World appear to be intractable. Juxtaposed with political and economic problems among the developing world, the Soviet Union today has an unique opportunity to dislodge from the Western sphere of influence some of the developing countries which have been the West's strongest allies.

It would be convenient if we could easily determine those developing countries most likely to reach the critical mass at which economic problems become political disasters. However, the variables are too numerous for us to construct such a calculus so easily.

Despite numerous attempts in the past at developing highly sophisticated computer models, no method yet exists for successfully predicting instability. Neither does there exist a satisfactory model for relating economic developments to social instability. Indeed, the argument can be made, and has, that violence is not dysfunctional to social stability. Hannah Arendt in the classic On Revolution attributed the most violent form of revolution to poverty while other studies indicate that the poor are the least likely to revolt because they lack the energy to do so.

Many studies have taken the view that aggression follows frustration. The key to violence is therefore among those whose position in the social order is changing either upwardly or downwardly. Both the gainers and losers from economic growth can be destabilizing forces. Economic growth does not mean that everyone gains equally, especially in developing countries where the gains from growth are disproportionately held by a few.¹

Not enough studies have been made of income distribution, partly because of the sensitive nature of such work, to determine adequately the relationship between the distribution of wealth within a society and social unrest. However, there are some general indications that low rates of growth, coupled with high inflation, and an inadequate distribution of wealth, lead to violent social upheavals.² A survey of the present conditions in three states of specific interest to the United States for reasons of national security indicates that these three countries, the Philippines, Turkey and Zaire, may soon reach that critical mass of revolution.

Each of these countries despite its disparate location and differing level of development shares certain characteristics of vital importance to its stability. These shared characteristics include low growth rates, high rates of inflation, substantial poverty, inadequate distribution of wealth, continuing and blatant corruption with the government, and communal conflict, including armed and organized revolutionary groups. A brief review of the critical statistics illustrates their problems:

	Low Income Zaire	Middle Income Philippines	High Income Turkey
1. Level of Development			
A. GNP per capita US \$ 1977	130	450	1,100
B. Average Annual Growth (%) 1960-1977	1.1	2.5	2.1
2. Inflation Rates (Average Annual Rate)			
A. (%) 1960-1970	29.9	5.8	5.5
B. (%) 1970-1977	22.4	14.3	19.9
3. Poverty Levels			
A. Daily Per Capita Calorie Supply (as a % of requirement)			
1974	85	87	113
B. Percentage Share of Income Held by Lowest 20%	...	3.7	3.4
4. Source of Communal Conflict	Katangese	Muslims, Communists	Kurds, Armenians

In the next few pages a more detailed analysis of these countries' problems will be made which will include their relationship to United States national security needs. The economic situation in all three has significantly deteriorated since the 1973-1974 oil price hikes and despite action by the international economic community, the situation continues to move toward total economic collapse. All three countries are facing armed revolts from ethnic groups fighting for independence. All three countries face internal dissension concerning their forms of government. All three countries serve vital U.S. interests. These problems, economic and political factors, and relationship to the U.S. will be reviewed in that order.

Economic Situation

Each state is facing high rates of inflation, high rates of unemployment, growing balance-of-payments deficits and foreign indebtedness, and low growth rates. Recently, each country has had to accept International Monetary Fund conditions - some of them highly onerous - in order to

obtain aid. Each state has had to implement equally onerous economic policies which have had little effect on their deteriorating economic situation while on the contrary contributing to public dissatisfaction with the government. The success of these policies may be limited by the growing internal unrest in each country.

In recent years the Philippines has failed to reach its target growth rates of 7.5%. In 1978 the rate was 6.3%, in 1979 5.8% and estimates for 1980 put it around 6%.³ The real economic growth of the country is not much different from the 1950's and 1960's despite the claims of the present government for impressive development. Average annual growth rates for Turkey and Zaire from 1960-1977 were equally small, 2.1% for Turkey and 1.1% for Zaire. However, figures for these countries often understate the depths of the problem. Inflation is probably a better indicator of the direction of the economy than aggregate growth figures.

Inflation in the Philippines is projected at 20% for 1980.⁴ The average rate of inflation based on the consumer price index figures for the first six months of 1980 was 20.2% per annum. The rate was 12.9% in 1979.⁵ Inflation in Zaire was 105% in 1979⁶ and may reach 200% in 1980.⁷ In Turkey consumer prices rose by 80% in 1979⁸ and inflation may be nearly 100% in 1980.⁹ With inflation rising at astronomical rates for all these countries, unemployment is also growing.

Unemployment figures are not available for the Philippines. Because of the extended family system, it is difficult to determine actual unemployment in the country. However, unemployment has been estimated for Zaire at 50% in 1980,¹⁰ 20% in Turkey.¹¹ The failure to grow and the consequent unemployment guarantees that the problem of unequal distribution of resources will remain in each country. Figures for Zaire have

never been estimated but the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko's personal fortune has been estimated at more than \$3 billion¹² while the annual per capita income of the rest of the country is \$117.¹³ In the Philippines the top 20% of the country control 53.9% of the household income. The comparable figure in Turkey is 56.5%. In addition in Turkey, 9% of the country control 40% of the wealth.¹⁴ These conditions of inequality, coupled with a failure to develop in any direction, can only contribute to what must be interpreted as a pre-revolutionary situation in each of these countries. A quotation by a Turkish industrialist is equally applicable to the Philippines: "The middle class is being crushed by inflation, the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer and that's why I fear we are going to have a revolution in Turkey."¹⁵

In order to overcome their problems, each of these countries have recently imposed a program of economic reform. In the Philippines credit was tightened, wages adjusted upwards, price controls were lifted, energy prices were permitted to float, and interest rate ceilings were raised. This program has reduced business profit margins, especially in the vital manufacturing sector.¹⁶ As a result, latest predictions see the current Philippine recession lasting into 1981.¹⁷ As a condition for receiving a loan from the I.M.F., Turkey was required to substantially reduce subsidies for state-owned businesses, reduce public spending and bank lending to the private sector, devalue their currency by 22% (the second devaluation within twelve months), remove their interest rate ceilings, and to place limits on their foreign debt.¹⁸

State-run businesses are extremely inefficient with one-half of the government's budget going to cover their deficits. For example, the state-run airlines employs 8,000 people but has only 14 planes.¹⁹ Turks have not traditionally been known as businessmen but rather as diplomats,

warriors, and administrators. The business of the Ottoman Empire was left to Armenians and Greeks. The Turkist bureaucracy is one of the reasons for the economic problems. Every new political leader brings in vast numbers of new bureaucrats so policy continuity is lacking. Zaire has also had to impose economic measures as a result of I.M.F. pressure. Indeed, I.M.F. members were seconded to the Ministry of Finance basically to make policy but with limited success. Zaire has substantial resources. It has a wealth of diamonds, copper, and cobalt. It could be a net food exporter, feeding the rest of Africa.²⁰ But 34% of all its children die of protein deficiency before they are five.²¹ Because of a failure to develop and maintain its economic infrastructure, the road network, necessary for developing these resources, has been reduced from 87,000 miles during its years as a Belgian colony to the current 12,400 miles.²² Most of the rich mineral resources are being smuggled out of the country, often with the connivance of top officials in the government. A Belgian custom team was introduced in early 1980 to reduce the smuggling activity but their success has been minimal. An I.M.F. team brought in in 1978 to control finances and supervise outflows has also been unable to stymie the flow.²³ In January 1980 thirteen cabinet members were forced out of government and in February 1980 the currency was devalued by 30%. But Zaire is basically a country being raped and pillaged by a few of its own citizens. Measures imposed by the outside to encourage economic reform will have no success without radical changes in the country's ruling elite.

Efforts to implement economic policies to restrain economic disintegration have floundered in part because of external forces and in part because of government inadequacy. The most prominent and uncon-

trollable external force has been high oil prices, but there have been other forces as well. In Zaire, the staple crop, the manioc root, was attacked by a blight, the manioc mosaic disease, during 1978-1979. The Philippines has been hit by low world prices for one of its major exports, coconuts. However, higher prices for oil imports remain one of the major impediments to development. None of these countries has been able to develop large amounts of indigenous oil resources and energy imports account for a sizeable portion of their imports.

In 1960 energy accounted for only 16% of the merchandise export earnings of Turkey but by 1976 energy's share was 58%; the comparable numbers for Zaire are 3% in 1960 and 16% in 1976. In the Philippines in 1979 one-third of all export earnings went to finance fuel imports. With an ambitious and probably unrealistic energy program, the Philippines hope to reduce that figure to 45% by 1989. In 1960 fuel accounted for 10% of the Philippines' merchandise imports but by 1976 this figure had increased to 24%. In 1980 Turkey almost ground to a halt because of an inability to finance oil imports. Factories were working at one-half capacity.²⁴ Zaire has 13% of the world's hydroelectric potential but blackouts occur frequently. Oil import dependency and the consequent drain on balance of payments remains the most enduring source for all three of these countries problems in the economic sphere. The recent increase in oil prices at the OPEC June meeting portends only further difficulties. For the Philippines alone the 1979 oil import bill was 1.6\$ billion.²⁵ Despite major efforts, the country has not yet discovered substantial reserves of oil.²⁶ In Turkey the trade deficit for 1980 is estimated at 3.75\$ billion with a current account deficit of \$2.2 billion. To support what little growth is

occurring, these countries have had to turn to substantial borrowing on international capital markets. This borrowing has gone mainly to purchase oil as well as the capital equipment needed to develop manufacturing and agricultural development.

There has been concern in many of these countries that a reduction in foreign borrowing will encourage political unrest by aggravating the economic instability currently existing. This is especially true in the Philippines where foreign borrowing has increased greatly under the Marcos Martial Law regime.²⁷ The Philippines' balance of payments deficit for the first half of 1980 was \$282 million.²⁸ The country has been relying on high rates of foreign borrowing, now at about 5% of its GNP, to prevent the recession from worsening. By the end of 1979, the Philippines' external debt was almost \$10 billion.²⁹ The situation is much worse in Turkey where 45% of its export earnings is spent on servicing foreign debt. By 1982 the figure may go to 65%. Oil imports are expected to cost in 1980 between 3.5\$ to 4.5\$ billion.³⁰ These imports are absolutely essential. Turkey receives 85% of its energy needs from imported oil. Turkey has recently obtained a loan from the I.M.F. totalling \$1.6 billion, the largest loan in the organization's history,³¹ but there is still some doubt as to whether this will permit the country to overcome its economic problems or will only provide temporary relief. This three-year loan was complemented by a loan provided by the OECD countries to Turkey in April of \$1.2 billion. This makes Turkey the largest aid recipient in the world.³² Zaire, too, has been forced to go to the I.M.F. for aid as well as to its commercial lenders, requesting additional funds and rescheduling of old debt. Recently, Zaire rescheduled \$400 million owed to 130 commercial banks.³³ The country's total debt is now estimated

at \$4 billion.

Each of these countries has found it almost impossible develop the type of economic policy which might assist them out of their present difficulties. The minority government of Turkish Premier Suleyman Demirel has announced new policies but these austerity plans take time to work and in the interim unemployment rises as well as the prices for basic commodities. There are indications that his government will be replaced in the next elections if the military does not step in sooner. The situation is much the same in the Philippines where there is no lack of intelligent economic planners, but popular dissatisfaction with President Marcos's regime is rising as the prices of basic commodities rise there also. In Zaire there is a complete lack of planning. Mobutu Sese Seko's government is completely corrupt and incapable of governing. Another invasion by the Katangese into Shaba Province, as they did in 1977 and 1978, might provide sufficient catalyst to overthrow Mobutu. The situation in all three countries is now at a crisis level. What all three need is a catalyst for revolution.

Political Situation

In each of these three countries the political situation is also unstable. Turkey has been under partial martial law rule (20 out of 67 provinces) since late 1978. Over 2,000 people have been killed in 1980 alone as a result of conflicts between leftist and rightist factions. The Philippines has been under martial law rule since September 1972 and has had to face a growing Communist movement as well as Muslim secessionists in the southern part of the country. Zaire has been a dictatorship since Mobutu, then chief of the National Army, staged a coupe in November 1965. One of the current myths of development is that authoritarian regimes are

good for development, while the situation is arguable with Turkey which is a democracy, the other two cases appear to put the lie to this myth.

Marcos's control over the Philippines appears to be weakening.³⁴ His hold on the country appears to be due to his control of the military and his adept ability to keep the opposition fragmented.³⁵ But he faces enemies everywhere. Two armed rebellions are growing in intensity. They are both of long-standing but have gathered renewed strength since 1972. The first is the Muslim secessionist movement in the south. It is currently tying down 80% of the Philippine combat troops in a fruitless guerrilla war which neither side can win. The Muslims appear to be uniting under one military command. While this will not provide them with victory, it will guarantee the continuation of the conflict against the less-than-effective Philippine troops. At the same time, the spiritual descendants of the 1950's Huk Movement, the New People's Army, with its political arm, the National Democratic Front (NDF), is becoming more powerful. Some estimate that the NPA has almost doubled in strength from the 2,600 in 1979.³⁶ As disenchantment with Marcos grows, especially among the middle class in Manila, recruitment to the NPA increases also. Conflict between the army and the various rebel elements which spills over into the civilian community has helped to radicalize the Catholic Church. The Church in the Philippines is divided among several groups but the moderate element appears to be becoming more radicalized as the Army reacts to its inability to cope with guerrilla movements by terrorizing settlements. The head of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, Cardinal Jaime Sin, has stated that some acts of civil disobedience could be sanctioned as a result of the military's activities.³⁷ While to date, most of fighting has occurred in rural areas, urban conflict is also on the rise. A movement called "Light A Fire" was recently active in MetroManila, setting fires to luxury hotels.

For the first time since martial law was declared, private arms are becoming a problem. In 1972 Marcos enforced a law confiscating all private weapons but now weapons are seeping back into the civilian sector.³⁸ Student groups are also becoming more active. On July 29, 1980, 10,000 students in Manila staged the largest demonstration since martial law was declared, exploding several homemade bombs.³⁹ Marcos's rule of the Philippines is being likened to that of the Shah with similar consequences for his departure.⁴⁰

While Premier Suleyman Demirel does not suffer the same taint of dictatorship as President Marcos of the Philippines, political stability in Turkey is equally precarious as the country is torn by political factionalism fueled by hatred and violence from both the left and the right. Like Iran however and the Philippines, the internal stability of Turkey is a vital issue for United States national security. If the continued conflict in Turkey cannot be resolved, U.S. bases in that area may be jeopardized anew. The political conflict in Turkey has raised the basic issue of whether or not an effective government in that country can ever be established as all the factions in the country share ideological differences concerning its governance. Foremost is the need to establish a consensus on economic policy.⁴¹ While it is too early to determine yet, this may be being done as the two major political opponents, the present premier and the former premier, Bulent Ecevit, recently met on neutral ground to seek a means to cooperate.⁴² The military is having difficulty in maintaining law and order, even in those provinces under its martial law jurisdiction, in part because of antiquated nature of its equipment. The Chief of the General Staff, General Kenan Evren, has called for more military powers for martial law commanders as well as tougher sanctions

against terrorists.⁴³ But the military's effectiveness has also been cut by being spread out over too wide an area. In addition to terrorists, the military must restrain two separatist movements, the approximately 7 million Kurds in Eastern Turkey along the border with Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and the 60,000 Armenians that have been mounting attacks, especially abroad against Turkist diplomats and their families.⁴⁴ While the Armenians do not pose a direct internal threat yet, the potential is there. Police effectiveness has also been damaged with the police departments being split along the factional lines of the political parties. The military thus provides the basic glue to hold the country together without some accommodation in the political arena.

In contrast to the Philippines and Turkey, Zaire is basically a feudal kingdom. Mobutu rules through intimidation and reward, turning a blind eye to the corruption of his bureaucracy and his army in return for their support.⁴⁵ They in turn intimidate the masses. The military remains the dominant political force in the country but even their control is limited because of the diverse geographical nature of the country. These areas may not come under central control for decades according to one estimation.⁴⁶

There are over 200 distinct tribal groups in Zaire dominated by the Bantus. Few of these groups feel any allegiance to the central authority despite Mobutu's efforts to establish a sense of national identity with his Zairois program. Mobutu's essential political style is the "personalization of authority,"⁴⁷ polite terminology for dictatorship. Because of this, there is little institutionalization of power. Decisions are made on an ad hoc basis with Mobutu providing no clear direction for policy other than self-aggrandizement.

Opposition to Mobutu's rule centers on the Katangese forces which invaded Shaba Province in 1977 and 1978, only to be driven back into Angola by Western backed troops, and opposition groups based abroad. Because of the vital nature of the mines in Shaba, another invasion by the Katangese would probably invoke a similar response as in the past by the West. The opposition groups abroad are splintered and lack the strength of resources and personnel to affect change in Zaire. However, the worsening economic situation is bringing increased cooperation among disaffected groups within the country. Students have been on strike since April and in October expect to renew their activities with the cooperation of a joint strike with the 32,000 miners in Kolwezi, Shaba.⁴⁸ Still without pressure from the West or assistance from the Soviets, it is difficult to see how Mobutu can be driven from power. In the past he has proven himself to be a ruthless exterminator of any opposition. The situation in all three countries is therefore ripe for violent change. While seemingly poised at the edge of the crevasse now, each situation appears to demand some catalyst in order to be pushed over into the fissure. In all three countries the Soviets are now placed in an excellent position to exploit such instability and if necessary to provide the deciding nudge. Each country, though, is of a vital national security interest to the United States. In the next section, U.S. interest in these countries will be examined and the possible role of the Soviets considered.

The Philippines has long been of vital interest to U.S. power in the Pacific. U.S. bases in the Philippines are extensive, as the summary list below suggests. Their mission has gained added importance as the U.S. has readjusted its forces to cope with conflict in the Middle East. As Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of state, has stated: "Without

bases in the Western Pacific and more importantly, without the friendship, close ties and security relationships we maintain in Asia, our ability to support American interests in the Indian Ocean would be significantly limited."⁴⁹ Subic Bay Naval Base is of special importance to providing additional support to the U.S. base at Diego Garcia.⁵⁰

United States Bases in The Philippines

1. Subic Bay Naval Base
 - A. Naval Station (Port Olongapo)
 - B. Naval Air Station (Cubi Point)
 - C. Naval Magazine (Camayan Point)
2. Clark Air Base, Angelo City
3. Naval Communications Station, San Miguel

The Subic Bay Naval Base contains a total POL storage capacity of 111.68 million gallons but more importantly contains four floating dry docks which can repair all major combat ships except aircraft carriers. Clark Air Base has a POL storage capacity of 25 million gallons and its runways are of sufficient size to permit any type U.S. aircraft to land. The Naval Communications Station has equipment with a range of 1,500 miles.

United States Military Personnel in the Philippines

Army	28
Air Force	8,005
Navy	4,594
Marine Corps	786
Total	13,413

The mission of these U.S. installations is three-fold: First, they are to support U.S. forces in Northeast Asia. From the perspective of Japan, they have the vital role of protecting Japan's sea-lanes of communication through the Southeast Asian straits. Second, they have the mission of supporting operations in the West Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Third, they are to support operations during a Middle East crisis. In addition, the Subic Bay base performs 60% of all the U.S. 7th

Fleet's repair work. In terms of the Middle East, our bases in the Philippines provide the closest local from the Pacific for insertion of a carrier task force. It takes a CTF thirteen days, steaming at 15 knots, to reach the Arabian Peninsula while comparable times from Australia take several days longer.⁵¹

PHILIPPINES


U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS (Millions US \$)

	1962-75	1976	1977	1978
Economic Assistance-Total	646.7	75.7	86.8	83.9
Loans	258.4	47.0	32.2	54.3
Grants	388.3	28.7	54.6	29.6
Military Assistance-Total	367.8	27.1	38.1	37.3
Loans	22.6	--	20.0	18.5
Grants	345.2	27.1	18.1	18.8
Total, Economic & Military	1014.5	102.8	124.9	121.2
Loans	281.0	47.0	52.2	72.8
Grants	733.5	55.8	72.7	48.4

SOURCE: U.S. Agency For International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans And Grants And Assistance From International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1978, Washington, D.C. 1979, p. 79.

United States military and economic aid to the Philippines has been substantial. Since 1962, over 13 billion dollars has been provided to the Philippines in total aid. In 1979, a new bases agreement was signed which gives the U.S. access to its bases for five years before the agreement is renegotiated. During that period, 500 million dollars is to be provided in military assistance: \$50 million for the military assistance program, \$250 million as foreign military sales credits, and \$200 million as security supporting assistance.⁵² These amounts give some indication of the importance of the bases to U.S. security interests in the Pacific.

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES



Source: The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 1979, p. 148

U.S. interests in Turkey are of equal importance to our bases in the Philippines.⁵³ With the increase in uncertainty in Iran, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Saudi Arabia, Turkey has become an even more important base for U.S. forces in the Mediterranean. Turkey is also the only Moslem member of NATO. Our bases in Turkey are extensive with a variety of missions, the most important being intelligence collection, primarily aimed at obtaining information on Soviet nuclear missile developments. The mission of these bases are five-fold: (1) intelligence collecting posts, (2) air fields for tactical fighter aircraft, (3) defense communication stations, (4) supply and ammunition depots for U.S. air and naval units, and (5) 14 NADGE early-warning radar sites as part of NATO's defense.⁵⁴

United States Military Bases in Turkey

1. Incirlik Air Base (capable of tactical nuclear strikes)
2. Iskenderun and Yumurtalik storage depots
3. Kargabarun - U.S. Navy LORAN Station
4. Ankara - site of an air station and logistics group
5. Izmir - air support base and headquarters of NATO's Land-Southeast command and 6th Allied Tactical Air Force
6. Cigli: USAFE tactical air base

Of these bases however, our intelligence facilities in Turkey are of the most critical importance. Because of its geography, Turkey provides an excellent locale for tracking Soviet MIRV testing of the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs from the Soviet range in Tyuratam. In the past, 25% of the United States' hard intelligence information on Soviet missile launches has come from Turkey.⁵⁵ These facilities have several functions:

Functions of U.S. Intelligence Facilities in Turkey

1. collect data on Soviet air and naval activities in the Black Sea and missile testing (Sinop & Samsun)
2. track Soviet naval traffic in the western Black Sea and straits (Karamursel)

3. seismographic detection base for monitoring nuclear tests (Belbasi Station)
4. track Soviet military activities (Diyarbakir Air Station and Pirinclik Air Base)
5. several U.S. Defense Communication Systems (DCS) terminals and fourteen NATO NADGE early warning sites.⁵⁶

U.S. access to these bases has been jeopardized following Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974. In 1975 the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo on Turkey and in retaliation Turkey closed twenty-six U.S. bases. In 1978 the embargo was lifted but not until January 1980 was a five-year defense cooperation agreement signed between the two countries allowing U.S. continued access. However, Turkey continues to refuse to allow the U.S. to use the bases for U-2 reconnaissance flights such flights are needed to verify the SALT II Treaty.

TURKEY

U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS (Millions U.S. Dollars)

	1962-75	1976	1977	1978
Economic Assistance-Total	1,488.9	--	0.2	1.2
Loans	1,122.7	--	--	0.4
Grants	366.2	--	0.2	0.8
Military Assistance-Total	2,485.9	--	125.0	175.4
Loans	185.0	--	125.0	175.0
Grants	2,300.9	--	--	0.4
Total, Economic and Military	3,974.8	--	125.2	176.6
Loans	1,307.7	--	125.0	175.4
Grants	2,667.1	--	0.2	1.2

SOURCE: U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1978, Washington, D.C. 1979, p. 29.

In addition Turkey's invasion of Cyprus caused Greece to withdraw from NATO. Current fears are that in the event of a Persian Gulf conflict, it

will be difficult to develop a coherent NATO defense as a result of disagreements between Turkey and Greece. Turkey could veto Greece's return to NATO's ranks and Turkey does not appear to want Greece to return with the same responsibilities for securing the air and sea space around the Aegean Sea which Turkey has now assumed.⁵⁷

United States Military Personnel in Turkey


Army	1,080
Air Force	3,463
Navy	22
Marine Corps	19
Total	4,584

In the last few years, U.S. economic assistance to Turkey has been limited, totalling 1.2\$ million in 1978. Military assistance has been more substantial, \$175 million in 1978, but most of that has been loans rather than outright grants.

The Turkish military's equipment is basically of World War II vintage and there is a belief among some Turkish leaders that Turkish support for NATO has contributed to the country's economic decline by sapping vital resources out of the country.⁵⁸ An increase in military aid is planned from NATO. West Germany is planning on providing 200 Leopard tanks and several F-104 Starfighters.⁵⁹ Continued support for Turkey is obviously of vital interest to the United States and a major reason for the recent package of economic assistance provided by the I.M.F. and O.E.C.D.

Zaire is a more dubious case of vital U.S. national security interest. Certainly it provides supplies of minerals, especially cobalt, but U.S. involvement as an ally of Zaire's resulted less from a perception of an intrinsic security interest and more from a desire to deny it from the Soviet sphere of interest. The United States has long been identified with the death of Patrice Lumumba, the country's first premier, in 1961.

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES



Source: The Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., April 1979, p. 148

Because of Lumumba's Marxist leanings, it has been suggested that the CIA engineered his death. The CIA was involved in an abortive plot to kill Lumumba and did have ties to the people that subsequently succeeded in so doing.⁶⁰ Zaire also played an important part in Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's maneuvers against the Soviets during the 1975-1976 Angolan crisis.

ZAIRE				
U.S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS				
(Millions U.S. Dollars)				
	1976	1977	1978	1962-78
Economic Assistance -Total	28.7	45.7	31.7	499.7
Loans	22.4	39.3	23.4	242.5
Grants	6.3	6.4	8.3	247.2
Military Assistance -Total	19.4	30.4	19.5	140.3
Loans	19.0	28.0	17.5	102.9
Grants	0.4	2.4	2.0	37.4
Total, Economic and Military	48.1	76.1	51.2	640.0
Loans	41.4	67.3	40.9	355.4
Grants	6.7	8.8	10.3	284.6

SOURCE: U.S. Agency For International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance From International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1978, Wash.DC, 1979, p. 135.

As a result, the U.S. expanded its military assistance to Zaire. In 1977 such aid totalled 30.4 million dollars. Under the Carter Administration, aid has declined.⁶¹ There have been several scandals associated with what aid has been given. For example, \$1.3 million from the U.S. Food For Peace Program was diverted to associates of Mobutu and C-130 airplanes given as military assistance have been used on a regularly scheduled basis to smuggle goods out of the country.⁶² The United States does not maintain any bases in the country. Unfortunately, much of the U.S. support for Zaire comes from the misperception that it is a pro-West state when in fact it is a Mobutu monopoly. The neighboring country of Congo, Brazzaville, which was the first African Marxist state, established in 1963, is in fact a strong supporter of capitalism and encourages foreign investment.⁶³ That is not however an argument for the U.S. abandoning

Zaire but for an understanding that if the U.S. wants to strengthen Zaire against a communist takeover, it will have to consider an active involvement in replacing Mobutu with a different leader and a different form of government.

There is ample opportunity in all of these states for Soviet adventurism. The Soviets have been active in quietly wooing the Turks away from the Western umbrella. They are now Turkey's sixth largest customer. In the 1970's they provided Turkey with \$1 billion in project credits and in June 1979 signed agreements totalling \$4 billion, including provisions for one to two nuclear power plants. Turkey shares a border with Russia and depends on Russia for electricity and oil. In 1979, 10% of Turkey's oil came from the Soviet Union. A joint project is now underway to construct a dam on the Arpacay River for hydroelectricity.⁶⁴ Soviet policy toward Turkey is to show the Turks they need not fear Soviet domination.⁶⁵ Still, Bulgarian weapons have figured prominently in terrorist attacks.

While the Soviets have not yet supplanted the United States as the Philippines' largest trading partner, they have been quietly make inroads here also since diplomatic relations were established in the late 1970's. They have offered to provide the Philippines with arms should the United States falter and even offered a nuclear power plant in 1978. By maintaining a low profile, they have managed to build up a wide base of support among the previous hostile public.

While an active communist insurgency movement is underway in the Philippines, the Russians have been careful not to show direct support. The growing involvement of the Soviet navy in the South China Sea provides a strong base from which they could easily intervene should the opportunity

arise, and Soviet merchant vessels now operate regularly out of Philippine ports. Recently, the Soviets were accused of violating Philippine airspace with four TU 95 Bears (they were intercepted by U.S. planes from Clark Air Base).⁶⁶ Such flights provide a subtle reminder that the U.S. Navy and Air Force are not the only military forces in the area.

A more difficult situation for Soviet involvement exists in Zaire. Although the Soviets and the Cubans are in strength in the neighboring country of Angola, Western resolve to intervene directly with their own military in Zaire would probably restrain a more active Soviet involvement. However, should the country fragment under the pressures of social unrest, the Soviets and the Cubans would be in a strong position to provide support for separatist movements, as they have in the past with the Katangese, and in the event of a protracted internal conflict intervene directly.

NOTES

1. See Mancur Olson, Jr., "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force," in James C. Davies, ed., Why Men Revolt, New York: The Free Press, c. 1971, p. 219.
2. "As a group experiences a worsening of its conditions of life, it will become increasingly dissatisfied until it eventually rebels." James C. Davies, "Toward A Theory Of Revolution," American Sociological Review, v. 27, February 1962, p. 6.
3. Times Journal (Manila) December 26, 1979, p. 6.
4. See E.S. Browning, "Philippines' Recession Likely To Be Long, Economist Says," Asian Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1980, p. 1.
5. See Asian Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1980, p. 3.
6. Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1980, p. 34.
7. New York Times, "Mobutu's Rule Seen As Growing Shaky," May 23, 1980, p. 4.
8. David Tonge, "Heavy involvement leaves lenders little choice," Financial Times, (London) February 18, 1980, p. x.
9. Marvine Howe, "Turks' War on Terrorism Is Bogged Down in Politics," New York Times, July 30, 1980, p. A2.
10. New York Times, May 23, 1980, p. 4.
11. Howe, Ibid., New York Times, July 30, 1980, p. A2.
12. Pranay B. Gupte, "Mobutu's Rule Seen As Growing Shaky," New York Times, May 23, 1980, p. 4.
13. Jonathan Kwitny, "Poverty Stressed by Wealth of a Few," Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1980, p. 27.
14. Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1980, p. 8.
15. Dusko Doder, "Turkey Slips Toward Anarchy," Washington Post, February 6, 1980, p. A13.
16. J.P. Estanislao, "Some 'Relevant' Facts About The Philippine Economy," Asian Wall Street Journal, April 22, 1980.
17. Browning, Ibid., Asian Wall Street Journal, July 19, 1980, p. 1.
18. "I.M.F. Grants Turkey Record \$1.6 Billion Loan," New York Times, June 19, 1980, p. D-1.

19. Doder, Ibid., Washington Post, February 10, 1980, p. 1.
20. Jonathan Kwitny, "Zaire's Rich Soil Feeds Few Because Farming, Roads Are Primitive," Wall Street Journal, June 26, 1980, p.1.
21. Jonathan Kwitny, "Poverty Stressed by Wealth of a Few," Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1980, p. 27.
22. Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1980, p. 34.
23. Wall Street Journal, June 25, 1980, p. 16.
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25. Bulletin Today (Manila), December 3, 1979, p. 21.
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The Marines, Their Role and Structure

I Introduction

Marine Corps structure, weaponry, and most significantly, Corps ~~missions~~ - have been the subject of a number of analytical treatises in the ~~last~~ half decade. The nature of this analysis is substantially different ~~from~~ that seen during the armed forces unification fight of the late 1940s. ~~Today's~~ critics by and large are not out to "get" the Corps, for they ~~under~~stand its long proven value as a dependable, ready, superior fighting ~~force~~. They are, for the most part, exhibiting a genuine concern that the ~~Corps~~ adapt itself to the emerging demands of national security.

Understanding of the Corps is not always as clear as the Marines would ~~like~~ it to be. On the other hand, the problems are neither as definable nor as ~~tractable~~ as the Marines sometimes think they are. Money, technology, ~~manpower~~ quality and availability, national priorities, NATO and Third ~~World~~ politics, Russian aggression, and geography all serve to complicate ~~defining~~ the mission and the structure of the Corps.

We are not advocates of matching our antagonist unit for unit, or ~~weapon~~ for weapon. But it should be noted that the Soviets have followed a fairly steady growth pattern in their development of forces designed for projection beyond seas. It seems more than probable that something like a Marine Amphibious Force can be deployed by the Russians by the mid-80s. Nearly two dozen LST's (Tank Landing Ships) are now in their fleet. An LPD has entered the force, the Ivan Rogov, with the surety of more to come. In addition to growth in amphibious shipping and in the development of high speed, aircushion landing craft (of which there are about 40 now), there is interest in larger caliber naval guns, and in the use of aircraft aboard Kiev class carriers, both of which can provide support for projection

forces. As an adjunct of their amphibious fleet, the Russians are fully capable of using merchant marine bottoms to lift additional troop units and provide logistic support, and, in the next few years, we can expect an increase in the type of merchant shipping more suitable to the transport of combat troops.

There are more issues than this chapter can possibly address, and none that it can solve. Certainly a starting point is to look at the Corps of today and to see how it fits the design of Congress. The House Armed Services Committee reported the following during the 82nd Congress:

"... The National Security Act of 1947 (The Unification Act) provides that it is the responsibility of the Army to prepare land forces for the effective prosecution of war, and that the Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the Air Forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war. The purpose of insuring a ready Marine Corps of four combat divisions and four air wings is not to provide either the land forces or the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war. Rather, its purpose is to provide a balanced force in readiness for a naval campaign and, at the same time, a ground and air striking force ready to suppress or contain international disturbances short of large scale war. The committee feels that, far from being duplicative or competitive, such a force would better enable the Army and Air Force to concentrate on their major responsibility of preparing for all-out war..."¹

The wisdom of Congress, as evidenced in this paragraph, was never clearer than today as we look out across a world so full of those "international disturbances." The 1980 Marine Corps is a product of that thinking, and although there is room for change, the Corps is an effective force that can provide the President a range of options in projecting power beyond the seas. Furthermore, when a Marine force is assembled to do a particular task, it does not bring together strangers, as can be the case in joint task forces. Instead, it brings together those who know and are practiced in a system of conducting lethal business, requiring an extraordinary degree of coordination.

The active Corps today consists of three divisions and three aircraft wings; the Reserves account for another division and wing. The active forces gross 30 maneuver battalions (including three tank battalions), 12 field artillery battalions, 33 fixed wing (including 2 OV 10 squadrons) and 22 rotary wing squadrons, and two light antiaircraft missile (LAAM) battalions. These and other combat and combat support units can be combined in a variety of ways shown below in national organizations. A Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) is the type of force that has been afloat in the Mediterranean for almost thirty years. The Marine Corps Amphibious Brigade (MAB) is the basic unit with sustained fighting capability and is the type of unit that conducts periodic exercises on NATO's northern and southern flanks and elsewhere on the ocean littorals of the world. The MAB, or a variant of it, will be a primary unit in the Rapid Development Force. The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) is the largest task organization. There are three such forces on the active rolls and a division/wing team in reserve. I MAF operates from the West Coast of the continental US, II MAF from the East Coast and III MAF from Japan. These forces are

unquestionably powerful, but the air element, in particular, is becoming very expensive. The means to move these forces are both expensive and inadequate.

The public is not often aware of how active the Corps is on a day-to-day basis. Although worldwide attention last fall was directed to Guantanamo Bay, the scene of a Marine Corps reinforcing exercise in response to identification of a Soviet ground combat force in Cuba, we might note that, at the same time, Marines throughout the world were busy practicing their combat skills and showing the flag. To illustrate this extensive schedule, a three-month list is shown below which reflects the intensity of Marine Corps deployments and exercises overseas during the past nine months:

Tromso, Northern Norway - Two Infantry Companies

Mediterranean - Marine Amphibious Brigade

Shoalwater Bay, Queensland, Australia - Marine Amphibious Unit

Southern Spain & Western Mediterranean - Marine Amphibious Unit

Auckland, New Zealand - Infantry Company

Okinawa, Japan - Marine Amphibious Force

Vancouver Island, Canada - Marine Amphibious Unit

Tinian, Pacific Trust Territory - Infantry Company

Korea - Marine Amphibious Brigade

Iran - Marines in Hostage Rescue Attempt

II. Recent Analyses

There have been at least a half dozen extensive, serious papers on the Corps over the past five years.

The 1976 Brookings Study, Where Does the Marine Corps Go From Here?,² suggested that sufficient amphibious capability be retained to match the

Navy's amphibious shipping; that Marine tactical aviation be sharply reduced; and that most of the reserve Marine amphibious force be disbanded.

Brookings options include:

- o Reduction of the Corps to an amphibious assault force of one and one-third divisions and aircraft wings, eliminating the remaining one and two-thirds division-wing team (and the reserve MAF).
- o Replacement of the Army in Asia and the Pacific with the one and two-thirds Marine divisions not involved in the amphibious mission.
- o Assignment of the airborne mission to the Corps, replacing the Army airborne division with a Marine division, and cutting the Corps manpower by about 28%.
- o Assignment of an enlarged European role by moving one and two-thirds divisions from Okinawa and the West Coast to the East Coast and forming them into two Marine mechanized infantry divisions, with reliance on the Air Force for tactical support by fixed-wing aircraft.

The 1976 Culver Report³ also raised several Corps issues. The report pointed out that assault sealift problems are imposing, stating that it takes 48 amphibious warfare ships to embark one MAF. Navy holdings today total about 65, a portion of which are in shipyards at any given time, so that a 48-ship requirement constitutes some 80% of all available operational assets. The Culver Report concluded that limited shipping and its widespread deployment would impose a two-month lead time to assemble and launch a division-size amphibious operation.

The report goes on to question whether such operations could succeed

under high intensity battlefield conditions and leaves a series of questions for the reader to ponder: "Does a three-division Marine Corps contribute significantly to the U.S./Soviet military balance? Would US capabilities increase or decrease if the Army absorbed major Marine Corps functions? Are amphibious assault capabilities still essential US assets? What would we gain or lose by scaling back in this area? Do Marine aircraft wings contribute significantly to the U.S./Soviet military balance? Would US capabilities increase or decrease if the Air Force absorbed Marine air missions?"

Another commentary appears in the Taft White Paper.⁴ Former Senator Robert Taft, with the assistance of William Lind, made the case that the United States should adopt a seapower strategy and that land forces should receive major cuts. He suggested that the Army airborne division be eliminated and that all Army infantry divisions be converted to armour, or be mechanized. He recommended retention of the three Marine divisions but suggested that they be restructured as a mechanized force for high-intensity warfare. Senator Taft would have nine Army armored or mechanized divisions for what he calls the "prepositioned" mission with its mechanized divisions.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has published several issue papers which have discussed the role of the Corps. CBO posited that the likelihood of an amphibious landing in a NATO war is small, especially if the war is short and there is little or no warning of Warsaw Pact attack. One paper reflected CBO thinking at the time that Marine air could supplement Air Force elements supporting NATO land forces.⁵ Another excellent paper, by Dr. Zackheim, analyzed several sizing options for projection forces, including both Army and Marine units.⁶ The greatest of the force mix issues - aviation vs. ground - was, in part, the

topic of a Record-Lind analysis in the July 1978 Naval Institute Proceedings.⁷ The Senate Armed Services Committee has shown a heightened interest in the future of Marine forces, having asked for four analyses in that many years - manpower quality, mission and force structure, sealift, and airlift/air assault.

The most recent analysis, and a thorough one, is again from the pen of Dr. Zackheim of the Congressional Budget Office.

The Marine Corps is at a crossroads where far-reaching decisions can be made about its structure and missions, depending on whether rapid deployment to the desert or defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's northern flank is the paramount concern, according to Zackheim. The Congressional Budget Office notes that since 1970, Marine budgets have sustained a larger real decrease in purchasing power than military budgets as a whole. Within that pattern, almost two-thirds of procurement funding between 1970 and 1979 has gone to the air wings. In keeping those resources at an acceptable level, other areas have suffered.

Additionally, the only large Marine-related research and development program supported by the Carter Administration is for the aircushioned assault landing craft (LCAC). The AV-8B program has survived only because Congress continually overrides Defense Secretary Harold Brown's objections to it.

Observers have noted the ambiguities of the Marines' European role. Two of the three divisions and related air wings make up the strategic reserve force of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, the study said. The corps, which relies heavily on infantry, may not be effective in the armored environment of central Europe. Also, lack of specific training may inhibit operations in cold and mountainous northern Europe.

The CBO report added that the Marines' emphasis on airborne fire support over ground mobility and fire power may be a hindrance, once its units get past a beachhead and have to fight armored units in desert areas like the Middle East.

In the rapid deployment role, the report said, the Administration wants the CX transport as well as 12 new prepositioning ships, which would be dedicated to support three armor-heavy Marine brigades capable of operating for 30 days on long-distance deployment.

The prepositioning idea has spread to Norway and Denmark. Norway wants Marines to help in defense of its narrow northern and western corridors. Denmark hopes for Marine assistance in protecting against Soviet amphibious attacks on Jutland, Zealand and its smaller islands.

As spending plans stand now, \$207 million is in the Fiscal 1981 budget request for construction of the first of a new class of eight large maritime prepositioning ships, with the first of them to enter the fleet in Fiscal 1983. Four roll-on/roll-off ships, already built, will be purchased and converted for prepositioning. The report also noted plans to increase such capacity with other ships.

Added to that are other spending plans that, the report said, appear to be directed at facilities improvements for various ports and airfields in Somalia, Oman and Kenya, which could cost \$250 million.

Based on the corps' current mission, structure and equipment, and spending plans, as well as the response that would be needed for various contingencies, the Budget Office analyzed four approaches to the 1980s.

The first concerns the path now being followed by the Defense Department in which there are no significant changes in the current budget request for strategy, structure, acquisitions or systems development

beyond the effect of the rapid deployment force. In aviation, the programs calls for continued procurement of F/A-18s and Sikorsky CH-53E helicopters, but not the AV-8B.

The second option envisages reinforcement of Norway and Denmark in a crisis that might precede a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict. Such a significant shift away from the Marines' general purpose role would mean conversion of nearly two divisions and air wings into a force concentrated on land warfare in northern Europe. Equipment for one brigade, including cold-weather gear, would be prestocked in Norway, with the equipment for four others in Denmark.

With the accompanying deemphasis on amphibious lift, both the LSD-41 and LCAC programs could be discontinued and lift would be allowed to decline to the equivalent of the capacity for two brigades. This would also limit the corps' contribution to the rapid deployment force, thereby giving the Army the role of prestocking equipment on Diego Garcia.

The third alternative would make the Marine Corps the chief participant in the rapid deployment force for Third World missions. It differs from current Defense Department planning in that the Marines would be equipped solely for Middle Eastern combat. This option reflects the view that NATO allies should take up a greater share of defending their own territory. It also might bring on the dedication of some Army units to NATO's northern flank.

A requirement emerging from this approach would be more amphibious lift, generating constant deployment of a Marine Amphibious Brigade in the Indian Ocean and intermittent deployment in the Pacific, as well as the current presence in the Mediterranean. Coupled with Diego Garcia prepositioning, the increase in lift would permit nearly two Marine divisions to land anywhere on the Arabian Sea littoral within two weeks of

the order to deploy.

There would be a need for more light armored vehicles, as well as the LCAC, which could carry at least three of them for up to 200 miles at speeds over 40 kt. Acquisition of the AV8B also would be justified because of its performance from poor airfields or areas without airfields. CX procurement could be reduced by greater reliance on seaborne lift.

The final option concerns rapid response to a mix of crises demanding both land and amphibious capabilities. It would resemble the second and third approaches in dedicating much of the corps to specific missions while preserving one division for a wider variety of tasks.

Prestocked supplies for two brigades committed to northern Europe as a whole would be on ships homeported in the United Kingdom. British shipping and C-130 theater transport aircraft could support the deployment of Marines from the U.S. prepositioning in the Indian Ocean would go forward.

Current levels of Marine lift would be maintained while slightly fewer LSDs would be procured and additional LPH amphibious assault carriers acquired to complement AV-8Bs. At-sea air support would be enhanced for both air superiority and ground attack during landings. The option calls for development of the LCAC and light armored vehicles.

The first option, the Defense Department baseline as amended in March, calls for expenditures of \$8 billion for systems and programs related to the corps' operations for Fiscal 1981 and \$44.77 billion for Fiscal 1981-1985 in Fiscal 1981 dollars. The force distribution would be one dispersed-afloat brigade, three brigades for the rapid deployment force, five brigades for the Saceur reserve, and lift for more than one Marine Amphibious Force.

A similar breakdown for the other three options shows:

o No. 2, prestocking for a Europe-oriented corps - \$133 million under the Defense Department baseline for Fiscal 1981 and \$201 million over the five-year baseline. Force distribution would consist of 2/3 of a dispersed-afloat brigade; four brigades for Denmark; one brigade for Norway; 1/3 of a brigade for Iceland; one brigade for Asia and the Rapid Deployment Force; two brigades for the Saceur reserve; and lift for 2/3 of a Marine Amphibious Force.

o No. 3, a rapid deployment force for Third World missions- Exceeding Fiscal 1981 baseline by \$244 million and \$4.6 billion over the five-year baseline. There would be 1 2/3 dispersed-afloat brigades; three brigades for the Rapid Deployment Force; 4 1/3 brigades for general purposes, and lift for 1 2/3 Marine Amphibious Forces. The normal three air wings would be cut by three fighter/attack squadrons.

o No. 4, prestocking for a dual-mission corps -\$26 million less than the Fiscal 1981 baseline and \$4 billion more than the five-year baseline. The forces would be divided into one afloat brigade, as in option No. 1; three Rapid Deployment Force brigades; two brigades for northern Europe; three brigades for general purposes, and lift for more than one Marine Amphibious Force. Again, three fighter/attack squadrons would be cut.

Fundamental to these analyses is the question of amphibious assault, the prime role of the Marines in World War II and during the critical stages of the Korean War. Many observers ask whether, during active hostilities, the US can cross the seas in the face of Soviet sea control forces. Once across, can Marines get ashore against opposition? Is the amphibious operation, as we know it, technologically obsolete? The Marines think not,

provided adequate investment is made in mobility and firepower.

There is, among some critics, a predilection toward viewing the corps mainly in the NATO context. These observers suggest mechanizing the corps so that it can fight as part of a land army against Warsaw Pact forces. Others say that if combined air/ground marine forces cannot make it to the NATO front, Marine Aviation should be sent along to do battle in Europe. Moreover, there is substantial question in some quarters about the size of Marine air. Several authorities have stated that capital investment in the air arm is unbalancing the structure, to the detriment of the ground element. The additional point is occasionally made to the effect that Marine air draws quality manpower away from the combat divisions.

The Marine Corps stands at the crossroads of both technological and geopolitical change. The direction it takes - or is enabled to take by Congress and the Executive Branch - must be set now, for the security of the United States is in such a state of flux and uncertainty that it demands a force with the high state of readiness, combat quality and versatility of the Marines, a force capable of going places in a hurry and of staying to fight.

III. Functions of the Corps

Force mix, or structure, or organization, or whatever you wish to call it, is affected by an interrelated set of influences - geopolitics, national aims, military missions, technological capabilities, costs of weapons and manpower, to name a few. The missions, or functions, of the Corps are fundamental considerations. Given the interdependence of nations, the breadth of U.S. national interests, and the competitive drive of the Soviet Union, it is essential that the US be able to project

conventional forces across the seas of the world. This action may include amphibious assault by Marine units.

Some critics hold to the view, however, that such operations would be in the image of the Iwo Jima or Tarawa campaigns of World War II. They view the Marine Corps as thinking of itself almost solely in terms of the head-on, grinding amphibious assault. A recent Commandant put the Corps' role in perspective by referring to it as a highly mobile air/ ground force in readiness, possessing amphibious expertise. This is a good description and implies a broad range of functions. Among these functions, the amphibious role is important but not dominant to the degree it was in World War II.

In view of this and to provide a backdrop against which force options can be viewed, we have suggested that four major functions be recognized. These reflect the spectrum of possibilities in a world in which the United States and the Soviet Union are the most powerful antagonists; but also one in which there will be continuing diffusion of power among an ever growing number of small states. The Marines must be prepared for a role in a conflict typified by an attack from Warsaw Pact forces against those of NATO, and they must be just as prepared for a conflict in Africa, Latin American, the Far East, and the Middle East - with or without the presence of Soviet, or Chinese, or surrogate forces.

While a European conflict would be the most damaging to both the Eastern and Western alliances, it is the lowest on the scale of probabilities. The likelihood of Marine involvement is much greater, we believe, in the low- to mid-intensity range and outside of NATO. Soviet proxy forces are wandering about Africa; ferment continues in Southeast Asia; the Korean issue floats on, an unstable kite in a gusty breeze. The

Middle East is in a heightened state of turmoil, and its petroleum is coveted by all. US interests are, or will, inevitably be threatened in these areas. However, because of the rapid spread of sophisticated military hardware in the Third World, these kinds of conflicts will have a different quality from what we have experienced recently in Southeast Asia.⁸

In any event, we believe that the functions of the Corps⁹ through the remainder of this century need recasting into four broad, but not mutually exclusive, areas:

- o Force Projection - the extension of Marine forces into area threatened or controlled by unfriendly forces. This function covers a broad range of operational scenarios from the small force protecting US lives and property to a seaborne Marine Amphibious Force penetrating a defended coast. Landing by air, with or without sea support, would also lie in the spectrum covered by this function. Air movement is a highly important option, although seaborne mobility is essential for Marine staying power.
- o Geographic Control - the exercise of local or regional power to guarantee our use of land, sea, or air space, while conversely denying its use to another force. This is a function for example, applicable to the critical choke points on the sea lanes of the world. Hormuz would be good example.
- o Reinforcement - the function of providing complementary or supplementary forces to strengthen US or allied forces in a threatened area. This can be

illustrated by the introduction of Marine forces in a NATO or Korean crisis.

- o Presence - deployed force, either visible or just over the horizon, within short sailing distance of a crisis area. Even without crisis conditions, the presence of forces afloat in such areas as the Mediterranean, Caribbean, Western Pacific and Indian Ocean can provide immediate and continuing evidence of readiness to protect and support US interests.

IV. Problems in Mobility and Structure

Several problems, then, face the country in tending to its power projection capabilities. Although we sometimes think only of the Marine Corps when considering such capabilities, the Navy plays a role that is inseparable from that of the Marines. And, given the need for rapid response, military airlift is just as critical an element as sealift.

In geopolitical terms, the Persian Gulf and the Eastern Mediterranean have appeared repeatedly in the expressions of Secretaries of Defense as "half-war" contingencies. These areas could require highly responsive US forces. By the early to mid-80s, the Soviets will have enhanced projection capabilities, which, coupled with their interest in the Middle East, could involve both superpowers directly. Other regional powers that pose threats to US interests have large and, in some cases, sophisticated forces. The most demanding contingency could arise here, one that poses enormous demands on US capabilities. The only likely contingency outside of Europe requiring greater force would involve Korea.

Availability of airlift and sealift are critical to the speed with which the US could respond in the Persian Gulf; especially if we postulate a threat based on Soviet capabilities. Given present lift resources, the light elements of two Army divisions and about two-thirds of a Marine Amphibious Force could, by superhuman effort, be lifted by air and sea to the Gulf in about one month. It is probable that aerial refueling would be required for the airlift, which would already be strained by the need to withhold a part of the aerial tanker fleet to support the strategic mission. Further, shipping would probably be diverted to the European front in anticipation of a Soviet thrust in that direction.

Other contingencies on the world's littoral, with the Korean exception noted above and the exception of central Africa, are not as demanding as the Middle East. But no matter where the contingency may be airlift and sealift forces are not now adequate for such movement. For Marine and Marine-related Navy requirements, we can say that, funding in general at the enhanced level of defense budget program guidance would go far toward alleviating shortfalls that will hamper contingency responses and thus undercut the President's options in crisis.

Although it is a variation on an old theme, the evolving idea of rapidly deployable forces in brigade packages is a good one. If designed properly, the President will be provided an option for faster reaction in more appropriate strength and with greater staying power. The Marines are the perfect match for this mission. In the course of a press conference on 5 December 1979, Major General (as he then was) P.X. Kelley, USMC, outlined the Administration's thinking along these lines. According to General Kelley, under the maritime prepositioning concept, heavy equipment and 30 days of supplies for a Marine Amphibious Brigade would be preloaded aboard

multipurpose ships which would have organic capabilities to offload and deliver such equipment and supplies to a beach. These ships would be strategically deployed to friendly ports in, or close to potential crisis areas, or would steam with naval forces in the potential crisis area.

The Secretary of Defense has directed that maritime prepositioning for three Marine Amphibious Brigades be developed sequentially through the mid-'80s. Total cost is estimated at several billion dollars, and the first two ships designed for prepositioning are to cost \$220 million. General Kelley emphasized that adequate strategic airlift is also essential in order to make possible optimizing air and sealift by moving heavy equipment by aircraft, marrying the two at the destination.

Long range lift is the most fundamentally critical area to be addressed in power projection enhancement, followed closely by certain tactical mobility systems and weapons systems. For example, the ability to deploy the fighting elements of one to three Marine brigades to one of the most remote regions - the Persian Gulf - with advance elements in place in days, might deter direct Soviet involvement in the petroleum producing areas. Some key mobility and weapons improvement programs that must have continuing, or increased support as the case may be include

- o Enough flight crews for C-5A's and C-141's to permit high utilization rates.
- o Modification of civil aircraft to carry oversized military cargo; and development of a new large military transport craft.
- o Continued C-141 stretch modification.
- o Replacement of amphibious shipping to maintain a three to four brigade lift capability.

o Expansion of "prepositioning" shipping.

However, until such time as technology and costs are such that airlift and continued support of brigades with adequate firepower can be rapidly and economically accomplished, the long term staying power of Marines rests with the Navy and the Merchant Marine.

On the tactical level, there is a serious asymmetry in the current means of transporting troops and equipment from ship to shore. At one extreme is the transport helicopter, which provides an excellent rapid means of transport from ships which are over the horizon from the objective. At the other is the much slower amphibian tractor (LVT). In between are various types of landing craft which are not much faster than the craft of World War II. The LVT of today is an excellent vehicle; but it is slow and, in tandem with its sister landing craft, requires troop debarkation from ships within sight of the shore. To land forces from farther offshore via LVT and landing craft in any kind of sea state would reduce troop efficiency far below acceptable levels. By increasing the helicopter lift, greater standoff capability could be achieved but only in light troop units. Tanks, self-propelled artillery, engineer equipment, and other heavy items will still come by slower means, requiring much of the amphibious shipping to come fairly close ashore. Although the technology for much faster surface landing craft is at hand, the investment in research and development is such that these much needed additions to the general purpose forces could not be in operational service until about 1990.

Capabilities for the ship-to-ship movement and operations ashore for the next five or six years must be optimized by doing the best we can with

what we now have. By 1990 some fairly revolutionary changes can be made, if the country is willing to invest adequate money in research, development, and acquisition of amphibious equipment.

V. Structure

There are a number of issues of importance with respect to structures. Because the Corps, though small, is complex, only a few of those issues can be covered here.

Even though the law calls for three marine divisions and three aircraft wings, the Marines have taken a sensible approach to organization by having a light MAF in the Pacific and two heavier MAF's in the United States. To mechanize any MAF fully would severely curtail its sea mobility, although its utility on the ground in Europe would be increased. Small expeditionary forces can be deployed from these MAF's in key maritime areas. The light (or Pacific) MAF could ultimately consist of two brigades, with only helicopter transportable artillery, and with other light supporting units. This would be folly, however, if the second U.S. Army Division is withdrawn from Korea. Each of the two stronger MAF's can be so structured as to provide for the task organization of brigade-size forces with optimum mobility and shock power. Furthermore, these brigades would be ideal for use under the prepositioning concept in Third World situations where, as we have said, increasing amounts of sophisticated weaponry in unsophisticated hands appear to be the order of the day.

Much progress has been made in the past three years in developing mobility concepts. Several of the suggestions of the Marine Corps Structure Board of 1975-76 have been effected. The proposal for a mobile assault regiment (or, the assault brigade) is being developed in exercises at Twenty-Nine Palms and in training exercises elsewhere, including NATO's

northern flank. Brigaded task forces including one or two tank battalions, an LVT battalion (or armored carriers) for infantry mobility, a self-propelled artillery battalion, a forward antiaircraft defense platoon (Redeye or, later, Stinger), and an appropriate service group are being devised. The present LVT is not an armored personnel carrier, but it is all the Corps has and will simply be part of the make-do arrangement of the next several years. Despite the shortcomings of the LVT, this type of mobile force cannot only provide a unit that operates in an independent situation, but it would give the commander of a deployed MAF a strong counterattack force or a breakout force, depending on the requirements of the moment. More important, however, is the role the mobile assault brigade can play as a rapidly deployable independent force.

There is no reason to shy away from armor on wheels in developing structure for the 80's and 90's. Wheeled armor can be very effective and is generally less expensive, less noisy and, on suitable terrain, faster than tracks. Purchase of, and practice with, platoon-equivalents of several of the wheeled armor varieties available in Europe will be a useful exercise.

On the lower end of the organization scale, we would suggest a combat battalion of three infantry companies. The four company battalion may be suitable for low intensity guerilla war, but we believe it will be too large to handle efficiently on tomorrow's battlefield. The battalion, however, with its significant combat capability, will continue to be a basic maneuver element in mid to high intensity combat.

Efforts to enhance antiarmor capabilities are essential, increasing the density of direct fire weapons appropriate to various tactical levels. Ground reconnaissance missions require continuing attention as well. The

force reconnaissance company mission can be assumed by the division reconnaissance battalion, with the latter organized and equipped to provide a stronger capability to conduct reconnaissance-in-force, counterreconnaissance screening, and economy of force missions.

Technological developments in sea surface mobility and land warfare can be drawn upon for substantial improvements in the long run. The air cushion landing craft (LCAC), under development now, is essential for enhancing tactical mobility. While the Soviets have some 40 of these craft already, the U.S. has managed to produce but two prototypes. In the next five years at least a dozen of these craft should be started. This will add an incremental increase in the over-the-horizon capability and will enhance the options of the commander in maneuver and will enhance the value of the more powerful brigaded force.

Pursuit of the high speed LVA (landing Vehicle Assault)¹⁰ concept is also essential. Further LVA development was halted because the concept was perhaps more advanced than the technology. All deliberate speed should be maintained on present LVT improvement but an LVA-type should be developed in order to enable over-the-horizon launch of all amphibious assault elements.

The general fighting capability of the landing force will not only be increased by the greater flexibility and mobility provided by the LCAC and LVA, but the force can also be structured to provide greater surface mobility, firepower, and protection. Developments that are most promising in this regard are a lightweight armored fighting vehicle with a powerful automatic cannon, or high velocity rocket, a shoulder fired antiair/anti-armour weapon, and much improved conventional munitions. More accurate

artillery and naval guns and improved aviation ordinance will greatly increase the overall effectiveness of firepower. Introduction of a multiple launch rocket system under certain circumstances will enhance firepower, provided the system is kept light enough for helicopter transportability.

Weight is also highly important when thinking in terms of armored firepower. Some insist that the main battle tank and armored force doctrine and tactics will prevail through the end of this century. Others claim that the advent of precision guided weapons and scatterable mines heralds the end of the present concepts of armored warfare. It is possible to produce a relatively inexpensive, lightweight, low-profile, armored fighting vehicle with frontal protection against the best antiarmor rounds and with a rapid-fire cannon or missile that will kill or cripple armor out to appropriate ranges.

The lightweight vehicle unit referred to above could be organic to the division and consist of a battalion headquarters, an antitank company armed with TOW, and three or four light armor companies. The vehicle could be transportable by CH-53E helicopters, and it would have a hydraulic power boost system that would enable a fast start and rapid maneuver when needed. The beauty of this system would lie in its firepower, its inherent mobility, and its adaptability to movement by helicopter, fixed-wing transport aircraft, or by maritime prepositioning. A mix of tanks with a large number of the lighter armored vehicle would make for a formidable force.

We mentioned earlier that a serious question in structure concerns aviation. The Marine Corps has an inventory of aircraft that covers almost the full spectrum of air missions. Heavy transport and strategic are the only major air missions not covered. The essence of this issue is cost.

Fixed wing aviation absorbs an enormous share of the total aviation pie, with helicopters a small second. In terms of the Fleet Marine Forces, the ratio of dollars is about two to one on the side of aviation. Aircraft, their armament and their operators and maintainers are very expensive indeed, especially in the fixed wing category. At any rate, the options faced in this dilemma are:

- o To maintain the status quo. This will mean a continuing degradation of helicopter forces and ground forces;
- o To invest larger amounts of green and blue money in the total force, thus leaving fixed wing aviation structure pretty much the same, improving helicopter forces and broadly modernizing the ground forces; or
- o To reduce fixed wing aviation structure and to redirect resources into ground and helicopter force modernization.

It simply does not make good sense to take the first option. The second is the best option from the U.S. security angle, and the one we would strongly recommend; but, given the range of competing national priorities, it does not appear totally feasible. As unpleasant as it is to say so, the third option is the most likely candidate. If this is so, then fighter/attack squadrons must be taken from the structure.

A decision has already been taken to reduce the twelve fight/attack squadrons to nine. A phased further reduction to six squadrons could enable the redirection of resources.

Three points need emphasis

- o The missions presently assigned Marine Air are essential - especially for the force projection role in the Third World.

- o Of these, the lowest priority in terms of a full house of aircraft is the fighter/attack mission. This is so only because Navy (and Air Force) can perform in the air superiority role more efficiently than in any other of the Marine fixed wing roles.
- o No matter what the source - whether from within the Corps or without - any reallocation of resources must be to the upgrading of ground and helicopter forces, with emphasis on mobility and all-weather, accurate firepower.

Within the fixed wing community itself, a strong argument can be made for an all VSTOL light attack force of AV-8Bs. The medium all-weather attack force should also be retained, as well as the EW capability. The composite reconnaissance squadron is expensive and is a capability that can be, along with a part of the fighter capability, shifted to Navy Air, or in certain circumstances to the Air Force. If the recon squadron is retained, then it may be necessary to reduce the fighter/attack force by slightly more than a squadron's worth of aircraft in order to continue funding the recon squadron as an in-house support system.

Ground loiter, and the "ski jump" take-off capability of the AV-8B are among the advantages of a VSTOL force. Perhaps above all, the VSTOL (with the ski jump) makes possible the provision of excellent light attack support, in spite of the diminishing amphibious fleet and the concomitant reduction of the capability to haul an expeditionary airfield with leading Marine forces.

As for other fixed wing aircraft, there is continuing need for the OV-

10 utility squadrons and the C-130 refuelers.

The helicopter force is a major element of the structure that has received too little attention. The VTOL Aircraft is critical to the current concepts of amphibious warfare, as well as a wide variety of ground operations; yet the only real modernizing has occurred in the heavy helo squadrons. The capability to move the assault elements to two regiments 50 miles in 90 minutes is a sound concept, although a hundred miles would be a better distance. This capability is becoming more dicey. Survivability is the question. Increasing the survivability of the CH-46 (medium transport) requires the added weight of subsystems plus necessary added structural weight, the combination of which will reduce the troop capacity significantly.

A new medium VTOL craft is required. This could be done in ten years with enough effort. The craft should carry about 25 troops, have all-weather navigation capability, a variety of protective systems as well as FLIR and night vision. The UH-60 will be too small for the purpose. The VTOL modernization requirements again emphasize the need for reallocation of defense resources.

The CH-53E is an important addition to the heavy force. It would be desirable to increase the number of these aircraft beyond the planned three squadrons to a total of at least six, if for no other reason that this improves the capability to move light armored weapons systems of the sort described earlier. The lighter, utility and escort force can remain essentially the same as it is today.

VI. SUMMARY

The minimum active structure we should plan for the next fifteen years should include

- o Three not necessarily equally structured MAFs, with the capability to organize and support three rapidly deployable brigades, and two MAUs afloat, and of mounting out of one full-blown MAF on short notice.
- o Twenty-one to twenty-four infantry battalions, three medium tank battalions and three light armored units.
- o Seven squadrons of light attack aircraft (AV-8B); five squadrons of medium all-weather attack; one EW squadron; six squadrons of fighter attack aircraft; three utility squadrons; three refueling/transport squadrons.
- o Eight squadrons of medium helos (a new VTOL craft) six CH-53E squadrons; three utility squadrons; three escort squadrons.
- o Twelve field artillery battalions; two light antiaircraft missile battalions; two mobile rocket battalions.

National interest over the remainder of this century require a Marine Corps capable of rapidly deploying immediately effective, sustainable combat forces. An amphibious assault capability is essential but the broad worldwide mission requires, above all, the capability for rapid deployment of small but powerful forces. The Corps must maintain strategic mobility by striking a balance between light infantry and armor. It can continue to move in this direction by using weapons systems now at hand to task organize and experiment with mobile fighting units within the two larger MAFs. Reorientation of structure and a shift in allocation of resources devoted to aviation can be made, but the fighter/attack, medium all-weather attack, light attack, electronic warfare and helicopter/mobility

roles are all essential, and a capability to execute such missions must be maintained. Expanded and modernized sea and airlifts are essential for the effectiveness of whatever structure evolves.

Paramount in all of this is a thought Erwin Rommel expressed during his campaigning in Africa almost four decades ago. He said that prejudice against innovation is a typical characteristic of an officer Corps which has grown up in a well-tried and proven system. That advice is worth remembering by a Corps and a Congress who have grown up with a tried and proven system.

FOOTNOTES

1. HASC Report accompanying HR666 and S677, 30 June 1951. Italics are added to emphasize the reasoning behind the Marine Corps' present structure and missions.
2. By Jeffrey Record and Martin Binkin.
3. This was an extensive report on the U.S.-Soviet military balance prepared for Senator John C. Culver by the Congressional Research Service, dated 21 January 1976. The report was compiled by John M. Collins, with the assistance of John Chwat.
4. "A Modern Military Strategy for the United States", 1976, Senator Robert Taft, Jr., assisted by William S. Lind. An update of the paper, again with the assistance of Lind, was issued in 1978 by Senator Taft in cooperation with Senator Gary Hart.
5. "Planning U.S. General Purposes Forces: The Tactical Air Forces," Congressional Budget Office, 1977, by Nancy Bearg, under the supervision of John Kohler and James Blaker.
6. "U.S. Projection Forces: Requirements, Scenarios and Options", Congressional Budget Office, 1978, by Dov S. Zackheim under the supervision of John Kohler and James Blacker.
7. "Twilight for The Corps?", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, July 1978, by Dr. Jeffrey Record and William S. Lind.
8. Sizeable numbers of armored vehicles are scattered about the globe. For example: Algeria - 470, Egypt - 4,450, Iraq - 2,900, Lebanon - 300, Libya - 1,440, Morocco - 550, Peru - 420, Ethiopia - 650.
9. "The Marines Through 1999," Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1978, Major General Fred Haynes, USMC (Ret).
10. The LVA, as originally conceived was similar to the LVT but would provide high speed ship to shore movement with the capability to shift into a land mobility mode at the waterline. The developmental effort was halted largely because of the size of proposed vehicles, as well as expense.